mr. kaufman of colorado. 64 mr. sherman. and thank you for your -- all of you for your testimony in service to the country. my concern as a marine corps veteran and is specific to the remains of those who've been lost particularly in afghanistan and iraq and certainly anyone lost in combat, and i can remember being in iraq there was extraordinary care and respect paid to those that fell on the battlefield. where i see the breakdown whether it's with the air force at dover would be army at arlington is the fact that you have civilian personnel whether by the army or by the air force that number one come from a different culture where the trees that may or may not be there but it's not necessarily shared. but more importantly, not subject to the uniform code of justice. when there is a violation of a regulation in the uniformed military personnel can be prosecuted under the uniform code of military justice where civilian personnel are not accountable to the code of military justice, said the violation of the same regulation an

mr. kaufman, a lot of his remarks with regard to positioning of our forces. what i would like to explore here in the next few minutes is the nesting of operational concepts, interested to know to what degree we use modeling and simulation as we went through the strategic review and particularly here at the joint operational concept that drives the army operational concept, because so much of this leads to requirements. last time the army operational concept was published in 2009, very aware of how all the ins and outs to make that happen and certainly have no expectation there's a new document on the street. but as you went through the process of the strategic review, if you could share with me the notable points with regard to the 2009 document that you think may need to be readdressed in the current process of operational concept. and then other deductions and risks that you see in the force in relation to what we think we're going to need. >> as we looked at the last ten years, under the operational concept document, one of the key things is what with see

mr. kaufman for bringing that up. to this chemical we shall be adjourned. thank you everyone for being here today. .. >> okay, ladies and gentlemen, can you not coming. my name is john hamre, president at csis. i said to the foreign minister of the last we had a crowd like this was when bill gates was here before he gave his money away. it was quite a crowd and of course this is probably the most important -- certainly the most important thing i am going to do this week in an exceptionally grateful that the foreign minister has come to csis and made his part of his visit to washington. we've had a chance to visit to find working the ship with the foreign minister when i first met him back in 2008. and at the time, felt this was an exceptional intellect in a very remarkable position. but most impressed me was something that sounds so some of when he started talking about the zero problems with neighbors. you know, it's not a nice idea. it would not be good if every country thought about that is their strategy. unfortunately, not all of his neighbors had zero

mr. kaufman and is a march with regard to positioning of our forces.ould like to explore the nesting of operational concepts. to what degree do we use modeling and simulation as we went through the strategic review? so much of this leads to requirements and the need for structure and procurement and later development. last time the army operational concept was published in 2009, i was aware of how bold it was. in your notes that you took as you went through the process of the strategic review, if you could share with me the notable points with regard to the 2009 document that may need to be re-address to in the current process and then other deductions in risk that you see in the force in relation to what we think we will need? >> it is about looking at the last seven years over all and we are trying to crack -- project what we see in the future. under the original document, what we see is what the threat will be and how we respond. it is a concept of a hybrid threat and the fact that we will face an adversary that as a combination of conventional and