mr. quigley. >> tha you, mr. chairman. it is not that i disagree with you on the point.ut i want to understand better. you advocating your testimony toda and in your editorial, discussing the recommendation to supply our strength, -- to simplify or make smaller. the risk-taking will shift elsewhere in the system were is harder to regulate. think hedge funds. what is your response to that? >> that sounds like an embracing a too-big-to-fail. >> i do not think he is correct. >> this is similar to a different argument. our largest banks are not of the size and scope that they are. they will not able to compete with larger european banks. if we break that down, what it really means is that, ok, so other countries guarantee their banks and those banks hen't advantage. unless we guarantee our banks, our banks will not able to compete with those other banks. that is essentially what it comes down to. so the question becomes are you willing to believe that the government should subsidize and guarantee financial institutions or do you believe that we should be true to our capitals

mr. quigley. >> thank you, mr. chairman. it is not that i disagree with you on the point. but i want to understand better. you advocating your testimony today and in your editorial, discussing the recommendation to supply our strength, -- to simplify or make smaller. the risk-taking will shift elsewhere in the system were is harder to regulate. think hedge funds. what is your response to that? >> that sounds like an embracing a too-big-to-fail. >> i do not think he is correct. >> this is similar to a different argument. our largest banks are not of the size and scope that they are. they will not able to compete with larger european banks. if we break that down, what it really means is that, ok, so other countries guarantee their banks and those banks haven't advantage. unless we guarantee our banks, our banks will not able to compete with those other banks. that is essentially what it comes down to. so the question becomes are you willing to believe that the government should subsidize and guarantee financial institutions or do you believe that we should be true to our cap

mr. quigley, for five minutes. mr. quigley: thank you, mr. speaker. mr. speaker, montana is the home to the second largest coal plant west of the mississippi. one box car full of coal is burned every five minutes. the burning coal creates mercury, aluminum and ars nick which is pumped out of the factory and into the air. the chemicals caught in the air are caught in the scrubbers and dumped with coal ash into settling ponds. these are shallow artificial lakes of concentrated toxicity which leech these poison into ack with you phiers. the sludge flows from the surrounding towns and countryside bubbling up, cracking the floor of a local grocery store. ranchers in eastern montana are suing the plant for damages. noxious water is the only liquid that fills their wells and stock ponds. james, a renowned climate scientist it will cause the extension of 400 species. but coal strip burns on. why? because we have no national energy plan. and because there are currently low federal enforceable regulations specific to coal ash. this lack of federally enforceable saf

mr. quigley, for five minutes. sorry. i just promoted you to chairman. i'm sorry, ranking member, mr. quigley. >> soon to be chairman. [laughter] >> if you want to scoot over, i'm all good with that. >> thank you so much, mr. chairman, and i soon will be joined by chairman platts as well. i'd like to thank our witnesses for their time today and their contributions. as we all know, in december of 2008 bernard madoff was arrested for running the largest ponzi scheme in american history. losses from madoff's fraud have been estimated at $18 billion, devastating the savings of many americans. we all know the sec missed madoff despite being tipped off on several occasions. although no regulatory agency should be expected to be perfect, a failure of this magnitude is, clearly, unacceptable. how did this happen? be many have blamed the sec's outdated technology which is woefully behind what the fan firms are using, the silo problem which prevents coordination among the sec's many offices. another culprit that has been cited is the sec's work force which some argue includes too many lawyers an

mr. quigley is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you mr. chairman. madam chairwoman "the new york times" shirt for good on march 5 this year that the sec declined to enforce the requirement from dodd-frank. that would make rating agencies subject to expert liability and the securities law. this would make rating agencies liable for false ratings. could you comment on the timeline for implementing this measure? >> yes, i would be happy to. the way the rule works world works is if the rating is included in a registration statement for security than the rating agency must consent having liability. that is the dodd-frank requirement. we had existing sec rules that required for asset backed securities registration statements that of the rating was used to sell the securities the rating needed to be included in in the registration statement. rating agencies have absolutely unequivocally at least the ones that are in existence now, refused to consent so that made public offerings up asset-backed securities impossible because they couldn't get the consent of

mr. quigley, is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. madam chairman, "the new york times" reported on march 5th of this year that the sec has declined to enforce the requirement from dodd-frank that would make rating agencies subject to expert liability under the securities law. this would make rating agencies liable for faulty ratings. could you >> all public offerings of asset-backed securities and pushing them into the private markets which we felt were not as good for investors. we are right now our staff is working through reconsideration of our disclosure requirements, and i believe that they will recommend that we eliminate our pre-existing requirement for including the ratings and, therefore, the liability provisions can go forward. we're also hopeful that some of the newer rating agencies that have indicated an interest in becoming registered with us will actually be willing to consent which is, i think, how congress hoped the law would work. >> could you guess on the time frame for that? >> i can't, but i'd be more than happy

mr. quig low's amendment for each modification. -- quigley's amendment for each modification. the chair: the gentleman reserves. the gentleman from north carolina is recognized. mr. mchenry: i'd say that his views is from the ranking member of the financial services committee, mr. frank and his staff. $7,500 he claims. the treasury department claims $20,000. my colleagues also said this is a little program. that's absolutely absurd, mr. chairman. that's absurd. it's a $29.5 billion program of our taxpayer dollars. but, you know, i think he needs to understand something -- my colleague needs to understand what this program is actually doing to people. you ask my colleague from hickory who is in a hamp program. we have been in a hamp program since february of 2010 and still have no answer. we're being charged late fees and we've been reported to the credit bureau. we've been in underwater since april and on trial payments for six months which is only supposed to have been three months. we've not received an answer. another constituent from stanley said, we've paid payments every

mr. quigley. >> thank you, mr. chairman. not that they disagree, i want to understand it better. as you advocate in your testimony today and editorial comment certainly ms. bair implementation to react to the response to that about today to fail and if i could quote, there is no reasonable way of sufficiently reducing their size and complexity without jeopardizing their independent. large european and asian banks will gobble them up, pushing the too big to fail risk overseas and outside our control, putting banks than its eyes hoping they will be any less risk-taking in the financial system. it will mean the risk-taking will go elsewhere in the financial system, where it is harder to monitor and regulate. think hedge funds, and quote. what would your response to that beat? >> that seems almost be like in embracing a too big to fail. >> is the correct? >> i don't think is correct. this is very similar to a different argument that's been advanced. our largest things that they're not at the size and scope that they are, they're not going to be able to compete their larger european b