mr. litt, in your written testimony you expressed support for the majority of the disclosure requirements in this bi bill. i was wondering, is your support a direct result of formerly covert collection programs having become public or do you think that nationwide aggregate disclosures are inherently beneficial and should be sought out? >> i think the answer to that is that aggregate disclosures are a good thing provided they don't compromise our ability to collect important information. i think in the situation where we're in right now, whatever the appropriate result might have been six months ago, in the situation we're in right now where the director of national intelligence has already declassified the fact of certain programs and how they operate, that it's entirely appropriate to have aggregate disclosures of these activities going forward. for other important activity -- intelligence activities i'm not sure that we've reached the same balance. but to the extent that we're talking about

mr. litt's view that it's unlikely this would result in any more disclosures by companies to be able to make this the evaluation that would be required of the -- >> so they have the data? they could simply drill down on their own data without asking you for additional information? >> that's what i would anticipate. >> and revealing more information about drilling down on u.s. persons doesn't concern you as a company to have that additional information out there as required in this legislation. >> i think that as we look at the methods by which the intelligence community may address the u.s. persons' estimation, it makes sense other to look at that. how do you minimize those additional steps and do they in fact require intrusions where there weren't any before absent that obligation. >> mr. bankston, do you have any thoughts on that? >> the general privacy concerns they raise but there are additional concerns about privacy that would be raised by drilling down on this information. >> i think it's important to note that to some extent privacy is invaded and was invaded when the government coll

mr. litt's view that it is unlikely that this would result in any more disclosures by companies to be evaluatione this that would be required -- >> so they have the data. they can simply throw down on their own data without asking you for additional -- >> that is what i would anticipate, sir. >> and revealing more drilling downout on u.s. persons doesn't concern you as a company, to have that additional information out there that is required in this legislation? >> i think that as we look at the methods by which the intelligence community may address the u.s. persons makes sense to look at that. how do you minimize those additional steps, and do they in fact require intrusions where there were not any before, absent that obligation. banks, did you have any thoughts on that? for all of the general privacy concerns that they raised, there are additional concerns about privacy that would be raised by drilling down on this information. >> i think it is important to note that to some extent privacy is invaded and has been invaded when the government collects the data itself. to say that we cannot make

. >> and a final question is, i want to follow up on an answer i think mr. litt gave earlier in response to mr. dempsey's question about the corporate store, information collected as a result of corporate what are the standards when the collected data can be queried? is there a determination? is there a 12333 criteria? what restricts access to the data? is there an audit trail for a request come in greece into that database? >> actually i don't think i give any such answer so i will give this to raj. >> data will be subject to a background procedures that are there, something called -- a department of defense attorney general approved set of guidelines. but to your auditing question, everything that nsa does in terms of queries of internal data is auditable. and so we think that's an important projection that we have in place and applies here as well. >> thank you. >> concern was recently raised to me about the absence -- [inaudible] could you tell me two things. first of all, housing to think you will have one? what is your process for appointing one? and what w

my remarks today are based by mr. litt on our july 2012 report on defining policy and guidance for national security positions. mining message today is that actions are still needed to help ensure that a sound requirement processes in place to determine whether a position pars a security clearance for access to classified information. my written statement is divided into parts. the first addres addresses guido determine if a sibling position requires a security clinched. in july 2012 we reported that the deny as security executive agent had not provided agencies could find policies and procedures to consistently determine if a position requires a college. absent such guidance agencies are using an opm go to determine the sensitivity and risk levels of positions which in turn inform the type of investigation needed. the sensitivity level is based on the potential of an occupant of a position to bring about a material adverse effect on national security. opm audits, however, that inconsistencies among agencies using this too