mr. roth, there was an email about the incident forwarded up the chain of command on march 4. can you tell me a little bit more about that email, what you found? mr. roth: certainly. what we found was that -- let me get to the page of the report that has that. mr. chaffetz: the version i have is page 15. mr. roth: thank you, sir. correct. there was an email that was sent really up the chain of command all the way to the sac of the presidential protection division that described sort of in very vague terms what had occurred at the entrance of the e street. mr. chaffetz: why do you think the email was forwarded by deputy chief dyson to mr. connolly himself? mr. roth: i think it was to let mr. connolly know that in fact word was getting out of the incident and that he had the necessity to self-report. mr. chaffetz: how did mr. connolly respond to that email? mr. roth: during the night when he was driving home, he called deputy chief dyson and expressed concerns at the fact that this was getting o

this entity -- mr. roth: the internal affairs within the secret service. >> when did they know about it? march 9. you were informed of it on march 9. mr. clancy was informed of this on march 9 also? mr. roth: correct. >> he did not start an investigation of his own when you were going to take this on? is that usual operating procedure? where if you are going to do it, the agency will not conduct it. mr. roth: once decision is taken, everybody has to step back. >> we were going to focus in on who or what level we believe -- other than the self reporting of the chain of command. mr. roth: the point of failure. the senior management was in the uniform division, they knew of it and did not report it to for example director clancy. the watch commander reported up his chain of command. for example, the debbie -- deputy chief. additionally, there was a special agent. who was aware of what went on. she certainly could have and probably did have a duty to report it as well. >> i'm going to close because we are runnin

clayment . >> mr. roth, i want to ask about an email exchange that your investigators obtained twean the two agents who had been drinking in the bar plfment connelly and mr. obblevive. first let me walk through some facts. the incident happened on the night of march 4. your report found that they should have reported this incident but neither did. is that right? >> that's correct. >> based on their failure to report it seems like they were hoping this whole thing would just blow over. two days later on march 6 mr. connelly had this chance -- had his chance to come clean. he had a meeting with his superior the special agent this charge. but according to your report he never mentioned anything involving the incident. your report says thr. connelly met with his supervisor saic buster on march 6 and discussed the ud officer's handling of the confrontation with the suspect and the suspicious package incident. connelly did not mention the incident involving him and ogle vive. so on this meeting mr. connelly decid

>> mr. roth: that's right. >> rep. clay: it seems like they were hoping this whole thing would just blow over. two days later on march 6, mr. connolly had his chance to come clean. he had a meeting with his superior, the special agent in charge. according to her report, he never mentioned anything involving this incident. your report says this, and i quote, connolly met with his supervisor on march 6 and discussed the handling of the confrontation with the suspect and the suspicious package incident. connolly did not mention the incident involving him and ogilvie. with this meeting on march 6, mr. connolly decided he would just keep his mouth shut and not tell his supervisor what happened. is that correct? >> mr. roth: that's correct. >> rep. clay: he also would have learned at that meeting that no one else had reported the incident dealer. here's what i want to rescue about. the very next day on march seventh, mr. ogilvie and mr. connolly had an e-mail exchange. i would like to put it up on the screen. there we go. mr.

>> mr. roth: that's right. >> rep. clay: it seems like they were hoping this whole thing would just blow over. two days later on march 6, mr. connolly had his chance to come clean. he had a meeting with his superior, the special agent in charge. according to her report, he never mentioned anything involving this incident. your report says this, and i quote, connolly met with his supervisor on march 6 and discussed the handling of the confrontation with the suspect and the suspicious package incident. connolly did not mention the incident involving him and ogilvie. with this meeting on march 6, mr. connolly decided he would just keep his mouth shut and not tell his supervisor what happened. is that correct? >> mr. roth: that's correct. >> rep. clay: he also would have learned at that meeting that no one else had reported the incident dealer. here's what i want to rescue about. the very next day on march seventh, mr. ogilvie and mr. connolly had an e-mail exchange. i would like to put it up on the screen. there we go. mr.

mr. roth: correct. mrs. watson coleman: do you think it makes better sense that there are department-wide policies regarding such important things? -- as opposed to a component-wide policies? mr. roth: it's not an issue that i looked at or thought about. there is certainly a validity to have uniformity across d.h.s. which there clearly is not right now. mrs. watson coleman: we hear that in the other committees i'm on. according to the memorandum of understanding between the secret service and your office, certain misconducts must be referred to you. mr. roth: correct. mrs. watson coleman: did it constitute something of that level? mr. roth: yes, it did. mrs. watson coleman: in youres

>> mr. roth: certainly. what we found was that -- let me get to the page of the report that has that. >> rep. chaffetz: the version i have is page 15. mr. roth: thank you, sir. correct. there was an e-mail that was sent up the chain of command all the way to the presidential protection division that described, in very vague terms, that occurred at the entrance. >> rep. chaffetz: why do you think the e-mail was forwarded by deputy chief dyson to mr. connolly himself? >> mr.roth: i think it was to let mr. connolly no -- know that he was getting out of the incident and he had the necessity to self-report. >> rep chaffetz: how did mr. connolly respond? >> mr. roth: during the night, when he was driving home, he called deputy chief dyson, who expressed concerns at the fact that this was getting out? >> rep. chaffetz: if deputy chief dyson denied he was aware of this, would you find that denial credible question -- >> mr. roth: not knowing the other facts, it would raise some additional questions i wou

mr. roth and his team for the good work on this report. acted swiftly, but a lot of people towards it and it does produce a very worthwhile result in that's why we are here today. we look forward to cheering from director clancy on this incident and learn whether the agency plans to take disciplinary action against the individuals involved. i have a concern just retiring for stepping aside doesn't solve the problem. that they don't truly have the consequences that would be associated with such egregious behavior. the job of the secret service is too important not to reprimand those who exercise shockingly poor judgment which could put the president and his family at risk. one of the other things were going to explore is how within the department of homeland security that are different tables of penalties within the department itself. mothers instead of for the department of homeland security there seems to be a different standard within the secret service and other agencies themselves and get

let me ask mr. roth one last question. mr. roth we're spending megabillions now for security at the airports when you add it all together. are we getting a bang for our buck? john: i think there's significant room for improvement. it is a massive task. when you talk, for example, security background checks, individuals that hold the passes to the secure areas. you're talking about 3.7 million people that you would have to give a background check for. this is a massive massive challenge. can t.s.a. tighten up? absolutely. and the reports that we have written over the course of the years show there are areas where they can tighten up. but we need to understand this sort of scope and significance of the problem that t.s.a. faces. mr. duncan: all right. thank you very much. mr. mica: i thank the gentleman. let's see if fedex can track a package and american express can detect instantaneously some incidents with your credit card certainly we can get this right. i have many more people to deal with. let's yield now to ms. kelly from

mr. roth. you are recognized for five minutes. >> chairman chaffetz ranking member cummings to members of the committee thank you for inviting me here to testify today about airport security issues. each day tsa is required to screen about 1.8 million passengers and 3 million carry-on bags in 450 airports nationwide. tsa faces a classic asymmetric threat. he they cannot afford to miss a single genuine threat without potentially catastrophic consequences. a terrace on the other hand only needs to get it right once. tsa's 50,000 transportation security officers spend long hours performing tedious task that require constant vigilance. complacency can be a huge problem. ensuring consistency across dhs' largest workforce would challenge the best of organizations. unfortunately although nearly 14 years at hassan's tsa's inception we remain deeply concerned about its ability to execute its mission. since 2004 we have published more than 115 audit and inspection reports on tsa's programs and operation

thank you, mr. roth. i yield now to the gentle lady from new york. >> thank you for your testimony and your work, and i thank the ranking member and chair for calling this important hearing. i agree completely with the statements of mr. roth, when he said the terrorist only has to be right once. we have to be right 100% of the time. we have to stop them from coming through. i would say nothing is more important than protecting our people. i will say that since 9/11 the new york city police department has documented well over 17 attempts to murder new yorkers. they have been thwarted through the combined efforts of all of law enforcement including tsa, which is working every day to stop it. for some reason, in our intelligence classified intelligence briefings airlines continue to be a top priority for target. they keep trying different ways. we hear it from press reports, your report, reports from airline stewartesses and captains, how they're trying to break the perimeter and get into the cockpit in diff

let me ask mr. roth one last question. mr. roth we're spending megabillions now for security at the airports. when you add it all together. are we getting a bang for our bucks? >> i think there's significant room for improvement. when you talk about, for example, security background checks on individuals that hold the pass to secure areas. you're talking about 7 million people you would have to give a background check for. this is a massive, massive challenge. can tsa tighten up? absolutely. there are areas where they can tighten up. but we need to understand the scope and significance of the problem that tsa faces. >> all right. thank you very much. >> thank the gentleman. let's see, if fedex can track a package. if they can detect instantaneously some incidents with your credit card, certainly we can get this right. let's yield to miss kelly of illinois. >> thank you, mr. chair, and ranking member cummings for holding a hearing. i would also like to thank our witnesses who have taken time to speak with us today. mr. chairman

mr. roth. the secret service division or component is a component of d.h.s. right? >> correct. >> do you think that it makes better sense that there are departmentwide policies regarding such important things as opposed to o a componentwide policy? >> it's not an issue that i really looked at or thought about. i mean, there is certainly a facial validity to have uniformity across all of d.h.s. which there clearly is not right now. >> we hear that in the other committee that i'm on. adoreding to your memorandum of understanding between the secret service and your office, certainly categories of misconduct must be referred to. >> correct. >> so did what happened on march h constitute something of that level? >> yes, it did. >> in your estimation, who

mr. roth fust: i thank my friend for yielding. -- mr. rothfus: i thank my friend for yielding. since its establishment, the national guard has responded to national crises. after september 11 2001, they were once again called on to stand to post, deployed for months on end, leaving loved ones behind. unfortunately, the army's aviation structure is said to have a -- set to have a devastating impact not only on the national guard in pennsylvania but all of the national guard, leaving them less operational. last year, congress wisely created the committee on the future of the army to create a deliberate approach. we need to allow the commission to do its work and ensure that the congress has sufficient time to consider the commission's report and recommendations before the army takes any further harmful and irreversible actions. the amendment i have offered with representatives palazzo and walls will ensure congress has that opportunity. i urge your support. i yield back. the chair: the gentleman yields back. the gentleman from rhode island is recognized. mr. langevin: i continue

mr. roth: i don't have that information. rep. chaffetz: he could revoke it immediately? mr. roth: i am not sure exactly what the process is. rep. chaffetz: he could be put on non-paid leave. do think this is an aggravated situation? rep. chaffetz: unfortunately you are getting into areas of employment law that are beyond by competence. i think that is a fair situation. as mr. russell pointed out even if they were not drunk and they interrupted a potential scene, that is acceptable. if they lied to somebody who works for the secret service that is unacceptable. if you look at what happened in the e-mail chain, there is monday of. this is a pivotable moment for the secret service. this is when we find out if they have the guts to do what needs to be done. in my opinion, these people should be fired. they should have their security clearances revoked. those that did not report it, i have a list of people who have at least according to your report highlighted policy that could lead to their removal. mark connolly. perhaps and probably michael. at the very least, they need to be t

i met with mr. roth earlier this week because i read the testimony. and i have read the ig reports that were the basis of the testimony. and i wanted to understand what his concerns were and what his concerns were with respect to the responsiveness of tsa to those concerns. and i told him i saw great value in the oversight of the inspector general and i saw great value of the entity outside an agency, looking hard outside the actions and purposes. i see that -- i see a great work list of issues to attend to. i think that the inspector general has raised exactly the kinds of questions that if confirmed, i would ask going into tsa, irrespective of a inspector general report out there. when i look at the world of security, i think in terms of, first of all, what is the threat that we're facing, and how is that threat evolving over time? there's a big intelligence component of that. and then, what are the risks or -- what are the vulnerabilities in the system that create the risk. and what are the capabilities we have to address the vulnerabilities and fi

i met with mr. roth earlier this week because i read the the testimony. and i have read the ig reports that were the basis of the testimony. i told him i saw great value in the oversight of the inspector general and the great value of the entity outside an agency looking hard outside the actions and purposes. i see that a see a great work list of issues to attend to. i think that the inspector general has raised exactly the kinds of questions that if confirmed, i would ask going into tsa irrespective of a respecter general report out there. when i look at the world of security, i think in terms of first of all, what is the threat that we're facing and how is that threat evolving over time? there's a big intelligence component of that. and then what are the risks or vulnerabilityies in the system that create the the risk. and what are the capabilities we have to address the vul nerkt vulnerabilityies and finally, how does a workforce field the tul tools? how do you train the workforce? and how do i ensure that stays trained and continuely adopts and evolve

we appreciate the good work of mr. roth and look forward to a good, vibrant discussion today about his findings. with that, i will now recognize the ranking member, mr. cummings. rep. cummings: thank you very much, history chairman. thank you, general roth, and your team, for your hard work. you have worked with us and met with us and we took your guidance and we really appreciate all that you have done. you started immediately after receiving these allegations on march 12 and finish them in eight weeks. that says a lot. in that time, they conducted an impressive number of interviews and obtained a wide variety of documents and materials. the inspector general confirms key allegations, such as the claim that to agents, -- two agents, mr. connelly and mr. ogilvie, had been driving -- drinking before driving a government vehicle to the white house. it also includes that there is "no evidence that the video of the incident was intentionally deleted." this was a model of how an investigation should be conducted. and a demonstra

my frustration is not with you mr. roth or the inspector general's office. without that information we could still be left in the dark, and what you a and your staff he done we're appreciative on both sides of the aisle and pre appreciate it. it's now our responsibility to hold the administration accountable and make sure they fix the problem so we can stop having hearings like these. we do wish you god speed. thank you for this work, and look forward to the other reports you're still working on. this committee stands adjourned. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> on capitol hill, only four days of work left before lawmakers go on a week-long memorial holiday break. they're facing deadline's then highway trust fund and government surveillance provisions in the patriot act and this week both the house and senate are planning on taking up and passing a bill to fund the federal him and transit program for two months to give them time to work on a longer term highway

mr. rothful: my time has expired. mr. hill: thank you. dr. asher, reflect for me that when we put pressure on developed countries and through the financial process, through the patriot act, we squeeze legitimate users and illegitimate users out of those marketplaces. we have had an important tool, whether it is finding noriega's acids are other players around the world. what can we do in that arena? can we expand the process, can we amend it, is there a process we can use with other countries we do not have a full treaty with western can you expand on that? dr. asher: we have not utilized the process of forfeiture that effectively. it is something i have advocated against, the use of rico, which has huge transnational residents against terrorist organizations as organized criminal entities. that is a specified unlawful act. under the law. if you engage in more than two sua's that are allowed under rico, you are engaged in a criminal conspiracy that can be prosecuted and the thing about rico is you can charge anyone. if you are in isil or al q

roth. from the report and gaen in his testimony before us the ig found that mr. mayorkas appeared to play favorites with democratic political operatives and insert himself improperly this ways that influenced the outcome of cases. these are very serious allegations and ones that if true should not be ignored. although the ig did not allege that these acts were criminal in nature they without a doubt raised questions about the deputy secretary's judgment. this was not the first time that the inspector general's office reviewed allegations of impropriety at uscis. in a separate report the ig found that in late 2009 the former u.s. cis chief counsel also placed pressure on career staff to reverse the outcome for a petition filed by a university that the chief counsel was connected to. therefore, in april of 2010 in response to that mr. mayorkas himself put out a policy memo to uscis employees that stated quote, each uscis employee has the duty to act impartial alley in the performance of his or her official duties. any occurrence of actual or perceived preferential

roth. from the report and again in his testimony before us the ig found mr.orkas appeared to play favorites with democratic political operatives and inserted himself improperly in ways that influenced the outcome of cases. these are very serious allegations. and ones if true should not be ignored. although the ig denied alleged that these acts were criminal in nature, they without a doubt raised questions about the deputy secretary's judgment. this was not the first time that the inspector general's office reviewed allegations of impropriety at uscis. in a separate report the ig found in late 2009, the former uscis chief counsel also placed pressure on career staff to reverse outcome for a petition filed by a university that the chief counsel was connected to. therefore in april 2010, and response to that, mr. mayorkas himself put out a policy memo to uscis employees that stated, quote, each uscis employee has the duty to act impartially in the performance of his or her official duties. any occurrence of actual or perceived preferential treatment, treating si