mr. verrilli said not necessarily, although they would have a very difficult time justifying them under the kind of scrutiny that mr. verrilli hopes the court will apply here. >> suarez: marcia coyle, thanks for joining us. >> my pleasure. >> woodruff: there's much more about the same sex marriage cases on our website. you can hear audio of today's full arguments and also watch reaction from outside the courtroom. and coming up, a debate about the defense of marriage act. also ahead, using hip hop music to engage students in science; luring low income students to elite universities and slowing down traffic on the internet. but first, the other news of the day. here's hari sreenivasan. >> sreenivasan: the new director of the u.s. secret service was sworn in today. julia pierson is the first woman to hold the job. she officially assumed her new duties in an oval office ceremony in the white house. vice president biden administered the oath, as president obama looked on. >> she's breaking the mold in terms of directors of agencies. and i think that people are all extraordinarily proud of her,

mr. verrilli. that's a problem i have.this court doesn't like to get involved in racial questions such as something that can be left to congress. the problem here however is the comment i made earlier comment that the initial enactment of this legislation in a time when the need for it was so much more abundantly clear with double digits against it and that was only a five-year term. then it was reenact it five years later, a can for a five-year term. double digits against it in the senate. that was reenact it for seven years come in single digits it. been active for 25 years, eight senate votes against it. and the last enactment, not a single vote in the senate against it and the house is pretty much the same. i don't think that is attributable. i think it is very likely attributable to a phenomenon called perpetuation of racial entitlement. it has been written about whenever a society adopts racial entitlements. it is very difficult to get out through the normal political processes. i don't think there's anything to be g

verrilli? >> thank you, mr. chief justice, and may it please the court: there's a fundamental point that needs to be made at the outset. everyone acknowledges, petitioner, its amici, this court in northwest austin, that the voting rights act made a huge difference in transforming the culture of blatantly racist vote suppression that characterized parts of this country for a century. section 5 preclearance was the principal engine of that progress. and it has always been true that only a tiny fraction of submissions under section 5 result in objections. so that progress under section 5 that follows from that has been as a result of the deterrence and the constraint section 5 imposes on states and subjurisdictions and not on the actual enforcement by means of objection. now, when congress faced the question whether to reauthorize section 5 in 2006, it had to decide whether -- whether it could be confident that the attitudes and behaviors in covered jurisdictions had changed enough that that very effective constrai

general verrilli? >> mr. chief justice, and may it please the court -- proposition 8 denies gay and lesbian persons the equal protection of the laws -- >> you don't think you're going to get away with not starting with the jurisdictional question, do you? [laughter] >> as an amicus, i thought i might actually, your honor. and -- and, of course, we didn't take a position on standing. we didn't -- we didn't brief it, we don't have a formal position on standing. but i will offer this observation based on the discussion today and the briefing. we do think that while it's certainly not free of doubt, that the better argument is that there is not article iii standing here because -- i don't want to go beyond just summarizing our position, but -- because we don't have a formal position. but we do think that with respect to standing, that at this point with the initiative process over, that petitioners really have what is more in the nature of a generalized grievance and because they're not an agent of the state of c

mr. clement. general verrilli? >> mr. chief justice, and may it please the court: the equal protection analysis in this case should focus on two fundamental points: first, what does section 3 do; and second, to whom does section 3 do it? what section 3 does is exclude from an array of federal benefits lawfully married couples. that means that the spouse of a soldier killed in the line of duty cannot receive the dignity and solace of an ofication of n. >> suppose your -- you agree that congress could go the other way, right? congress could pass a new law today that says, we will give federal benefits. when we say "marriage" in federal law, we mean committed same-sex couples as well, and that could apply across the board. or do you think that they couldn't do that? >> we think that wouldn't raise an equal protection problem like this statute does, mr. chief justice. >> well, no, my point is: it wouldn't -- you don't think it would raise a federalism problem either, do you? >> i don't think it would raise a federalism proble

general verrilli? >> mr. chief justice, and may it please the court -- proposition >> -- >> you don't think you are going to get away with not starting? >> i thought i might. we don't have a formal position on standing, but i will observe that -- i will offer this observation based on a briefing. we do think that while it is not free of doubt, the better argument is that there is not article 3 standing here. i want to go beyond summarizing. we do think with respect to standing that at this point, but the process over, petitioners have what is in that nature of a generalized grievance. have another official tie to the state that would result in any official control. rather tenuous, but today, question, and our interests are, justice alito, in tomorrow's issues where we have briefed the court tomorrow. with respect to the merits, two fundamental points lead to the conclusion that there's an equal protection violation here. first, every warning flag that warrants exacting scrutiny is present in this case. and pe

mr. clement. general verrilli? >> mr. chief justice, and may it please the court: the equal protection analysis in this case should focus on two fundamental points -- first, what does section 3 do -- and second, to whom does section 3 do it? what section 3 does is exclude from an array of federal benefits lawfully married couples. that means that the spouse of a soldier killed in the line of duty cannot receive the dignity and solace of an official notification of next of kin. >> suppose your -- you agree that congress could go the other way, right? congress could pass a new law today that says, we will give federal benefits. when we say "marriage" in federal law, we mean committed same-sex couples as well, and that could apply across the board. or do you think that they couldn't do that? >> we think that wouldn't raise an equal protection problem like this statute does, mr. chief justice. >> well, no, my point is -- it wouldn't -- you don't think it would raise a federalism problem either, do you? >> i don't think it wou

general verrilli? >> mr. chief justice, and may it please the court -- proposition 8 denies gay and lesbian persons the equal protection of the laws -- going don't think you're to get away with not starting with the jurisdictional question, do you? [laughter] >> as an amicus, i thought i might actually, your honor. and -- and, of course, we didn't take a position on standing. we didn't -- we didn't brief it, we don't have a formal position on standing. but i will offer this observation based on the discussion today and the briefing. we do think that while it's certainly not free of doubt, that the better argument is that there is not article iii standing here because -- i don't want to go beyond just summarizing our position, but -- because we don't have a formal position. but we do think that with respect to standing, that at this point with the initiative process over, that petitioners really have what is more in the nature of a generalized grievance and because they're not an agent of the state of californ

verrilli? >> thank you, mr. chief justice, and may it please the court: there's a fundamental point that needs to be made at the outset. everyone acknowledges, petitioner, its amici, this court in northwest austin, that the voting rights act made a huge difference in transforming the culture of blatantly racist vote suppression that characterized parts of this country for a century. section 5 preclearance was the principal engine of that progress. and it has always been true that only a tiny fraction of submissions under section 5 result in objections. so that progress under section 5 that follows from that has been as a result of the deterrence and the constraint section 5 imposes on states and subjurisdictions and not on the actual enforcement by means of objection. now, when congress faced the question whether to reauthorize section 5 in 2006, it had to decide whether -- whether it could be confident that the attitudes and behaviors in covered jurisdictions had changed enough that that very effective constrai

general verrilli? >> mr. chief justice, and may it please the court -- proposition 8 denies gay and lesbian persons the equal protection of the laws -- >> you don't think you're going to get away with not starting with the jurisdictional question, do you? [laughter] >> as an amicus, i thought i might actually, your honor. and -- and, of course, we didn't take a position on standing. we didn't -- we didn't brief it, we don't have a formal position on standing. but i will offer this observation based on the discussion today and the briefing. we do think that while it's certainly not free of doubt, that the better argument is that there is not article iii standing here because -- i don't want to go beyond just summarizing our position, but -- because we don't have a formal position. but we do think that with respect to standing, that at this point with the initiative process over, that petitioners really have what is more in the nature of a generalized grievance and because they're not an agent of the state of c