mr. zandy if we need a systemic risk regulator and we need it -- and you advise it to be in the federal reserve, you need to address the situations as to future asset publics for dealing with being countersicyclical as opposed to being pro cyclical and to address maybe the regulatory side, capital requirements as well. is that correct? >> yeah. they would have authority there as well. >> you have to raise the point on the asset bubble with regard to the housing bubble that we have. i'm going back further with the tech bubble. alan greenspan said maybe i missed that one and he maybe sort of rewrote history as far as the review of whether he knew it or not. but if you look at the minutes of the federal reserve, they all missed that and there was no discussion whatsoever with regard to an asset bubble during the entire time. they were looking at that purely as an increase in productivity. the federal reserve is out front for a long time. which would go in the wrong direction with regard to that. a

mr. zandiays, and here's where i think maybe we can all come to a consensus. he said the treasure and fred were confused as to whether they had the authority or ability to intervene to forestall a lehman bankruptcy and ensure and orderly of the failure. they didn't have, the procedure was in place. mr. mahoney today has that give them that procedure. as i understand it, give them a procedure. but in bankruptcy. is that right, mr. mahoney? >> that's right. i think the idea of adding another chapter to the bankruptcy code makes perfect sense. it is probably the case that the amount of agenda control that debtors had in the standard chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding could be disruptive in the case of a large financial institution where you are dealing with some short-term creditors who need to know what's the value of this obligation that i'm holding, sooner rather than later. and so i think you could create a quicker, more streamlined procedure here but i would draw a sharp distinction between the