michelle is saying is that there was a cover up here and that is the thing that's going to sink mr. dimonho is a friend, a good guy, i have no vendetta. i don't know what it will do to the rest of the bank. but that's a big problem, is it not? >> larry, if there were a cover up of course that's a huge problem. i would say that it doesn't ring true to me. these banks -- i mean i've been in the banking world all my life and you can't cover things up with the regulators without a bad result in the end. and i believe that at the top of the house of chase, i don't know what maybe had gone on in the bowels of the organization. but they knew the way they can create a serious problem for themselves and their institution is not to be forth coming with regulators. it would be insane to do that. >> that's what's been reported. i'm going say in a long story by the bloomberg news service that's what was reported. josh is confirming that. michelle you're asking that question whether it happened or not. >> i guess i would ask mr. isaac, if all the facts have been laid out are true they stopped sending t

and jessica pressler, contributing editor at "new york" magazine, who has written extensively on mr. dimonm going to go to you, if i can, and start this out. how does this play out? jamie dimon, there's a little tarnish there, given the whale situation. but how much of this is going to stick to him? >> i think very little. i think we'll find that there is probably, or some misconduct by some lower level officials. there are an awful lot of people in this madoff situation that had information they should have acted on and allegations they should have had. we had whistle-blowers taking pretty important information to the s.e.c. we had commodities trading exchanges that were alleged to have trades take place and the trades never happened there. what was happening with those exchanges, what was happening with the s.e.c.? what was happening with, you know, prominent friends of ours. ken langone almost put a substantial amount of money in there. some very sophisticated people were hoodwinked. ken, it didn't seem right to him, so he didn't, but we could put a list of very prominent people with tr

during the same earnings call mr. dimon tried to downplay the significance of the losses by infamously characterizing them as a quote complete tempest in a teapot. the truth of the matter is the $6 billion, some of which is federally insured, is an inexcusable amount of money to be gambled away on risky bets. this investigation potentially revealed systemic problems in our nation's financial system. the size of the potential losses and the accompanying deception echoed a misguided and dishonest action that the banks took during the financial crisis four years ago. let me be clear, jpmorgan completely disregarded risk limits and stonewall federal regulators. it is unsettling that a group of traders made reckless decisions with federally insured money and all of this was done with the full awareness of top officials at jpmorgan. this bank appears to have entertained and indeed embraced the idea that was quote too big to fail. in fact with regard as to how the managed derivatives that are the subject of today's hearing it seem

i think those words keep coming back to haunt mr. dimoncase against the bank? >> well, i certainly would be investigating this quite thoroughly to make sure the disclosures that were made were appropriate. and the disclosure element of this is something that would trouble me. but until i knew what the actual facts were, i don't think we would be pursuing a case. >> harvey, brian sullivan here, do you believe the american public should think there is another whale sitting out there somewhere right now? some trader, somewhere sitting on a gigantic loss that nobody is aware of? >> i would like to tell you the answer to that is no. but i worry about this. and it's not just this particular matter but i think there are difficulties involved in adhering to the proper standards. that to me is what the real problem to this case is. >> there's been speculation that jamie dimon should testify. given the acquisitions if you were advising him, what would you tell him to do? >> the fact that he has already spoken, without question i would advise him to

on friday night may 11, 2012, i walked into the office of mr. dimonom i had a close and respectful relationship. i told him of my decision to resign from j.p. morgan. it was a devastating and very difficult decision for me. it marked the end of three decades of hard work at an institution i loved. we talked about the decision and how important i believed it was to let the company move forward with new leadership. i accepted responsibility for the events that happened on my watch in one of the portfolios in my division. my overwhelming sadness and concern was extended to the 400 people who worked for me, many for more than 20 years. it also went to my colleagues throughout the firm who are now leading the company going forward. there were many people from the front office risk, finance and quantitative research who worked on and analyzed the synthetic credit portfolio. in particular, i relied on the expert experts -- to vet and supervise trading in that book and elevate important concerns to me. ultimately, my oversight of the synthetic credit book was

night, may 11, two dozen top, i walked into the office of mr. dimon, whom i had a close relationship. i told him it was my decision to resign from jpmorgan. it was a devastating and very difficult decision for me. of three the end decades of hard work at an institution i loved. we talked about this decision at how important i believed it was to let the company move forward with new leadership. i accepted responsibility for the events that happened on my watch. my overwhelming sadness and concern was extended to the 400 people who worked for me. many for more than 20 years. it also went to my colleagues throughout the firm who are now leading the company going forward. there were many people from the front office, risk, finance, and quantitative research, who worked on and analyzed the synthetic credit portfolio. toelied on the experts supervise trading and elevate concerns to me. of theely, my oversight synthetic credit book was undermined. there were two critical fax that have come to mind recently. first among company's new var was flawed and unders

dimon was aware of the cio's investment activities. the record of your reaction is exhibit 71 and in 2012 e-mail, mr. scott waterhouse recounted the 2010 incident. the first paragraph this is what he wrote. we did and examination of the cio, have a follow-up plan, we had some concerns about overall governance and transparency in the activity. we received a lot of push back from the bank regarding our comments. she calls occ's examiner in london and sternly discuss the conclusion for 45 minutes and basically she said investment decisions are made with a full understanding of executive management including jamie dimon. she said everyone knows what is going on and there's little need for more limits, control reports. according to this e-mail you said cio's investment decisions were made with a full understanding of executive management. >> it is true. >> according to scott waterhouse, january or february of 2012, the bank stopped sending investment bank's daily profit and loss data to the occ, just stopped sending those documents, no notice, no information, no lost data for the investment bank, one of t