mr. rapuano. >> mr. chairman, i would say just on the issue of the election process the department is clearly there to support the response or the mitigation of potential threats to electoral process but it is something that when you look at the separation of authority between state and local governments, the lead for the coordination and support in our current system is dhs here can we provide defense of authorities as requested support those needs and requirements. >> that obviously assumes that the department of homeland security has the capabilities and the authority in order to carry out that requirement. whereas this cyber is warfare. cyber is warfare. cyber is an attempt to destroy a democracy. that's what mr. putin is all about. so to somehow shuffled off on to the department of homeland security of course this goes back to this problem with this organizational chart. so i steadfastly reject your shuffling off the responsibilities of cyber over to the department of homeland security, and we have

mr. rapuano. >> mr. chairman, i would say just on the issue of the election process the department is clearly there to support the response or the mitigation of potential threats to electoral process but it is something that when you look at the separation of authority between state and local governments, the lead for the coordination and support in our current system is dhs here can we provide defense of authorities as requested support those needs and requirements. >> that obviously assumes that the department of homeland security has the capabilities and the authority in order to carry out that requirement. whereas this cyber is warfare. cyber is warfare. cyber is an attempt to destroy a democracy. that's what mr. putin is all about. so to somehow shuffled off on to the department of homeland security of course this goes back to this problem with this organizational chart. so i steadfastly reject your shuffling off the responsibilities of cyber over to the department of homeland security, and we have

mr. rapuano. >> mr. chairman, i would say just on the issue of the election process the department is clearly there to support the response or the mitigation of potential threats to electoral process but it is something that when you look at the separation of authority between state and local governments, the lead for the coordination and support in our current system is dhs here can we provide defense of authorities as requested support those needs and requirements. >> that obviously assumes that the department of homeland security has the capabilities and the authority in order to carry out that requirement. whereas this cyber is warfare. cyber is warfare. cyber is an attempt to destroy a democracy. that's what mr. putin is all about. so to somehow shuffled off on to the department of homeland security of course this goes back to this problem with this organizational chart. so i steadfastly reject your shuffling off the responsibilities of cyber over to the department of homeland security, and we have

mr. rapuano? >> senator, i would just note, when you look at the national response framework that we used for noncyber but kinetic in the range of state actor or natural events, what you have seen, and particularly since katrina, is a maturation of a very similar process, many disparate roles, responsibilities and authorities and many different target stakeholders who may require assistance from local, state, all the way up. this system, the national cyber response framework, is based close closely on the national response framework. we are in a more nascent stage when it comes to cyber in all aspects. i would say, if you look at the last several months in terms of very significant multiple hurricanes and what i think overall, in light of the consequences, was a very effective federal response, there has been a dramatic evolution in our ability to work as a whole of government team when it comes to complex problems with colliding authorities. >> i do have one more question. i get the gist of what

mr. rapuano? >> senator, i would just note when you look at the national response framework we use for non-cyber and kinetic and events, what you've seen since katrina is a maturation of the process and many different target stakeholders who may require assistance from local, state, automatll the way up. this is based very closely on the national framework. we're in a different stage when it comes to cyber? when you look at the last several months of very significant multiple hurricanes and overall a very effective federal response, we have been able to work as a team when it comes to complex problems by colliding authorities. >> i get the gist of what you're suggesting. let me ask this in terms of the overall picture. we can either have defense within our country or defense to try to stop something in terms of a cyber attack before it gets here. that involves not only a cyber system universal, system sometimes in our all lies' country and areas actually the bad guys located creating the attacks t

mr. rapuano, please proceed. >> thank you, chairman mccain, ranking member reed and members of the committee. it is an honor to appear before you to discuss the roles and responsibilities the department of defense and its interagency partners in defending the nation from cyber attacks of the significant consequence. i hear today in my role as the assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and global security as well as the principal cyber advisor to the secretary of defense, in which i oversee cyber policy in the department, lead the coordination of cyber efforts across the department and whether interagency partners, and integrate the departments cyber capabilities with its mission assurance and defense support to civil authorities activities. i appreciate the opportunity to testify alongside my interagency colleagues because these challenges to require a whole of government approach. dod is developing cyber forces and capabilities to accomplish several missions in cyberspace. today i will focus on our mission to defend the united states and its interests against high consequence c