mr. roseman had questions about risk appetite. he also had questions about liquidity, whether there was money to pay a margin call, to cover a margin call if you got one. mr. stockman, you talked about the limited conversation that you had with mr. roseman and about the interviews that you had and discussion of risk appetite in those interviews. how about liquidity? whoever was interviewing you, did you talk about liquidity concerns, whether you had the money or liquid assets to meet a margin call if you got one? >> sir, as i pointed out, we analyzed the risks in -- >> you start with a yes or no? >> i'm sorry. can you repeat the conversation? >> did have you a conversation with mr. roseman about liquidity concerns? >> we did not. >> did you have a conversation in your interviews for the position about liquidity concerns? >> during that period of time, liquidity was fully available and there was -- >> that's no. okay. so at what point did you ever raise the liquidity concern in the 11 months, 10 months, however long you were there w

mr. roseman -- i'm story, mr. stockmore. when you took office in january 2011, were you aware of your predecessors concerns of the $2 billion limit? >> mr. roseman and i did not spend a lot of time together in the overlap. and as a general mter, these were large position but i was not specifically aware of concerns at that point upon joining. >> so as he was leaving, he didn't tell you nor there was any documentation that you came upon that he said gee once they hit $2 billion my predecessor got nervous, maybe i should think about this? >> i explored upon arrival a couple of board meeting minutes that covered that period from, the best of my recollection, november and december before i -- before i joined. and to try and find explore a little bit what my -- what had been undertaken just before i joined. and in those minutes was no specific indication of concern. but it certainly did highlight -- >> so you didn't find anything that basically said that a bell went off and when you came in there were $4.5 billion and that didn't

mr. roseman. i am sorry. mr. stockman. when you took office in january of 2011 were you aware of the concerns of the $2 billion limit? >> mr. roseman and i did not spend a lot of time together in overlap. as a general matter we were in large positions but i was not specifically aware of concerns at that point on joining. >> as he was leaving did he tell you there was any documentation you came across in that period of time that indicated my predecessor got nervous and i should think about this? >> high explore upon arrival lake couple of board meeting minutes that covered that period to the best of my recollection november and december before i joined to try and find -- explore a little bit what had been undertaken just before i joined. in those minutes was no specific indication of concern but highlighted -- >> you didn't find anything that said a bell went off -- you thought that was acceptable? >> it was a little different. in the board memo minutes there was an indication that the risks were d

mr. roseman's background was about and people worked with each other. so, mr. roseman, you have a very impressive resume and a wide variety of experience in the financial industry. do you believe that your background was not fully attuned to the broker dealer side of mf global's side of business? >> i would fully disagree with that statement. i had experience in investment banking prior to mf global. >> so it is true that you have a very strong financial background and experience and a good, strong resume? you would agree with me there, right? >> i appreciate you saying it that way but i would say i had a strong background. >> so mr. stockman , in a lette to a subcommittee, moody's indicated that they did not understand until august 2011 that was part of the mf global trading book? did that surprise you since mf global had exposed this several months before? >> yes, i was not fully attuned to exactly the dialogue but, yes, i would find that surprising. >> you found it surprising? even though mf global had exposed the exposure several months before? so it should

mr. roseman. there's been substantial discussion about mulch f global's participation in reaction of sovereign debt known as repo to maturities. the company's european somp debt trading strategy was firmly in place when i joined the company in late january 2011, as maengsed by mr. roseman at that time the board approved a sovereign limit of $4.75 billion. after i joined mf global the risk department regularly analyzed the company's sovereign positions. the first several months of my tenure based on analysis performed by the can see department, i believe the risk profile was acceptable in light of the then prevailing market conditions. among the many metrics supporting this assessment were credit ratings, kraed spreads, probabilities of default among other things. in addition the risk department under my direction analyzed potential liquidity needs associated with these trades under stressed market conditions and had received information from other departments that the company possessed adequate li

mr. roseman. did you spend any time as he passed on the obligations of the chief chris officer? how much time did you spend? >> michael and i spent an hour together, too, three, four weeks into my initial when i first arrived and michael was helpful in the transition as well with the series of including the the e-mails that i remember receiving but i couldn't speak to exactly -- >> did he indicate his concern about the rest in excess of $2 billion of sovereign debt? >> as a general matter during that brief discussion that we have for an hour to the best of my recollection, it was certainly an indicator as an item of the interests as it relates to the company. but i don't recall any specific discussions. >> i want to go back to the october 13th break the glass scenario that you indicated in response to the german's question that you were not directly involved in this plan. is that correct? >> correct. you are the chief risk officer responsible for how many employees in the organization? >> in my tea

mr. roseman, you have a very impressive resume. and a wide variety of experiences in the financial industry. do you believe that your background was not fully at tuned to the broker dealer side of mf global's business in. >> i would fully disagree with that statement. i certainly had the experience in investment banking prior to mf global. >> okay. so it is true that you have a very strong financial background and experience and a good strong resume? you would agree with me there, right? >> yeah, i appreciate you saying it that way but i would say i certainly had a strong background. >> thank you. >> with more on today's hearing we're joined by correspondent sarah lynch from reuters and in the rayburn house office building. thanks for being with us. >> no problem. >> what did you learn today about mf global and what came out of today's session? >> today's hearing was really an opportunity for lawmakers to expand beyond what the focus has been up till now. they've mostly been holding hearings trying to determine what has happened to

mr. roseman out and replaced mr. roseman with the yes-man. does it look that way to you guys? mr. roseman, would you comment at all you gave them information they didn't like and replaced you and put someone in that gave them information that they liked? >> i would say some of my views would have played a part, i believe. >> stockman disputed being a yes-man but then faced the question of whether once those trades were made keeping the risk off the balance sheet was actually ethical. >> as it relates to accounting and accounting treatment and how the -- >> you don't have to keep going. i get the drift. $1.2 billion worth of people got the drift. we're hiding around the corners. we're doing stuff that we don't know is legal. we certainly will not say it's ethical or unethical. and we're deeply sorry. >> one thing they both agreed on is that they warned the board and ceo jon corzine. >> oh, really? >> at different times, the former risk chief said he warned him at the end of 2010 before he was replaced. and the newer risk chief, michael stockman, said he warned him in july of 2011. b

mr. roseman, do you think that it could jeopardize the integrity of the markets? people could lose faith in our system? >> i would hope not. i mean, hopefully this will get reconciled and they don't lose faith. >> even if they get reconciled, the point is, people were in segregated accounts, they were told that it was safe and the money is missing. even if it gets returned later, i think it's safe to say that people lose faith. thank you very much. >> thank you, gentlemen. i thank our witnesses for your time. and with that, this panel is excused and we will call up panel number two. >>> and we are waiting to take you live to las vegas where donald trump plans to make a political announcement. earlier he confirmed media reports that he's endorsing mitt romney for the republican presidential nomination. this morning, several news organizations reported that mr. trump was going to endorse newt gingrich. mr. trump met with both of these republican presidential candidates last year at his trump tower offices in new york city. nevada republicans hold their caucuses this

mr. roseman here today who were risk officers inside the organization. again, the bottom line here is trying to figure out what happened. what we will sense, and what we've seen in our problems we've had in the marketplace, there are those who said if we'd have had dodd/frank in place or this regulation in place or had this, one of the things that happens is people just to conclusions and try to overreact to that. what we want to do is get to the bottom of what happens here and make a finding. one of the things i think we've seen when we look back in the 2008 crisis, a lot of people said it was the fact we had lack of regulation. truth of the matter is had we taken time to ascertain exactly what happened, we would have found 2008 happened not because we didn't have enough regulations but in many cases regulators not doing their jobs, market behavior that was not acceptable. so the purpose of this hearing and the hearings we've had in the past, again, get to the bottom of that. i look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. with that i would yield to

mr. roseman. >> my name is michael roseman, former chief financial officer for mf global group.or the opportunity to testify today. i hope that my comments will be to continue to build on your knowledge of the events atmf global. >> i will ask you to pull your microphone a little closer to you. >> is that good? thank you. regarding my background, i started my professional career as an aerospace and engineered after graduating from the university of delaware. as an aerospace engineer. in 1994, i received an m.b.a. from the university of north carolina and pursued a career in financial-services. i first joined financial products with the responsibility of the risk analysis function. the following year, i'm co- manage the u.s. dollar otc portfolio. for a number of years, before returning to risk management. in 2001, i joined the bank of montreal as the head of u.s. risk oversight from trading, underwriting, and investment activities in the united states and with the mandate to strengthen the risk-management activities and capabilities in the u.s. in 2004, i joined new edge as the c

mr. roseman. >> chairman neugebauer, ranking member capuano, number said the subcommittee.men with michael grossman, chief risk officer of global group from august 2008, january 2011. thank you for the opportunity to testify today. i hope my comments will continue to grow on your knowledge of the events that led to the collapse of mf global. >> and ask you to pull your microphone a little closer to you? >> regarding my background and career as an aerospace engineer i'm graduating from the university of north carolina and university of delaware. as an aerospace engineer, since 1994 i received an mba at the university of north carolina and received a career in financial services. i first joined the responsibilities for the risk analysis function are the following year he moved and comanage the u.s. dollar otc portfolios. for a number of years as global head of market risk. in 2001, he joined the point of montrÉal and risk oversight of underwriting and investment that in the united states and with the mandated strength and risk management at today's in the u.s. then in 2004 i

mr. roseman here today officers inside the organization and the bottom line is to figure out what we willense what we have seen in other problems in the marketplace is there are those who say if we had dodd/frank and placer this regulation or this, and people jump to conclusions to try to overreact. we want to get to the bottom of what happened then make a finding. one of the things i think we have seen when we look back at the 2008 crisis coming people said there was lack of regulation but the truth is had retaken the time to ascertain what happened and, we could have found 2,008 have been did not because we did not have enough regulation but regulators not doing their jobs comment marking behavior that was not acceptable. the purpose of this hearing and those of the past is to get to the bottom of that so i look forward to hearing from our witness is today. with that i yield to the ranking member. >> thank you. another series of this issue i have not met any person that knows much about everybody that i knew i simply asking questions and for me as a supporter of dodd/frank i have no ide

mr. corzine and to the board. >> reporter: if m.f. global had not taken a huge $6 billion bet on european debt, roseman says, the company would still be here. roseman says his warnings helped cost him his job. michael stockman replaced roseman as chief risk officer, but said he was not hired to be a yes man. stockman insists he grew concerned last summer about the risk m.f. global was taking on. >> i found that the risks and rewards were acceptable, and then in july, i had a change of view. >> reporter: the ratings firms were next to feel the heat of congressional outrage. lawmakers demanded to know why moody's and standard and poor's waited so long to downgrade m.f. global. >> i don't know which one of you i should be more upset with-- the one who says, "it took me six months to get upset," or the one who said, "i didn't catch it in the first place, and as soon as i figured out i blew it in the first place, i got upset within a couple of days." both those answers stink. >> reporter: standard and poor's said m.f. global's chief financial officer sent an email a week before the firm failed, saying it had never been stronger. richard ca