musharraf's motives are hard to understand. >> charlie: this is wayoff the wall for me. we know a bit about how to turn people, about how to get people for a price to come over to our side. we've done that in our history, yes? >> right. >> charlie: how can we find somebody at i.s.i. to say he's across from the military academy? >> because the i.s.i. regards the c.i.a. as threat number one, not only in terms of us penetrating them for information like that, but us penetrating them for the most important information, where are pakistan's nuclear weapons. when we went in and got osama bin laden, the reaction of most pakistani generals wasn't, oh mix god, but the response was if they can do this, can they steal our nuclear arsenal? one person versus a couple hundred nuclear weapons was hugely different but that's their reaction. tells you they regard us as the existential threat along with india. >> charlie: it is sometimes said that if in fact iron gets a nuclear weapon that the saudis would go to their friends in pakistan that they've given a lot of money to and say we nee

musharraf motives are hard to understand. >> rose: this is a way off the wall for me. we know a bit about how to turn people, we know a bit about how to -- to get people for a price to come over to our side. we have done that in our history, yes? >> correct. >> how can we find somebody at isi to say to us, they got him, he is off across from the military academy? >> because the isi regards the cia as threat number one. not only in terms of us penetrating them for information like that, but us penetrating them for most important information, where are pakistan's nuclear weapons? you know, when we went in and got osama bin laden, the reaction of most pakastani generals wasn't oh, my god. >> rose: they invaded -- >> most pakastani generals response was if they can do this, could they steal our nuclear arsenal? and of course it is apples and oranges, one person versus a couple of hundred knew nuclear weapons is a hugely different, but that was their reaction, it tells you, they regard us as the existential threat along with india. >> it is sometimes said that if, in fact,

. >> and that includes general musharraf.eneral musharraf to general -- looking them in the eye and believing they are on our side. to give jimmy carter and ronald reagan credit, they looked into those eyes and knew that he was on our side this weekend for this objective. they did not come to the belief that he was eternally on our side. >> there is that famous story about richard armistice going over there. -- armitage, going over there. if you are against us, we will have to do terrible things to you. >> i am sure when he tells you your with us or against us it is a powerful threat. your with us or against us it is a powerful threat. >> and you know what he means, don't you? >> exactly. i think general musharraf looked at this and said, ok. i have to make some adjustments. i have to play the game carefully. but in time, i can go back. exactly. in his book, which is a fantastic book, general musharraf's memoirs which should be in the fiction section, he says he did a wargame and concluded that pakistan and the u.s. went to w

i think general musharraf looked at this and said, ok. i have to make some adjustments. i have to play the game carefully. in time, i can go back. book, which is a fantastic book, general musharraf's memoirs which should be in the fiction section, he says he didn't wargame and and thed that pakistan u.s. went to war, and it would be the biggest in a fishy area. i do not think he really didn't wargame but -- did a wargame. how does this influence our relationship with india? impact.ir has a huge >> exactly. >> back to afghanistan. you believe that they had to know from the get-go, they had to know when he came there because general share of -- mu sharraf never lies. he sat in this chair and said he was not there for five years. he saidonger but shorter. he was not there for five years. >> right after osama bin laden raf pointed mushar out, i remember that house, i rub her jogging by it. he had that item pulled off the -- remember her jogging by it. he had that item pulled off the internet because it was too revealing about what he should have known. af's motives are hard

last i remember there was a long discussion on the musharraf -- and a lot of time on talk on building pakistan there were efforts to spread this tradition. i'm not really sure what exactly are the concrete steps that states can take to change the outlook in the nomenclature within society because when you talk about spreading tradition and there are delegated efforts there's an amount of persistence to that. a progressive society probably is sometimes a national consequence of other steps you have taken and he mentioned education reforms and all that stuff. [inaudible] second is a historic anomaly. you talk about afghan taliban and pakistan's zone of comfort as opposed to the pakistani taliban. i'm still wondering what exactly was the reaction of taliban on pakistan's decision to site where the united states post 11 -- post-9/11? if they felt that kind of betrayal than i would assume that their reaction should have been, there should have been some sort of position within them and wouldn't that create attention against the state of pakistan? >> both very good questions. they felt ther

as much as i remember there was a long discussion on this during president musharraf's time and a lot of talk on building pakistan and other talks, turkey and there were efforts to spread the sufi tradition. i'm not really sure what exactly are the concrete steps that states can take in terms of changing their outlook but the societial outlook and the nomenclature in the society because when you talk about spreading sufi tradition and dedicated efforts, there's equal amount of resistance to that. progressive society probably is sometimes a national consequence of a lot of other steps that you take and that you have also mentioned in terms of education reforms and all that stuff but dedicated efforts can create a force -- for much benefit. second is about a historical anomaly. you talked about afghan taliban and pakistan's sort of -- with them for quite sometime. as opposed to the pakistani taliban. i'm still wondering what exactly was the ri action of afghan taliban on pakistan's decision to side with post- 9/11. was there a sense of betrayal if they felt that kind of betrayal, then i

i am not sure that musharraf's ouster was only because of the political departments. there is now growing concern among some experts in pakistan and outside whether it was something that -- had done things which should have stayed in the presidency almost impossible. i think the commanders now are very powerful. leave themef can military without the generals being on the same page. it is impossible to say something that is not popular for does not have the majority of the commanders on their side. a changingthere is dynamic. there is a changing issue in of thef political impact societal norms that we see. --e conservatism at time within those elements of the pakistan armed forces as well. add is having an impact on the command and control system. i believe the cohesion can be the most important factor for pakistan's survival. i am seeing some changes. just to complete the point of national security, also, is that the political leadership are still not really clear. i think at the heart of the larger point, and also the counterinsurgency, which the army never liked. [i

general musharraf who was he army chief and president concurrently never once visited fatah after having sent troops to fight there. there's no evidence of him having traveled to meet the troops in the field. the civilian leadership does not do that either. that is a mind-boggling thing for an observer like me. let me open it up to the audience. let me go to the back first or if you would, please come identify yourself. also want to let everybody know, i will take down the names and keep reminding me of interest. we will put a whole set on a website so it will be available to all of you for information. please identify yourself and ask your question. >> good morning everybody. i am at the embassy of pakistan. i have a short comment and then a question. the short comment, i'm giving with conviction because i have been a part of it myself. when we think about the four years lost, what went in those four years needs to be identified from the point of view of what was the army is in at those times. may,s starting off from october, meanwhile, in between, almost all of the seven agencies were

last i remember there was a long discussion on the musharraf -- and a lot of time on talk on buildingpakistan there were efforts to spread this tradition. i'm not really sure what exactly are the concrete steps that states can take to change the outlook in the nomenclature within society because when you talk about spreading tradition and there are delegated efforts there's an amount of persistence to that. a progressive society probably is sometimes a national consequence of other steps you have taken and he mentioned education reforms and all that stuff. [inaudible] second is a historic anomaly. you talk about afghan taliban and pakistan's zone of comfort as opposed to the pakistani taliban. i'm still wondering what exactly was the reaction of taliban on pakistan's decision to site where the united states post 11 -- post-9/11? if they felt that kind of betrayal than i would assume that their reaction should have been, there should have been some sort of position within them and wouldn't that create attention against the state of pakistan? >> both very good questions. they felt there

general musharraf who was he army chief and president concurrently never once visited fatah after having sent troops to fight there. there's no evidence of him having traveled to meet the troops in the field. the civilian leadership does not do that either. that is a mind-boggling thing for an observer like me. let me open it up to the audience. let me go to the back first or if you would, please come identify yourself. also want to let everybody know, i will take down the names and keep reminding me of interest. we will put a whole set on a website so it will be available to all of you for information. please identify yourself and ask your question. >> good morning everybody. i am at the embassy of pakistan. i have a short comment and then a question. the short comment, i'm giving with conviction because i have been a part of it myself. when we think about the four years lost, what went in those four years needs to be identified from the point of view of what was the army is in at those times. may,s starting off from october, meanwhile, in between, almost all of the seven agencies were