mr. o'hanlon. this committee has been handed the baton on one of the last legs of the race on the f-35, and the question, obviously, looking back at the earlier stages of the race, how could we have done this better? been further ahead? less cost? going back to the beginning, mr. sullivan, looking at what we were trying to achieve 12 years ago, anticipating a threat, anticipating technology changes, how did we miss it by so much where the unit cost of the airplane is almost double what we thought it would be, and what could we have done differently to be in a better place today? >> first of all, i would say that this program is not unique in many ways. a lot of the major acquisitions go down this exact same road. and i think it's very complex why programs get off to this kind of start. but if you look at the mechanics of a program, just the best way to set a business case, i think where this program went wrong is when it set requirements, and it didn't do enough due diligence up front before it had