. >> mr. dix? >> good old u.s.-based innovation has delivered today, available in the market today, capability to lock, locate, and wipe those devices on demand. >> we're getting close to maybe having a solution to authentication. it's been the holy grail for about 20 years. just a quick story, help put this many perspective. there used to be one government-approved rye private company in north korea. you know what they made? they made mobile phone apps. i see a pattern. >> and just another general question for the panel. do you think the fcc has any role to increase mobile device security and what should that be? >> absolutely. in fact, you look at the fcc, the critical infrastructure is there. i spent ten years at at&t and another ten putting electronics and systems into those type companies. it starts with that. you can look at the mobile networks as either good or bad. it can stop the crime i talked about today, if used correctly with technology that cannot be broken today. so i think that if you think of one g

. >> mr. dix, the ranking member. >> can you bring us up to date on yucca mountain? >> as far as i know, what is happening is that this is before the courts, and we're awaiting the decision of the courts. >> we understand that if the courts rule, and there is still law of the land, you have to start forward. how much would you estimate it costs to get this project back on, moving forward with it? >> i would have to get back on dersths to proceed, we will proceed. >> we understand it's around 100 million to get started. now, tell us about your blue ribbon commission. what recommendations did they have on nuclear waste? >> well, what they recommended is first they, as we all do, acknowledged that we have to solve the problem. and it's very important that we do solve the problem. one of the very important things that they noted is that they spent about two years, many, many meetings, a very thorough job. i commend them for the excellent job, but one of the things they noted was that other countries have done it in a different way. notably sweden, they think also finland

. >> mr. dix, anybody else want to respond, pretty much? >> that's fine. i want to go to -- also deal with a democracy movement in the former captive nation. whatever you want to call them, who follow the cyber techs. use years ago, the meddling by china and russian, their neighbors. although the new technological agents are allowing the movement to get their word out and communicate and that keeps evolving, but you also see governments like governor belarus try to clamp down on that at which i've also been very concerned about. that's just a statement. it's just an evolving -- it's like a competitive market. when people want to get information but the bad guys want to get around and it moves too fast and we can really regulate. i've always said that about this subcommittee and the tech community. there's going to be a lot of self interests that gets you people to move before they get caught. let me talk -- segue real quickly. i serve on the energy committee and go to power plants all the time. big proponent of nuclear power. and mr. terry's opening statem

. >> mr. dix? >> yes, good old fashioned innovation delivered in the marnlt today with the ability to lock kate, lock, and wipe those apps on demand. >> there's close to a solution to authentication. a quick story. there used to be just one government approved private company this north korea. do you know what they made? they made mobile phone apps. [laughter] i see a pattern. >> just another general question for the panel, do you think the fcc has any role to increase mobile device security, and what should that be? mr. connor? >> absolutely. in fact, you look at the fcc, the infrastructure's there. i worked at at&t and put electronics and systems into the company. you can look at the mobile networks as either good or bad. it can stop the crime. i talked about it today, if used correctly with technology that cannot be broken today. i think that if you think of one governing body trying to own each of the pieces, it's folly. i think doe has to work the public-private partnership for its doe domain.

schneck and maybe mr. dix can talk about this. you talk about hardware and during our system that may be militias and difficult for us to understand -- maybe malicious and difficult how to dealus to understand with it. maybe you can tell us what we ily or whategulator we can do on the part of the government when those things leave this country for nation states. >> those are hard questions. they are great questions, but i'm glad phyllis got one of them. the neutral answer is to say, when you look at a new technology, it usually takes between 2050 years to figure out how to get it. -- between 20-50 years to figure out how to get it. look at airplanes, steamboats. we are at 18. not doing too badly, i guess. we have some old ideas. they have not gone away. it was in pdd 63, which was in the clinton administration, and it does not work, give it up. there are obstacles to try to fix this, but if it is the electronic communications protection act designed for diyala telephones, you have serious issues here. u.f. privacy issues. -- for d

mr. robert dix of the juniper networks. we are delighted to have you here. thank you for coming this distance to share your wisdom with us. please proceed. >> good morning. thank you very much for inviting me to testify about cyber security. juniper networks is a publicly held, a private corporation headquartered in california with offices and operations around the world. information technology and communications networks or embedded in all manner of the nation's infrastructure including power plants, water filtration systems, financial and transportation networks, just to name a few. while risk assessments are being conducted, it delegates that networks are resilience. it is important to acknowledge that the risk continues to grow and change our efforts must be sustained and agile. in recognition of this reality, the private sector is working every day to protect against cyber threats. let me share a few examples. in 2007, a group of private companies can together to address the issue of software assurance and improving the integrity of software and hardwar

schneck and maybe mr. dix can talk about this. you talk about hardware entering our system that may be malicious and difficult for us to understand how to deal with it. maybe you can tell us what we should do regulatorily or what we can do on the part of the government when those things leave this country for nation states. >> those are hard questions. they are great questions, but i'm glad phyllis got one of them. the neutral answer is to say, when you look at a new technology, it usually takes between 20-50 years to figure out how to get it. look at airplanes, steamboats. we are at 18. not doing too badly, i guess. we have some old ideas. they have not gone away. it was in pdd 63, which was in the clinton administration, and it does not work, give it up. there are obstacles to try to fix this, but if it is the electronic communications protection act designed for dial up telephones, you have serious issues here. you have privacy issues. we have issues that could slow us down and put us at risk. >> i would like the record to refl

relationship between the congress, administration and private industry on this important issue. >> mr. dixthank you very much for sharing those comments with us. we will now go to dr. james lewis, director and senior fellow technology and public policy program, center for strategic and international studies. dr. lewis, thank you for being with us. we look forward to your testimony as will. >> thank you, mr. chairman but i would like to thank the committee for this opportunity to testify. one thing that military and intelligence experts would agree on is that the cybersecurity prom is getting worse, not better. there is straightforward evidence what we're doing now isn't working. most of these experts also believe that we will not change our laws and policies until there is a crisis. i hope they are wrong. we all recognize that growing dependents of our economy on cyberspace and the risk of this creates director of national intelligence testified last week about how iran, which is eagerly developing cyber attack capabilities is losing its reluctance to attack the american homeland to get th