mr. szubin? >> no. spirit we are entered into an agreement here of some of great importance with the country that we don't trust, that we have reason to believe is going to cheat or do whatever they have to. spent they are not close magnetic at least a year or two years away from a nuclear weapon should they decide to pursue one. it is not apparent that this agreement has made the decision to pursue a nuclear weapon. it's two to three months right now breakout for fissile material spent fissile material speak with the yes. under this agreement that would change to a year. >> which is a big step. >> huge step. >> mr. szubin, do you trust iran to forgo their terrorist activity and not spend any of his money that they would get, we say $50 billion, on promoting terrorism and unrest all over the world of? >> mr. chairman, i do not trust iran and to think we could be nearly certain that are in is going to continue to sponsor terrorism and groups like the quds force. that's what it's and, upon us to intensify

mr. szubin? undersec. szubin: no, senator. sen. shelby: so we are entered into an agreement of great importance with a country we don't trust that we have reason to believe is going to cheat or do whatever they have to because they are determined, they are in pursuit of nuclear weapons, and as you have said, they are close to it right now, is that correct undersec. sherman: actually, they are not close to it right now. they are a year or two away from a nuclear weapon, should they decide to pursue one, and it is not clear that the supreme leader has made the decision to pursue a nuclear weapon. two to three months for fissile material. sen. shelby: fissile material. undersec. sherman: under this agreement that would change to a year. sen. shelby: which is a huge step. mr. szubin, do you trust iran to forgo their terrorist activity not -- and if we say $50 billion on promoting terrorism and unrest all over the world? undersec. szubin: mr. chairman, i do not trust iran, and we can be fairly certain that iran will continue to sponsor

mr. szubin: i'm sorry, mr. senator on the $50 billion.e answer is, and we have a high degree of confidence in our figures, that it is about $50 billion. i can get into more detail in a classified setting. i think that's important to do. thank you. mr. szubin: the reason the $100 billion figure has been out there is that there's $100 billion of the central bank of iran's foreign reserves that have been inaccessible to it. some of that has been due to the sanctions that congress put in place. some because it has already been obligated for other reasons. some because it is gone. one can lift it off the books, but it is just not there. the funds that have been spent, the funds that are obligated and now in place as collateral, can't be recovered even when sanctions are lifted. what remains is about $50 billion that can come back to iran. with that, one needs to keep the perspective of the about $500 billion that iran needs to meet really fundamental needs. in terms of unpaid military pensions and salaries, infrastructure, their oil sector. a

mr. szubin, you said could, you didn't say will. who determines that? sec. szubin: in respect to your hypothetical, it is done at the state department. the penalties are imposed on the banks unilaterally by the u.s. government. the only reason i was putting in the caveat at the top about the contract is that if a contract is signed between a european company and iran the contract , isn't invalidated by our sanctions. what our sanctions do is to tour -- senator: so that company would have to make a decision, doesn't risk the -- does it risk the suit for violating the iranian contract, given the heaviness of our sanctions? i appreciate the answer and i think you answered it. next question. that is our interpretation what you just gave, of what grandfathering means. i think ambassador sherman, what is your title? you are good by me, whatever your name is. a british ambassador said it agreed with the that after vacation. -- that interpretation. do we have that in writing somewhere that can, france -- britain france, germany, and the eu agree with that interpretat

mr. szubin? undersec. szubin: no, senator. sen. shelby: so we are entered into an agreement of great importance with a country we don't trust that we have reason to believe is going to cheat or do whatever they have to because they are determined, they are in pursuit of nuclear weapons, and as you have said, they are close to it right now, is that correct undersec. sherman: actually, they are not close to it right now. they are a year or two away from a nuclear weapon, should they decide to pursue one, and it is not clear that the supreme leader has made the decision to pursue a nuclear weapon. two to three months for fissile material. sen. shelby: fissile material. undersec. sherman: under this agreement that would change to a year. sen. shelby: which is a huge step. mr. szubin, do you trust iran to forgo their terrorist activity not -- and if we say $50 billion on promoting terrorism and unrest all over the world? undersec. szubin: mr. chairman, i do not trust iran, and we can be fairly certain that iran will continue to sponsor

mr. szubin. with regard to sanctions, at this point the jcpoa has been approved -- submitted to the security council and approved by the security council of the united nations, correct? what impact does that approval have on the sanctions regimes, both the u.n. sanctions regimes and the sanctions of the united states? >> it has no impact on the sanctions of the united states whatsoever. with respect to the u.n. sanctions regimes, as i understand it, the endorsement by the u.n. security council sets out a timetable right in line with what ambassador sherman was describing where iranian performance, when verified, will lead to the lifting of u.n. sanctions. >> and that would be all of the u.n. sanctions on iran? >> no. what it would mean -- at implementation day, when iran has taken initial steps and key nuclear steps would mean that the economic sanctions would be relieved. the sanctions on their arms trade, the sanctions on their acquisition of ballistic missile technology remain in place for man

mr. szubin? >> thank you, chairman shelby, ranking member brown, and distinguished members of the committee. thank you for inviting me this morning to appear before you to discuss the nuclear deal with iran. it's a pleasure to appear alongside ambassador sherman. the global sanctions coalition built and led by the united states across administrations and with broad bipartisan support in congress, including from this committee, gave us the leverage to secure unprecedented nuclear concessions from iran. from the start, our purpose in imposing these sanctions was to build the leverage that could be used to obtain concessions on the nuclear file. our secondary sanctions were meant to be the quid for the nuclear quo. our three goals were to close off iran's path to a nuclear weapon, ensure we had the access to know if they were cheating, and preserve the leverage to hold them to their commitments and to punish them if there was a breach. the jcpoa obtains these purposes. on the sanctions side of the d

mr. szubin, if you would describe what sanctions remain in place that will help us manage -- eliminate asmuch as possible nefarious iranian activities and terrorism in the region. within that answer if you would talk about the $50 billion figure, why it's 50 and not 100 in terms of obligations. and second if you would speak to the 500 billion -- you said half a trillion $500 billion -- i think you used the word whole in the iranian economy, what that means in terms of pressure on their government. i assume you're implying to meet some domestic needs as some of this money is available to the iranians. >> the sanctions regime that remains in place to combat iran's malign activities -- and i take your question to mean not just referring to terrorist groups like hezbollah, but the houthis, their support to the shia militants in iraq, the assad regime in syria. that sanctions regime fully remains in place, and it's a very extensive one. it's not just the companies the front companies and actors and the generals that we've listed so far. it's an ongoing authority that we have, that the european

mr. adam szubin, acting undersecretary of the treasury for terrorism. written testimonies will be made part of the hearing record. ambassador sherman, proceed as you wish. ms. sherman: good morning members. thank you for this opportunity to discuss the joint comprehensive plan of action that the united states and international partners recently concluded with iran. to reserve as much time as possible for questions, i will only highlight a few key points. by locking each of iran's potential pathways to get material required for a bomb the deal approved injures that iran's nuclear program will be peaceful over the long-term. under the deal of the provisions iran must remove two-thirds of centrifuges for 10 years, reduce the stockpile of enriched uranium by 98% for 15 years, and cap uranium enrichment at 3.67% far below the danger point for 15 years. the core of iran's heavywater reactor at iraq will be removed and rendered unusable, and the facility -- and the facility rebuilt so it cannot produce weapons grade plutonium. spent fuel from the reactor will

mr. chairman, when i was treasury now led by adam szubin is the war command for financial power tools. there is a question as to whether or not we do enough to think about preservation of the tools, use of them aggressively and other contacts and frankly the use of tools by other nationstates like the chinese and russians to extend their reach but also exploit our vulnerabilities. i would say that responsibility lies largely at the treasury department the treasury department in concert with the intelligence community in concert with others but perhaps we need to be more aggressive and forward leaning in terms of the use of the power. one of my concerns with the deal as it is not clear we've considered fully the long-term implications for the use of power in this regard. >> chairman shall become a simple question i would ask undersecretary szubin is an incredibly talented professional to provide either 10 to 15 year contained a planned for the use of economic sanctions against iran when has that nearest euro breakout and unlimited enrichment capacity to plan should be in place today bec

mr. chairman, we established when i was at the treasurer, the office of terrorism and financial intelligence, led by adam szubin and that is the war commend for financial power and tools. there is a question though as to whether or not wire doing -- we're doing enough in the preservation of the tools and the use in other context and the use of tools by the chinese and the russians to not only extend their reach but to also exploit our vulnerabilities. so i would say that that responsibility lies largely with the office of terrorism and financial intelligence at the treasury department in concert with the intelligence department and in concert with others and that perhaps we need to be more gressive and forward-leaning in terms of the power. one of my concerns with the deal is it is not clear that we've considered fully the long-term implications for the use of our power in this regard. >> chairman shelby, a simple answer, i would ask under secretary szubin, who is incredibly talented professional, to provide you the 10-15 year contingency plan for use the economic sanctions against iran when had has no breakout

mr. chairman, we established when i was at the treasury, office of terrorism and financial intelligence, now led by adam szubin, and that is the war command for financial power and tools. there's a question, though, as to whether or not we're doing enough to think about the preservation of those tools, the use of them aggressively in other contexts and, frankly, the use of these tools by other nation states like chinese and russians, to not only extend their reach but to also exploit other vulnerabilities. i would say that responsibility lies largely with the office of terrorism and financial intelligence at the treasury department in concert with the intelligence community, in concert with others but that, perhaps, we need to be more aggressive and more forward-leaning in terms of the use of this power. one of my concerns with this deal is it's not clear that we've considered fully the long-term implications for use of off power in this regard. >> chairman shell bishgs a simple answer, i would ask under secretary szubin, who is an incredibly talented professional, to provide you the 10 to 15-year contingency