mr. steamcamp, i was not involved or couldn't represent him on what the context was that he was -- >> did you pass along to anybody that you disagreed with the representations, that you thought there was, in fact, risk? who did you tell? >> sir, as i mention ed, as far as the risk highlights and risk reporting goes, you know, for example, at the august board meeting, there was a quite a detailed representation of both verbal and a power point presented. is that example you're referring to? >> okay. you had an auditor. price warehouse coopers. did they raise any concerns about the previous reporting relationship between mr. roseman and the ceo and the board and the change that you reported to the coo? did they raise any concerns with the processes that mf global had in place for pro pry takery traiting? was wise water house coopers, did they know about the ending of the direct reporting to the board by the cro? >> i was not involved in the -- any direct relationships or discussions with price waterhouse. >> are you aware of any? did anyone -- did anyone tell you they talked to price waterh

mr. steamcamp? do you have an opinion of the firm's viability? this is now ten days before the complete implosion of the firm and the filing of bankruptcy. did you agree that the firm was viable and in a strong position? >> not my area of expertise and i relied on our cfo and finance people to help us understand in specificity the liquidity and financial position of our company. >> i thank the gentleman. final question from new york. two minutes. >> thank you. mr. stockman, do you think you should be held liable, civilly, criminally in any form? >> no, sir. >> how about mr. corzine, do you think he should be held liable for anything? >> that would be beyond my chance to -- >> you don't have an opinion? >> i don't have an opinion. >> okay. just say you don't have an opinion. do you think it's possibly negligence, maybe even gross negligence for a new risk officer to come in amidst all of these things going on and only spend one hour with mr. roseman, the former, the prior risk officer and in that one hour you didn't even speak about the risky posi

mr. steamcamp's e-mail was, i don't know what context that he had sent that e-mail nor was i part of that e-mail chain. >> but in terms of context, were you at a meeting with moody's different rating agency three days later? >> yes, i was in that meeting. >> was mr. steeamcamp in that meeting? >> he was. >> and was he downgraded as a result of that meeting? >> the firm was downgraded three days later. i can't be specific as it was a result of that specific -- >> was it a result of anything that you said at that meeting? did you say anything at the meeting. >> me personally? >> yes. >> i spoke very little, frankly. >> did you let mr. moody's know that you were brought on to trade -- let mr. corzin e-trade through that $2 million number? >> that characterization

mr. steamcamp? >> not on this sstrject. >> given what you know about the liquidity challenges mf global was facing, a break glass plan, how could he make this representation to a credit rating agency? >> i would be speculating. it would be hard for me to a comment as to what the context was for that particular note. >> were there internal meetings between you treasury people at risk pobal ple and finance poba in this document's creation? >> there was. >> were you involved in any of those meetings? >> very early on as the treasury and finance team was pulling the document together. as i mentioned before, after that point in timsury a senior member of my staff assisted in the creation of that document as it relates to the various stress scenarios. >> $1.2 billion customer money was missing. i have constituents who lost a significant aus unt of us ney. your risk team was putting together what was essentially an armageddon plan for the organization and the with the committee to believe you had no direct