ms. minow?>> i agree. >> mr. stiglitz? >> it is important to affect the incentives. if you have the incentive for excessive risk-taking, you will do it. those are also at the organizational level. that is why it is so critical. even when we affect incentives, we will never do it perfectly. sweet constraints on leverage, behavior's, products, derivatives, and finally, for our system to work there has to be transparency. the way the system is set up, it is impossible for capital markets to exercise the discipline that is needed to make our system function well. >> thank you. >> the gentleman from california. >> thank you. i would like to throw out a few thoughts. i am going to suggest to you that the executive compensation issues on which we all agree, the excessive risks, the short- term focus, are more the symptom than the disease. if we treat the symptom, we will be at best ineffective and at worst counter-productive. that includes bills that were talked about from last year and a year before.

ms. minow?>> i agree. >> mr. stiglitz? >> it is important to affect the incentives. if you have the incentive for excessive risk-taking, you will do it. those are also at the organizational level. that is why it is so critical. even when we affect incentives, we will never do it perfectly. sweet constraints on leverage, behavior's, products, derivatives, and finally, for our system to work there has to be transparency. the way the system is set up, it is impossible for capital markets to exercise the discipline that is needed to make our system function well. >> thank you. >> the gentleman from california. >> thank you. i would like to throw out a few thoughts. i am going to suggest to you that the executive compensation issues on which we all agree, the excessive risks, the short- term focus, are more the symptom than the disease. if we treat the symptom, we will be at best ineffective and at worst counter-productive. that includes bills that were talked about from last year and a year before.

ms. minow? >> i agree. >> mr. stiglitz? >> it is important to affect the incentives. if you have the incentive for excessive risk-taking, you will do it. those are also at the organizational level. that is why it is so critical. even when we affect incentives, we will never do it perfectly. sweet constraints on leverage, behavior's, products, derivatives, and finally, for our system to work there has to be transparency. the way the system is set up, it is impossible for capital markets to exercise the discipline that is needed to make our system function well. >> thank you. >> the gentleman from california. >> thank you. i would like to throw out a few thoughts. i am going to suggest to you that the executive compensation issues on which we all agree, the excessive risks, the short- term focus, are more the symptom than the disease. if we treat the symptom, we will be at best ineffective and at worst counter-productive. that includes bills that were talked about from last year and a year before.