mr. gordon? >> chairman thibault, i'm in the happy situation to be able to agree even with what you couched as criticism or disagreement i agree with you. you can't even get started to begin on quality unless you have a report. if i could, could i -- could i step back and say a couple more words about this including the discussion -- >> i'm going to give you about 45 seconds to say a couple more words. >> i'll do my best. i do think that there's -- there were things said in the first panel discussion that were somewhat problematic assuming that these reports would solve all sorts of problems and in the of these reports we have nothing happening. both are problematic. the reports first of all wouldn't lead to suspension of debarrment. these are past performance issues. not things like for termination for default. and secondly, past performance assessments take place all the time. they're required -- we may not have the very good database we're trying to put together, but when i talk to people in t

mr. gordon. mr. ginman. >> chairman shays, chairman thibault, this thing which numbers of the commission, good morning. i served as the deputy director of defense there, and acquisition policy, one of my areas of responsibility is contingency contracting. i just like to take a minute and thank the commission for your support of our troops and all that you've done to help with the mission. and also to thank the men and women who serve this great nation, not only our military, but the civil servants, the coalition forces and industry partners as well. none of us could get the job done without all of us together. you asked me to discuss past performance and suspension and debarment today. i have prepared a statement, and rather than repeat or summarize it, i will send ask that it be included for the record, and i am ready to answer questions. >> thank you, sir. do i pronounce your name -- i got right. mr. rindner, thank you for being here. >> thank you. members of commission, i appreciate the opportunit

mr. blair, less so under gordon brown, was used more for briefing of cabinet colleagues and discussion of that kind rather than for acute decisions. i mean, it depended on the issue. >> i think we'll talk about some of those issues later on. up now also lord williams has been -- >> williams or wilson? >> williams. yes. they all become lords eventually. as the then dr. williams noted in his statement, there was -- for some reason you say he was a very assiduous -- the text hadn't been cleared with the proliferation office in the foreign office, it was quite an important discrepancy between the sort of standard intelligence line as it were and

mr. blair, less so under gordon brown, was used more for briefing of cabinet colleagues and discussion of that kind rather than for acute decisions. i mean, it depended on the issue. >> i think we'll talk about some of those issues later on. up now also lord williams has been -- >> williams or wilson? >> williams. yes. they all become lords eventually. as the then dr. williams noted in his statement, there was -- for some reason you say he was a very assiduous -- the text hadn't been cleared with the proliferation office in the foreign office, it was quite an important discrepancy between the sort of standard intelligence line as it were and the what was said. and it particularly revolves around the question of the five years in which iraq could get nuclear weapons in the parliamentary labor party statement it was stated that this had just happened. whereas rather critically in poll happen if sanctions had been lifted or ended. were you aware at the time of that discrepancy? >> i wasn't aware at all. >> there was also an article that you wrote for "the times" on the fifth of march, a coup

mr. blair, less under gordon brown was used more for a briefing of cabinet colleagues and discussion of thatkind, rather than for acute decisions. it mean it depended on the issue. >> we'll talk about some of those issues later on. also lord believed to have -- william wilson -- william's find, yes, this all become lord's eventually. as then dr. william noted in his statement, there was, for some reason, you say he was very residual, no reason to doubt that, though the text hadn't been prepared with the proliferation department in the foreign office. there was quite a discrepancy between the standard intelligence line as it were and the -- what was said. this particularly revolved around the question of the five years in which iraq could get nuclear weapons in the parliamentary level party statements paper it was stated that this could just happen whereas rather than critically, policy terms it could only happen in the assessment staff's view if sanctions had been listened or ended. were you aware at time of that discrepancy? >> no. i wasn't aware at all. >> now, there was also an article th