mr. hillman or dr. persons. is a united states government or our defense department, are we still purchasing, doing business with these people? >> the parts that we have been purchasing as part of this ongoing investigation are rare, hard to find and obsolete parts that are still being utilized in major weapons systems. the internet purchasing platforms demonstrate that contractors or subcontractors that are in need of these hard to find rare, obsolete parts have an outlet through these purchasing platforms to acquire these parts. a concern though is that the intent to deceive certainly exists. >> are we still purchasing? i just asked a very simple question. is the united states government still purchasing from these counterfeiters who are putting out inferior products?

mr. hillman? >> there are certainly, on the internet platforms we observed, there is a lack of testing for the parts being made available for sale. >> mr. sharpe, we have been told by many independent testing laboratories that more often than not, semiconductor companies refuse to assist them in determining an electronic parts. is that the case? >> we see it both ways. we generally tried to reach out to the component manufacturers to get information, die markings, things on absolute cards. >> sometimes you do not get the cooperation of the manufacturer. >> sometimes we do not. >> mr. toohey, you do not agree with mr. sharpe's assessment? do you agree or disagree with his assessment? >> senator, i think our industry has a standing record of working cooperatively with both private- sector and government officials to authenticate chips. as a matter of fact, one of the steps i indicated was changing to allow us to cooperate, because in many cases at the border, only the manufacturer can authenticate th

mr. hillman -- just stated by mr. hillman, you said i believe 40% i believe of the part you saw in the marketplace our estimate to be counterfeit or. we've notified the chinese basically of a. they have done nothing. is that your indication that the chinese government is complicit in this? >> i would have to say that the local businessmen who accompanied me, i am working off of what he said as far as the percentages go. i've heard also disinformation flowed around from other folks as well, that is as good as my information gets with regard to that, as far as just with a accurate percentage number is. regarding the chinese government knowing about this, it would be basically impossible for them not to know what is taking place in this marketplace, and also in the nearby area. it cannot be missed. >> mr. hillman, your report was focused on the defense industry, and all of you have spoken with reference to the. i assume this is prevalent every other agency in the federal, just as well? >> yes. counterfeit parts and other

mr. richard hillman works at the u.s. government accountability of this. he is accompanied by the chief scientist for the gao. the witness on our second panel is lieutenant general patrick o'reilly. general riley is the director of the missile defense agency. our final panel is three witnesses. the vice president for supply chain operation at raytheon. the vice-president of corporate procurement at l3. and the vice president and the sudden program manager for boeing defense -- and the poseidon program manager for boeing defence. we appreciate our witnesses. this is an important part. all of the companies and agencies represented have cooperated with the committee's investigation. the companies and the industry here and our troops and their families, we are on the same side. the only people who benefit from cut it -- from counterfeits are people making money off of those. we have to end that you we have to end the attitude of the chinese who will not cooperate with the -- this investigation. we wrote the chinese ambassador last week and invited him to send