this is -- this is effectively the end of nassarism. nassar dies three years later. but the idea of egypt as the leader of the arab world and the leading power against the israelis, it's already starting to shift here. we do have the '73 war which is, of course, a huge trauma for the israelis and many ways a greater existential threat than '67 was but '73 is interesting if you look at it from the egyptian vie point because the goal of '73 to get out of the conflict. to deal a big enough blow to israel to wake up the superpowers and make them come in to get the egyptians get out of the conflict. it wasn't to use the conflict for other purposes as the egyptians were doing in '67. it was really to get out of the conflict. of course, we have the -- i don't want to be teen logical about it. you have the war of attrition and then '73 war and both of them very serious conflicts. but from an egyptian point of view you can see that something shifts dramatically in '67. and then the last point i'll mike is that as the egyptians stop, move out of, you know, start thinking about

nassar is suddenly celebrated. he has been writing a losing streak since the end of a ua r in 61, the entry into yemen. there's a war of words between saudi's and the jordanian monarchy's, also others with nassar. one of my professors wrote an extraordinary book called, the arab cold war, all about it during the 1960's. nassar has lost his stature, until he announces he is sending horses back in to the sinai. suddenly he is the hero again. the idea that he would give this up, which is the memo implies without getting into it, i think was generally, unrealistic. but that was part of the mindset, in terms of how you look at nassar. , there is al see mindset also about the israelis. the interesting thing here, nassar is the one that has changed the status quo, and yet the entire focus of the administration wants -- once they realize there is a crisis, israel doesn't act. there will be six divisions on israel's border, but israel shouldn't act. 25,oesn't come until may doesn't start till may 14th. when he comes, one of

in '56, nassar lost the war against israel but won politically. britain, france, and israel teamed up against egypt. defeated the egyptian army but the super powers got involved and the united states in particular forced the israelis out with minimal concessions. the concessions being the ones that nassar overturned in '67. emergency force in signi. and that is the world in which -- that was nassar's greatest moment. the unstoppable political force in the arab world was 1956. america handed him this incredible political victory. i think in '67 he thought he could replay '56. escalate things at such a point that even if there was a conflict with israel, a conflict that he might not win on the ground, still come out the political winner. so his major miscalculation, he made two, one of them was the military miscalculation. the israelis destroyed his air force in record time and they did it alone. in '56, they had the french to help them in the air. and in '67, they didn't it. they did it alone. so though obliterated his forces so quickly, there wasn

nassar would never intervene.so it knew everything about the egyptian arm and bungled the intelligence assessment and that's usually because the intelligence chief always dependent on the opinion of the government and the chief of staff. want to prove you can localize the conflict with syria and that's what the israeli intelligence said. smoking gun. you don't find a smoking gun for this type of argument. youishly have circumstantial evidence. no one would say, you know what? we're in an economic crisis. we need a short victorious war. this is why we're going to war. not a thing that politicians -- not a thing you would say in a cabinet meeting. had this discussion with a professor in my department. do you have a smoking gun for your arguement? i said, wait, when we have the meet examination we argue about things, did anyone ever declare the real interest in the debate? he said, no. i said it's the same thing. the american role in the crisis. so, here's where my book, i think, differs with oorrins book with other