mr. cortman. mr. pagan? >> thank you mr. chief justice, and may it please the court, we agree with petitioners that respondent's ordnance here is unconstitutional, but we think that the context-specific intermediate speech should apply in exceptions to a sign ordnance where those exceptions are based on the same longstanding traditional rationales that justify the sign ordnance as a whole. a wooden application of strict scrutiny in this context would suggest that it's presumptively unconstitutional, for example for a town to limit signs on public property but have an exception if you want to paint your street number on your curb. now, that doesn't make a great deal of practical sense and that's not an example i just made up. that's essentially the ordnance this court upheld albeit without addressing this particular issue in taxpayers for vin sent. on a three -- vincent. on a theoretical level, the normal reasons for deep judicial skepticism of exceptions to a regulation of speech don't apply in the context of that street add