mr. valucas. i wanted to follow-up on a couple of questions mr. johnson was asking you. your report says on page two, gm engineers concluded that moving stalls were not safety issues because drivers could still may their calls so as a result they viewed the switch problem as a customer convenience issue, something annoying but not particularly problematic as to the safety defect it was. is that right? >> correct. >> and you told mr. johnson, so therefore, because they called it a customer convenience issue, they looked at issues of pricing and not issues of safety, is that right? >> that is correct. >> and this was despite the fact that early on, gm starting getting a lot of complaints about the ignition shifting into neutral and the car losing all power. is that right? >> that is correct. >> and in fact, in a review of the cobalt in "the new york times" -- in a review in "the new york times", the freelance writer said that his test kuo battle 2kri6 ven by his wife stalled after her knee bumped the steering column, right? >> there were reports in "the new york times" and

mr. chairman. the valucas report identified mr. giorgio, who has no credibility. but the gm design, release engineer, his title. is solely responsible for key decisions to athe deadly ignition switch in 2002 and to modify it in 2006. mr. valucas, your report states that one of the key failures was, quote, the decision by a single engineer who did not advice others of his decision to accept an ignition switch with full knowledge that it fell well below gm's own specifications. is that correct. >> that's correct. but the report is with problems with the ignition switch aside from low torque, many known as early as 2001, the entire electrical concept needed to be redesigned,nd quote and the switch had significant problems that were known to gm. in his interview with the committee and at this point i want to congratulate the staff of our committee for the amazing work that they did independently to investigate all these issues. that in this interview with the committee he told committee staff that he met with his superiors around february of 2002, to inform them that

mr. valucas confirmed he was given clear and limited parameters by the board of directors of gm, and he ad chairman murphy, there is much more to discover. keep in mind he said i had marching orders and followed those orders. >> could get messy. bob hillard, thank you again. >> thank you. >>> well, from right to work to really going berserk. turns out that is not so easy to quit a union. the michigan teacher who found that out the hard way. >>> what time is it? >> all: union time! reluctant to try new things. really? what's wrong with trying new things? you feel that in your muscles? yeah...i do... drink water. it's a long story. well, not having branches lets us give you great rates and service. i'd like that. experience a new way to bank where no branches = great rates. ally bank. your money needs an ally. was a truly amazing day.ey, without angie's list, i don't know if we could have found all the services we needed for our riley. for over 18 years we've helped people take care of the things that matter most. join today at angieslist.com that's why i always choose the fastest intern.r s

mr. valucas' report revealed there was no conspiracy by the corporation to cover up facts. in addition, the investigators found no evidence that any employee made a tradeoff between safety and cost. the pattern in this case is much more complex and more nuanced. what valucas found was a pattern of management deficiencies and misjudgments often based on incomplete data that were passed off at the time as business as usual. unfortunately, the report found that the seemingly benign actions led to devastating consequences. in short, we misdiagnosed the problem from the very beginning. experienced engineers with the responsibility for safety did not understand that the air bags would not deploy if the ignition switch changed into the off position. i know many of you are saying to yourselves that this problem isn't a fair reflection of the company as a whole. i know it, and i know you know it too. we are better than this. but we have to own this problem and we have to have the courage to deal with it in the right way. as we have learned more about the situation over the last few

mr. valucas has made public his report on the gm fiasco in which he concludes it doesn't appear to be a case of a coverup or a conspiracy. instead, according to mr. valukas's report gm's failure to recall faulty vehicles was a case of incompetence and neglect. perhaps this report should have been subtitled don't assume malfeasance when incompetence will do. i still have questions about whether gm employees knowingly withheld information during previous liability lawsuits. information that could have led to an earlier recall and prevented some of these tragedies from occurring. in many ways the facts surrou surrounding what finally resulted in the gm recall are far more troubling than a cover up. gm attorneys and engineers given the facts on stalls and air bag malfunctions and who were tasked with figuring out what went wrong did not connect the dots. that's because they were either incompetent or intentionally indifferent. today i want to know from both ms. barra and mr. valukas not just how it happened, but why did this happen. even when a good law like the tread act of 2000 is in place, it

mr. valucas has made public his report on the gm fiasco in which he concludes it doesn't appear to be a case of a coverup or a conspiracy. instead, according to mr. valukas's report gm's failure to recall faulty vehicles was a case of incompetence and neglect. perhaps this report should have been subtitled don't assume malfeasance when incompetence will do. i still have questions about whether gm employees knowingly withheld information during previous liability lawsuits. information that could have led to an earlier recall and prevented some of these tragedies from occurring. in many ways the facts surrou surrounding what finally resulted in the gm recall are far more troubling than a cover up. gm attorneys and engineers given the facts on stalls and air bag malfunctions and who were tasked with figuring out what went wrong did not connect the dots. that's because they were either incompetent or intentionally indifferent. today i want to know from both ms. barra and mr. valukas not just how it happened, but why did this happen. even when a good law like the tread act of 2000 is in place, it