mr. dimon. >> chairman angelides, vice chairman thomas -- >> if you touch the button on your mic and move the mic fairly close to you, because they're very distant sensitive. thank you. >> chairman angelides, vice chairman thomas and members of the commission, my name is jamie dimon, and i'm chairman and chief executive officer of jp morgan chase and company. i appreciate the invitation to aprevious before you today. if we are to learn from this crisis moving forward, we must be brutally honest about the causes and develop a realistic understanding of them that is not overly simplistic. the fcic's contribution to this debate is critical and i hope my participation will further the commission's goals. i would like to start by touching on some of the factors i believe led to the financial crisis. of course, much has been said and much more will be written on the topic, my comments are summary in nature. as we know all too well, new and poorly underwritten mortgage products, help deal housing pric

mr. dimon if you do business, you're going to make mistakes. hopefully they will be smaller and it will be pregnant your institution or anybody else. the process is very rigorous. you have a separate price group, and internal audit and an external audit, and reviewed by the fed, you can look at those things in day -- and you can be impressed by the diligence behind some of the process. we always did stress testing and you have to be prepared, but you should never be surprised. you don't know exactly what is going to go bad or what direction it will come from. when you look at a business -- we look at a whole balanced scorecard. if you're not financially successful, you failed. it is a sink one on of doing business sine -- it is sine qua non of doing business. it is never determined by one metric. in looking back, as a business you have to look at what you did right and what you did wrong. if you are not continually analyzing and improving it you will not do better. i've already mentioned the bi

mr. dimonully they will be smaller and it will be pregnant your institution or anybody else. the process is very rigorous. you have a separate price group, and internal audit and an external audit, and reviewed by the fed, you can look at those things in day -- and you can be impressed by the diligence behind some of the process. we always did stress testing and you have to be prepared, but you should never be surprised. you don't know exactly what is going to go bad or what direction it will come from. when you look at a business -- we look at a whole balanced scorecard. if you're not financially successful, you failed. it is a sink one on of doing business sine -- it is sine qua non of doing business. it is never determined by one metric. in looking back, as a business you have to look at what you did right and what you did wrong. if you are not continually analyzing and improving it you will not do better. i've already mentioned the biggest mistakes that we may. in mortgage underwriting, som

mr. dimonto make mistakes. hopefully they will be smaller and it will be pregnant your institution or anybody else. the process is very rigorous. you have a separate price group, and internal audit and an external audit, and reviewed by the fed, you can look at those things in day -- and you can be impressed by the diligence behind some of the process. we always did stress testing and you have to be prepared, but you should never be surprised. you don't know exactly what is going to go bad or what direction it will come from. when you look at a business -- we look at a whole balanced scorecard. if you're not financially successful, you failed. it is a sink one on of doing business sine -- it is sine qua non of doing business. it is never determined by one metric. in looking back, as a business you have to look at what you did right and what you did wrong. if you are not continually analyzing and improving it you will not do better. i've already mentioned the biggest mistakes that we may. in mor

but i disagree with mr. dimon. there is in no uncertain terms j.p. rgan is too big to fail. 2 trillion-dollar balance sheet, they are not think that i heard mr. blake lenk, i heard mr. dimon present order, and they say, and you ask the question, could you fail today? well, they said the system is a little too fragile right now. but once it is not fragile. to let me ask you, or if you want to ask them again, under what circumstances would j.p. morgan be a risk of failure when the system isn't fragile. it's not a close call in my world world, educable ever what else you talk to. maybe there are other people until. could j.p. morgan fill? >> the corner is this. when there is a government induced autolock lake, what is the government's role vis-À-vis the autolock lee and can you afford to have one member of that fail? so of course i agreed with mr. mayo. >> this discussion is going well. i will yield three, four minutes. utility which you need to i got flexibility this type of. >> that should be perfect. you mentioned that you disagreed with mr. dimon on

the only final question is to you, mr. dimon.the correct asymmetry -- i was in the private business, and if you lost, you lost. you bet big and you could also lose big. there is an asymmetry here where in the financial services industry, it seems that it's almost like you're at the blackjack table but you never get wiped out. the worst you can do is walk out with what you had. on the other hand, you can hit it big. it always tilts toward the biggest risk possible because there is no consequence for the biggest bets. >> there is a consequence. you can lose your job in your reputation. but you raise the issue -- you ashley risk adjusted. you make an evaluation to the employee to their right thing for the right thing -- for the right reason. you're always assessing. but it is one-sided that we. the more senior that people become, the more stock they own in the company -- so they are responsive to the well-being of the company. they will pay the price of the company pays the price. when the company goes belly up, people did pay a pri

the only final question is to you, mr. dimon. how the correct asymmetry -- i was in the private business, and if you lost, you lost. you bet big and you could also lose big. there is an asymmetry here where in the financial services industry, it seems that it's almost like you're at the blackjack table but you never get wiped out. the worst you can do is walk out with what you had. on the other hand, you can hit it big. it always tilts toward the biggest risk possible because there is no consequence for the biggest bets. >> there is a consequence. you can lose your job in your reputation. but you raise the issue -- you ashley risk adjusted. you make an evaluation to the employee to their right thing for the right thing -- for the right reason. you're always assessing. but it is one-sided that we. the more senior that people become, the more stock they own in the company -- so they are responsive to the well-being of the company. they will pay the price of the company pays the price. when the company goes belly up, people did pay