nato foreign ministers with isef contributing natos. there was a meeting of the nato russian council as well. it was a very productive day. they endorsed the president's strategy and approach toward afghanistan. 25 countries pledge to do more in terms of troops, trainers, and trust fund contributions. nato and their isaf partners pledged 7,000 more troops. we expect that there will be several thousand more likely in the near future. isaf countries also began a discussion on improving civilian coordination with an eye to agree on the mechanisms by the time of the london conference in january. in addition, nato countries and russia formally restarted the nato-russia council by the first meetings since december of 2007. they also agreed to some restructuring of the nic. and a work program for 2010. secretary had a number of bilateral meetings as she met with uk foreign secretary, polish foreign minister, norwegian foreign minister, georgian foreign minister, russian foreign minister, and she had her first meeting with the new eui rep. in t

and independent from nato, okay? and were openly collaborating to establish a european military force that was separate from nato. in addition, there were efforts at the financial level to establish european independence that culminated in the launching of the euro in january of 1999. as a united currency of at least some of the members of the european union. the launching was seen to have not only economic, but also political significance which is that it would be a challenge to the u.s. dollar. all of this was seen in threatening terms by the united states. and a major u.s. objective during the 1990s was to come up with a new, new purpose for nato because it was felt nato was the main institution through which america could establish its dominance over europe. if nato could be revived and have a new logic and a new rationale, america would be b better placed to prevent europe from establishing the feared and dreaded independent foreign policy. to a large extent, this u.s./european tension which existed throughout t

they didn't trust nato. however, it seemed likely or at least possible that that disagreement could be overcome since the serbs had already accepted the political demands and accepted in principle the idea of an armed force to oversee the implementation of the accords. and it looked like a full agreement could have been achieved. what caused the agreement to break down was a new demand put forward by the negotiating powers probably by the united states at the very end of the conference. and this new demand was that the peacekeeping force would not only have the right to occupy kosovo, but it would have full right to occupy all of serbia, okay? this is a totally new demand. one that was later acknowledged would have certainly been unacceptable to the serbs. and after this demand was put forth, the serbs seemed to lose all interest in the negotiations. and there was a complete breakdown of negotiating interest after this event, okay? now, this is called the military annex or annex b as it was proposed. why did

would we be better off if we have not expanded nato or if we had iincluded russia in nato?books with those questions. this is a more limited exercise. i tried to limit it to the more specific forecasts that policy critics made. i tried to limit it to things you can analyze. on that front, if you want to look at a policy criticism that looks better in hindsight, it was the iraq war. the critics said we were emphasizing the costs of a warrant that turned out to be costly. they are emphasizing the difficulty of holding together an iraq turns out to be difficult to hold together. they were not talking about several different things. on balance, they look more impressive in hindsight. the specific forecasts look better than some we associate with the government policy. many of the criticisms that loom large in scholarly evaluations, namely the prospect of prolonged counter-insurgency, none of that was figured in the pre-work criticism. we must distinguish it from forecasts. compared to the other group, they looked relatively good in hindsight. the weird thing is on this particul

of the documents for the ministerial meeting of nato-russia council because nato does not want to make the main objective of the work of nato-russia council the discussion on the new configuration of european security. so is this issue so difficult to discuss between russia and nato that we are ready to risk the first official ministerial meeting of net-russia council in one year? thank you. >> first of all, let me stress that i am not going to comment on internal negotiations and discussions within the nato- russia council. let me just say that it is not fair to single out individual countries in this. we are right now in a negotiation process, and it is quite natural that in the run- up to a foreign ministers' meeting where we are going to make important decisions, there will be some discussions. and we have some tough negotiations. i can confirm that. but i still confident -- but i feel confident that all countries within the nato-russia council are committed to finding constructive solutions to that, so that is what i can say right now. we will have the foreign ministers meeting on

this includes members of nato members of nato. and i am satisfied that there will be thousands of additional troops provided, not just by america and britain but also adding to that number will be troops from other countries. i said to the nato secretary general, eight countries have already indicated that they have numbers of troops that are prepared to deploy. i think it is also true to say that he has indications from announcements soon. >> why has the president of pakistan just announced that he has given up his personal control of that countries's nuclear weapons and transfer them to his prime minister, when for years we have been assured that their nuclear weapons were under the control of the army and not the politicians? >> mr. speaker, in a democracy, it seems right politicians make the final decisions. >> thank you, mr. speaker. my right hon. friend rightly focused on the equipment. in a recent opening -- the secretary of state saw the with how much pride that our workers are producing first- class equipment for our troo

there was no nato equipment. just recently they switched to nato guns. the national army does not have airlift capabilities. same thing with the police force. the concept of the league nation was created. germany is on that and is doing that. that is fine. you don't have to worry about it. the resources were limited. the approach was not appropriate. trading afghan forces with batons and pistols while the taliban is coming with rocket launchers. the job of the police officer is not to issue a parking citation for a car bomb. his job is to stay alive at first. the approach was not proper. the resources were limited. the ceilings were on realistic. 35,000 was raised recently. there is no shortage of manpower. pay them adequately. thousands will and list. -- thousands will enlist. they were recruiting police officers. it was increased. it was not enough. a cooked in afghanistan makes $3. a driver makes $500. how do you expect people will show up if you're paying that little? it is an expense you have to pay. u.s. soldiers cost $1 million a year. if the cost

troops to nato troops is 2-1. after this surge, 3-1 assuming no other nato input. the president wasn't exactly clear on the nature of the commitments that are going to be forecoming. many of the world's powers are consent to sit while america sacrifices on their behalf. you have touched on this today, but i think the question deserves further unpacking, i believe the secretary mentioned japan will contribute $5 billion. there is a move toward meeting with other nato allies to harden those commitments, but we're leading with our chin right now and the american people need to know this is not a disproportionate burden that we are undertaking. can you comment on that? and then i'll go to other questions. >> congressman, i think it's important to recognize that until relatively recently, the ratio between american and non-american nato i ssap troops was very close. because as admiral mullen was saying in response to, i think, congressman pence's question, we were at a level of 30,000 for a very long time. and the nato troops, bob, i think were about that, or a little b

the issue of nato turned out to be huge. i started to read this book on german unification it did not expect it. and as soon as they come into the sources in russia and germany and france and england and america it became clear to me that's bargaining over the future with nato as an integral part of the german unification process which surprised me because i had read often that it was really an issue more for the clinton era. and so, there's a huge section of the book on it in this country a separate article in diplomatic history. so, i'm just going to sketch out a few ideas here, but there's going to be more imprints. on the question of our alliance is about controlling allies as well as enemies. of coarse. in this time. there is also a separate organization which is the two plus four which is a lot about managing british and french expectations on top of nato. so certainly that's a component of it. on the question of expanding nato, that comes after -- expanding nuclear aggression, yes. it comes up very early in the discus

nato forces. sufficient. you are going to create stability in certain areas of afghanistan. i think one of the key areas is in mazar-i-sharif in the north. that could be an area that create stability in the region, allows development of command. you raise the militia, national guard, the military in that region under the control of the governor. then you start from that success spreading out. that is what at least i hope is the plan, but there is opportunity. i think he has enough resources to do it, and it would be useful and helpful if nato would do what i think they're going to do and at 5000 -- and add 5000 or 10,000 troops to it. host: you graduate from the u.s. military academy when? guest: 1961. host: these are the cadets listening to the president in the eisenhower facility. during the coverage, chris matthews referred to west point as "and in the camp." guest: i did not know that chris that -- "and menemy camp." guest: i did not know that chris did that. i do not know what he meant by tha

this includes members of nato members of nato. and i am satisfied that there will be thousands of additional troops provided, not just by america and britain but also adding to that number will be troops from other countries. i said to the nato secretary general, eight countries have already indicated that they have numbers of troops that are prepared to deploy. i think it is also true to say that he has indications from announcements soon. >> why has the president of pakistan just announced that he has given up his personal control of that countries's nuclear weapons and transfer them to his prime minister, when for years we have been assured that their nuclear weapons were under the control of the army and not the politicians? >> mr. speaker, in a democracy, it seems right politicians make the final decisions. >> thank you, mr. speaker. my right hon. friend rightly focused on the equipment. in a recent opening -- the secretary of state saw the with how much pride that our workers are producing first- class equipment for our troo

would we be better off if we have not expanded nato or if we had iincluded russia in nato?books with those questions. this is a more limited exercise. i tried to limit it to the more specific forecasts that policy critics made. i tried to limit it to things you can analyze. on that front, if you want to look at a policy criticism that looks better in hindsight, it was the iraq war. the critics said we were emphasizing the costs of a warrant that turned out to be costly. they are emphasizing the difficulty of holding together an iraq turns out to be difficult to hold together. they were not talking about several different things. on balance, they look more impressive in hindsight. the specific forecasts look better than some we associate with the government policy. many of the criticisms that loom large in scholarly evaluations, namely the prospect of prolonged counter-insurgency, none of that was figured in the pre-work criticism. we must distinguish it from forecasts. compared to the other group, they looked relatively good in hindsight. the weird thing is on this particul

nato, to do more so. but we have to appreciate that we have to build up the afghan forces just as pakistan has got to have a more professional approach to dealing with terrorism. that is where the answer to the problems lie in both pakistan and afghanistan. we won the afghan people themselves to take more responsibility for the run affairs. >> the helicopters -- is the considering purchasing new ones? dollars in any statements on helicopters, they will be made to the house. >> mark lancaster. >> mid that will have to cover the territory army. now that he has seen the error of his ways, can he reassure the house that there will be no cuts to the territorial army budget next year? >> became clear in the last few days the value we attach the territorial army by the decisions about money that we made. i hope that he will also consider that the priority at the moment is for the effort in afghanistan, and to direct our resources to afghanistan means also that we finance the territorial army for what we can do i

and other nato forces.this could lead to icc prosecutions of american soldiers even though the united states has never ratified their own statute. among other things, he's declined to rule out icc prosecutions based upon unmanned u.s. drone strikes against leaders there in afghanistan. however, this administration has been moving the united states closer to the international criminal court. the secretary of state has expressed great regret we're not a signatory to the statute. last month, for the first time since the statute entered into force, the administration september a delegation to participate in a meeting of the icc seam my of parties. it's my understanding that the u.s. ambassador at large for war crimes was at the meeting, said nothing to protest or dispute the icc's pros cue toral jurisdictional claims. we understand that there is an article 98 agreement with afghanistan that exempts afghanistan to their own agreement from turning our troops over to the international criminal court. however, the

>> nato training in afghanistan is part of that. the whole coalition is doing that, sir. >> okay. but are these people with police backgrounds training the police or military training the police? are we going to end up with a paramilitary police force? >> it's a combination. policemen have been hired, european partners, and some military as well. >> ambassador, back to you, on the smart power issue, and i'm a big proponent of that, i've talked with the secretary of state about this. we saw the investments of the housing that got involved in corruption and $8 million, other anecdotal stories where money has been wasted, housing has been occupied, it's been substandard. what efforts are we pursuing to protect those kinds of investments in infrastructure? >> we have many, let me highlight two. first of all, in terms of how we're contracting, we think we're designing contracts in a much better way than improved performance and transparency. second, in terms of audit and oversight, have many means for that. i want to emphasize that we think the most important is exactly with the united

>> well it is a nato mission.t are in the president has indicated he anticipates in the coming weeks additional nato commitments. and i think that's very good. >> and what about your calling to have expressed some of your colleagues have expressed concern about the karzai government and the charges corruption. do you feel like this is a -- >> it's just one of the problems we have to deal with, but i do think is important to remember we're not there just, you know, to build a jeffersonian democracy in kabul. we're there to protect the united states of america from another 9/11 attack. it would certainly be desirable if we had a better government to work with. but, you know, the national government in iraq was pretty shaky as well and that improved. and hopefully this one will as well. >> you're listening to senator mitch mcconnell as he talks with reporters live in a conference call. by the way, if you want to listen to the entire conference call is available online at east end.org. will also be posting the speech

and other nato forces. this could lead to icc prosecutions of american soldiers even though the united states has never ratified their own statute. among other things, he's declined to rule out icc prosecutions based upon unmanned u.s. drone strikes against leaders there in afghanistan. however, this administration has been moving the united states closer to the international criminal court. the secretary of state has expressed great regret we're not a signatory to the statute. last month, for the first time since the statute entered into force, the administration september a delegation to participate in a meeting of the icc seam my of parties. it's my understanding that the u.s. ambassador at large for war crimes was at the meeting, said nothing to protest or dispute the icc's pros cue toral jurisdictional claims. we understand that there is an article 98 agreement with afghanistan that exempts afghanistan to their own agreement from turning our troops over to the international criminal court. however, the

on the question of expanding nato. it comes up very early. the discussion about moving nato eastwards into east germany. i had read a lot of places that no one had thought of expanding it in eastern europe. i have a tab with myself that no one talks about going forward to eastern europe. the current holder of the record talked about hungry. very early on, there's discussion about gnat owe moving into eastern europe. not saying gnat owe membership but partnership. the calls are received. the whole issue pushed off the a againeda by saddam hussein. there's enough that gosh chafe picks up on it. baker says well, this isn't the phase where he's trying to come up with structures. he's come up with the common european home. you guys are the g 7 and ec 12. security council. baker said that's not only going to work. and the soviet union. baker says that's in the realm of fantasy. he keeps saying, why don't we think about this? it comes up but it's never taken seriously in the west baker then says where i finally come down in the book i find that just

there was no nato equipment. just recently they switched to nato guns. the national army does not have airlift capabilities. same thing with the police force. the concept of the league nation was created. germany is on that and is doing that. that is fine. you don't have to worry about it. the resources were limited. the approach was not appropriate. trading afghan forces with batons and pistols while the taliban is coming with rocket launchers. the job of the police officer is not to issue a parking citation for a car bomb. his job is to stay alive at first. the approach was not proper. the resources were limited. the ceilings were on realistic. 35,000 was raised recently. there is no shortage of manpower. pay them adequately. thousands will and list. -- thousands will enlist. they were recruiting police officers. it was increased. it was not enough. a cooked in afghanistan makes $3. a driver makes $500. how do you expect people will show up if you're paying that little? it is an expense you have to pay. u.s. soldiers cost $1 million a year. if the cost

richard formica andÑi lieutenan general william caldwell who also commands the new nato training missionin afghanistan. we are grateful for the cooperation provided by these fine officers. unfortunately, the july 30, 2009 report to congress by the special inspector general for afghan reconstruction said c- stica does not have the capability to ensure that u.s. funds are managed effectively and spent wisely. the report in which cstica concurred, the technical representative in country for the contract, had limited experience and had been unable to make field visits to check performance. more resources have since been applied to this problem. but significant questions remain to discuss in this hearing, not only for cstica and d.o.d. but also for the department of state and for the holders of federal contracts. we are fortunate to have the assistance of three panels of expert witnesses to help us

others are there because they believe that either the nato alliance or the relationship of the u.s. is another factor and i think that's very important. but stressing the consistencesy of our commitment, i think is the most key point. >> and general, you don't think that the deadline, 18-month deadline, affects the commitment in others, other nations? >> i believe if we put the perception of that, because, in fact, i don't -- i don't view july 2011 as a deadline. i stview that as a point at whi time the president directed we will reduce combat forces but we will decide the pace and scope of that based upon conditions at that time. so i don't believe that is a

i think certain people were spoiling for a fight in nato at that time. we were at a point where some people felt something had to be done against serbia so you just provoked a fight. with regard to the peace terms themselves, gilbert said, quote, i think the terms put to milosevic were absolutely intolerable.

one, general mcchrystal significantly changed the way that our military forces and nato isaf conduct themselves with respect to civilian population. he significantly tightened the rules for air support for any kind of combat in order to limit the number of civilian casualties, and he also issued orders concerning nighttime raids particularly with the use of dogs. when i was in afghanistan i had a number of people tell us that made a huge difference. secondly, in every reliable research that i have access to, there is no appetite for the return of the taliban whatsoever. what we have seen an increase in over the last several years has been more hedging, that people were understandably nervous about what is the outcome and who was site should i and my family in the pond. but there is no appetite for the return of the taliban. and we do not see what is a legitimate concern to keep in mind. the potential reaction that would lead to increased insurgents. we also know that a lot of the people who are in the taliban do not share the overall goal which is more to. the mullah omar core group

or nato forces. they get this team of helicopter pilots and administrative officers to try to help grow and afghan helicopter force. there are two wings. there are a bunch of americans, if you russian-made helicopters and they're trying to grow and air force from the ground up to either buy them with u.s. money you try to recruit some old afghan pilots that will probably trained by the russians 20 years ago and bring them back in and get them some refresher training and get them working by a u.s. model of air power were you were serving the ground troops. they have a process for calling them and making the request to deliver water. all that may seem simple in theory, but making it work in practice is really complicated. the americans worked hand-in- hand to show them how we do things in the u.s. air force. you can do it like us and you will be able to supply your own troops. what that looks like in practical terms, is that there is eight infantry battalion and americans help process the request and t

if you're going to have nato, you should extend it to russia.mes baker also said that every solution to a big problem contains within itself the seeds of a future problem. and i found that to be a profoundly wise statement because the solution, the pre-fab solution which worked very well does contain within itself the seeds of problems that we're now seeing today in our relations with russia. thank you. >> thanks very much. bruce cummings. >> i'd like to thank the miller center and especially mel leffler for inviting me to this conference. i commute from charlottesville because my wife works here. so it's nice to have an excuse to be here when i'm supposed to be in chicago on monday, tuesday. my paper i think has a fairly simple point that was also made in different ways by philip that the previous panel which is that the assumptions and premises that policy makers bring to bear, whether on predictable events or ones on a high probability or ones that are utterly surprising attempt to be very important in the way they filter information. i go on

the future of al qaeda, the future of the nato alliance, possibly nuclear war and peace in southeastl of these issues come together. on the 27 of march, president obama rightly focused the mission of american forces in this combat zone although on a more narrow one, on disrupting, dismantling and defeating al qaeda and destroying its sanctuary along the afghanistan-pakistan border. if you read his speech carefully, it was clear while there was a specific mission, to get there, we had to stabilize afghanistan and pakistan, and that's a much, much broader mission. the review that i gave to the president which he endorsed, has 20 major recommendations in it, 180 subrecommendations. i'm not going to go all of them here today. most of them are outlined in his speech on the 27 of march and his speech at west point. what i want to stress is this, this is resource-intensive. this is going to come with a big cost, to send one american soldier to afghanistan for one year costs $1 million. if you think there's economy of scale, forget it. sending 30,000 is going to cost more than $30 million. i

and nato commander in afghanistan, that depicted broader problems.the general wrote of the weakness of state institutions, ma lined actions of power brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials as well as errors by the international forces. despite all these challenges, the united states and other countries with a presence in afghanistan are working to promote a stable and democratic afghanistan while preventing al-qaeda or other terrorists from resuming operations from havens in that country. from that perspective, training the afghan national security forces is the ball game. regardless of the issue under debate, the end game must be creating self-sufficient afghan army, national police, and border police forces that are free from corruption and are able to provide adequate security. from fiscal year 2002 through 2010, the u.s. department of defense will have spent nearly 30 billion on training, equipping and supporting the afghan national security forces. as a point of reference, this effort is exceeded only by the theate

the 30,000 total ibound amecans will be joined by at least 600 nato troop its. in brusse today, dfense miisters from 2ofthe 44 nations in the allice confirmed the pledges the made lst wek. meantime, another u.s. ally visid the white house todafor talks with the president. the tur kiss prime minier now has nearly 2,000 troops in afghanistan, largely deployed innd around the capitol kabul. t timetable for when erican troops leave afghanistan also remained an issue. mr obama announced last week tt a dawdown would begin in july 2011. fense secretary robert gates and secreta of state hillary clinton elaborat the sundayalkhows. this is atransition that's goingo take place. and it's not an ashtraire -- arbitra date. obiously the transition will begin in the less contested areas of t country but it ll be the sa kind of gradual-conditions based transition provce by province, distct by district that wsaw in iraq. >> woodruff: those conditions will be dermined in part by t eadiness of afghan scurity forces. training them is ainchpin of the presidt's strategy. but ere was a

and nato defense ministers discussed their contributions to the cause. anti-government protests erupted in cities across iran. security forces fought with thousands of demonstrators. and the chairman of the federal reserve, ben bernanke, cautioned it's too soon to tell if the recovery will take hold, gwen. >> ifill: by now you've noticed we've made some changes to our nightly broadcast. well, there are big changes at the newshour's web site as well. for details of what you'll find online, back to hari sreenivasan in our newsroom. hari. >> gwen, it is indeed a brand new day on the pbs newshour's web site. the address, though, remains the same, newshour.pbs.org. we've introduced a new design, better navigation, and we've launched a news blog, called the rundown, which will feature regular updates and insights from our reporting throughout the day, all of it rooted in the guidelines of macneil/lehrer journalism. jim read those on-air friday, if you missed it, you can find the guidelines posted on our web site. also online tonight, more on the series ray sua

there were members of parliament from nato who said that it wasn't nato's responsibility to address the drug trade. now, again, we know there has been in the last four years an astronomical increase and we know that it's funding what we're fighting. i would hope that your strategy includes addressing this issue and perhaps you could give us some information today that would give us confidence that this, which is funding what we're fighting might be something that you can address? >> you're correct about the reluctance of other isaf nations to tackle this problem. i would tell you that nato's policy on this, the isaf policy it off which the governments have acceded, i wouldn't say they supported enthusiastically but the isaf rules of engagement in terms of going after drug traffickers, drug lords and the drug labs was changed about a year ago. and so isaf, the commander of isaf, now can deploy forces and engage forces in trying to deal with these groups. >> i thank the gentleman. mr. andrews? >> thank you, mr. chairman. admiral mullen in his testimony says that south asia is the epicente

there was no nato equipment. just recently they switched to nato guns. the national army does not have airlift capabilities. same thing with the police force. the concept of the league nation was created. germany is on that and is doing that. that is fine. you don't have to worry about it. the resources were limited. the approach was not appropriate. trading afghan forces with batons and pistols while the taliban is coming with rocket launchers. the job of the police officer is not to issue a parking citation for a car bomb. his job is to stay alive at first. the approach was not proper. the resources were limited. the ceilings were on realistic. 35,000 was raised recently. there is no shortage of manpower. pay them adequately. thousands will and list. -- thousands will enlist. they were recruiting police officers. it was increased. it was not enough. a cooked in afghanistan makes $3. a driver makes $500. how do you expect people will show up if you're paying that little? it is an expense you have to pay. u.s. soldiers cost $1 million a year. if the cost

from a conceptual point of view, and it should not be only nato forces.n national army should be in the league. there should be an afghan leader - flag. we need after a national security forces to secure areas. we need better police to do community policing within these secure areas. they need a civilian capability to work with the governors that is key. if you show progress across the lines of cooperation from a security point of view, you will move toward a situation where coalition force assets will move from a position where they have the lead in the planning of operations to a more supportive, mentoring support role. >> how long will that vision -- how long will it take for the vision to be achieved? >> i paid -- i think we need an overarching plan. we need to step up and increase our mentoring. it is successful and it is key. we need to implement more of it. we need to look into the current organization of the african national police. i think they should focus;#í on recruiting at a local level. it is recorded on a nationwide system presently. if you

number of partners we have with the police forces, we'll certainly welcome a lot of help from our nato allies to expand that kind of capability. >> senator, i agree with everything that the ambassador said. beyond that, we're actually conducting a 100% personnel asset inventory and getting biometric data so we can tell ourself, tell our afghan partners what ground truth really is. beyond that, central command also at general mcchrystal's request hired a team from ran to look at, in fact, the overall effort of afghan security forces and hire some individuals that have had some very good experience in this. speaking of that, a couple of lessons from iraq, one is and i don't want to, you know, sound sort of flippant here, but it is a lot easier when you're winning than when you're losing. the fact is in iraq, during that escalation of sectarian violence that took place in 2006, particularly after the bombing of the shrine in in sa mara, there were whole units that were hijacked by myrrhi imilitias bee situation got so bad, and in fact the police are the most vulnerable. we have to be very

and nato ispp forces is critical.his will expand our role and toe the afghans it take on a larger role in prying for their own security. president obama said the transition to afghan responsibility will begin in the summer of 2011 when we expect afghan security forces to begin assuming lead responsibility for defending their country. moving on from security. the second pillar of our comprehensive strategy focuses on governance. at the national and sub-national levels. our overarching going, improve governance so afghans can see the benefit of supporty a lift government and the insurgency loses its support. as general mcchrystal pointsous, one of our major impediments faced, the afghan government's lack of credibility with its own people. to strengthen its legitimacy our approach at the national level is improving key ministries, increasinged number of civilian technical advisers and providing more development assistance directly through these ministries' budgets. by focusing on ministries that deliver essential servic

that will be an effort that we will put together we hope with nato and other countries. we do not know exactly what the cost will be. but it will have to be long-term assistance. the sec said -- we recognize that this will be a burden on the government of afghanistan and that will need assistance. a lot of our economic programs that we're emphasizing right now is aimed at the generation of wealth. but at the same time, trying to find ways to help the afghan government would revenue collection. we are looking at that. the third would be, with regard to longer-term costs, i do not know what the order of magnitude of the cost of an american soldier or marine for one year in afghanistan, compared to an afghan national army soldier or police. if nothing else in our own long- term economic interests, and certainly the afghan interest, to continue to help the afghans stand there police sub -- stand their police up, so that we're not sending more u.s. soldiers are marines, but the afghan soldiers are taking their own place. that is a pretty good return. and the four. would be th

obama's call for nato countries to send more troops to afghanistan.german chancellor angela merkel has said germany will decide after an international afghanistan conference in late january. peter altmaier, parliamentary whip for merkels party, was non- committal on what germany will do. >> i cannot tell you today what concrete measures would be adopted, but we are aware of the challenge and we will certainly respond to it. this government led by angela merkel has been a reliable partner for the last four years, and i'm 100% convinced we will remain and continue to be a reliable partner for the future. gen. kujat says germany needs to beef up its forces for its missions own protection on the ground. we don't have time. we need to act. so as germans revel in the magic of the season they know they have a big decision ahead. >> lehrer: and finally tonight, the analysis of shields and brooks. syndicated columnist mark shields and "new york times" columnist david brooks. mark, the president's nobel speech that margaret referred to, what did you think of th

more contributions by other nato nations, and a realistic plan to transition responsibilities to theafghans. his is a more balanced, more flexible and achievable strateg and real possibilities, and speaking for the 2.2 million men and women who must execute it and who, with their families have borne the brunt of the st you will all have an opportunity to ask questions. >> there has been some confusion about whether the beginning date for troop reductions is set for july 2011 with the pace of those reductions being condition based or whether the 2011 july starting date itself is dependent on conditions on the ground. which is it? >> mr. chairman, it is july 2011 is when we expect the transition process to begin. our view is -- quite conditions based? >> no, certification. >> due to the partnering ratio, there are over 10,000 u.s. troops in the province and southern afghanistan. there partnered with only 1500 or so afghan soldiers. the partnering goal of the united states is almost the reverse. paraphrasing the national security council director, the three afghan to one u.s. ratio help

secondly, nato works. have a lot of discussions about the decision-making process with nato and one nation blocking decisions by 27 other nations, have worked in afghanistan because we had common nato background. we had the same structure. we had the same planning process and the same mental attitude and the same approach towards operations and we spoke the same language. from a technical point of view, every joint that had control could talk with every helicopter in the air no matter what country they were from. that's the way nato works. we were not only quite effective but quite efficient with only 600 soldiers. quite effective. so looking back in hindsight i can tell you if people asked me what impressed you the most in afghanistan, great people, loyal, they will never disappoint you, if you give them trust. and confidence and secondly, the way the coalition worked, i think we operate as a team with the different nations and based on that i think we have a better future although next year the deploymen

we had a caller earlier say that he's not that confident in nato troops. i have to say, i'm not either. i remember when i was in iraq, interviewed a polish general and asked -- it was a group interview, and we asked, what is the most difficult thing about your mission here in iraq, and he said most difficult thing is being international. coordinating among all. various groups. i think one of the reasons that, you know, and there are many, but one of the reasons that the surge turned out the way that it did in iraq is because essentially the u.s. government took hold of the operation and americanize it had and said we are going win this thing, it's too important to, you know, to say we're going to let our allies handle things that they might not be able to handle. so i'm much more encouraged by the 30,000 u.s. troops than the 7,000 or so nato troops. host: caller from here in washington, d.c. for stephen hayes, it it's mike on the republican line. hey, mike. caller: hey, how you doing? my question is, do you believe that the whole afghanistan war thing is g

more contributions by nato nations and a real plan. his is a more balanced, flexible, and achievable strategy and we have had in the past. it is based on real possibility. speaking for the men and women who must execute it and whose families have front of the stress of combat, i support his decision and appreciate his leadership. thank you. >> thank you so much. we are going to have a six minute round and will ask members to strictly adhere to that. you will all have an opportunity to ask questions. >> there has been some confusion about whether the beginning date for troop reductions is set for july 2011 with the pace of those reductions being condition based or whether the 2011 july starting date itself is dependent on conditions on the ground. which is it? >> mr. chairman, it is july 2011 is when we expect the transition process to begin. our view is -- quite conditions based? >> no, certification. >> due to the partnering ratio, there are over 10,000 u.s. troops in the province and southern afghanistan. there partnered with only 15

nato did not step up to the plates either. i believe they will make at the margin is significant difference with the commitments under the new nato training command. i am sure they will be well used from the most single level down through out at our training in the mission. but it is probably true that it is not well understood generally how difficult and help vital that mission is, even though it was underscored in the president's recent quality statement with respect to afghanistan that we must develop a capability to operate independently and secured the country. it is little known how many casualties the mentors have taken, including contract mentors in the country. and therefore it is probably has been underestimated the quality and extent of resources required to accomplish that mission. going forward, even though i am fully well aware that there command -- they are cognizant of the degree of challenge they face as it expands, and we're not sure of the full extent of the expansion yet. but already you can see it over the

this is true of not only the united states but also canada and the rest of nato.allocated for civilian assistance. democracy and human righá and everything else that falls under civilian assistance. like i said, of that 20 percent of civilian assistance. about 80-90% is channeled through nongovernment mechanisms. contractors and engineers. the fraction of the overall civilian assistance, for example some 35 billion dollars given to afghanistan, only about 2 billion dollars or so have been channeled through government and institutions since 2001, shoots why i state institutions in afghanistan either remain weak or absent or just on the paper. host: talking with ashraf haidari. he is head of political affairs and political counselor at the embassy of afghanistan and the numbers are there on the screen if you want to get involves in the conversatijjy line for democrats. welcome. caller: good morning. i have a strategic question. from what i read in the papers and see on television, the major problem with the taliban is they regroup and base in pakistan and then come

our nato allies and other partners, put also the central asian states, iraq, india, and china. none of these nations benefit from a base for al qaeda terrorists. regions that descend into problems have a right to lasting peace. sacrifices have been enormous. nearly 700 americans have lost their lifes. troops from over 20 countries have also paid the ultimate price. all americans honor the service are and cherish the friendship of those who have fowlingt and worked and bled by our side and all americans are awed by the service of our men and women in uniform, who have borne a burden as great as any other generation's. they and their family embody the example of selfless sacrifice. i remind everybody, the united states of america did not choose to fight a war in afghanistan. nearly 3,000 of our people were killed on september 11, 2001, for doing nothing more than going about their daily l. al qaeda and its allies have since killed thousands of people in many countries. most of the blood on their hands is the blood of muslims, who al qaeda has killed and maimed in far greater numb

if you're going to have nato, you should extend it to russia.lso said that every solution to a big problem contains within itself the seeds of a future problem. and i found that to be a profoundly wise statement because the solution, the pre-fab solution which worked very well does contain within itself the seeds of problems that we're now seeing today in our relations with russia. thank you. >> thanks very much. bruce cummings. >> i'd like to thank the miller center and especially mel leffler for inviting me to this conference. i commute from charlottesville because my wife works here. so it's nice to have an excuse to be here when i'm supposed to be in chicago on monday, tuesday. my paper i think has a fairly simple point that was also made in different ways by philip that the previous panel which is that the assumptions and premises that policy makers bring to bear, whether on predictable events or ones on a high probability or ones that are utterly surprising attempt to be very important in the way they filter information. i go on to talk ab

nato did not step up to the plates either.significant difference with the commitments under the new nato training command. i am sure they will be well used from the most single level down through out at our training in the mission. but it is probably true that it is not well understood generally how difficult and help vital that mission is, even though it was underscored in the president's recent quality statement with respect to afghanistan that we must develop a capability to operate independently and secured the country. it is little known how many casualties the mentors have taken, including contract mentors in the country. and therefore it is probably has been underestimated the quality and extent of resources required to accomplish that mission. going forward, even though i am fully well aware that there command -- they are cognizant of the degree of challenge they face as it expands, and we're not sure of the full extent of the expansion yet. but already you can see it over the horizon. they areñr already -- but there a

we have gone out and negotiated with some of our partners, our nato partners. i saw troops there were germany and from great britain and from canada and a number of other countries part of our nato partners. they are there and they are working hand in glove with american troops. so the additional anticipation of 7,000 or more coming from the nato section would be very helpful, madam speaker. and it doesn't substitute for the request, i don't believe, i don't think we get to say now it's 37,000. i would have rather seen if it's going to be the minimum number asked for by general m mcchrystal, don't think his request was, by the way, you don't need to send me any if nato will come up 40,000. don't think that was part of the equation as all. our commanders value and they should our american troops as being more effective than the troops put together in the coalitions from nato themselves. even though we have valuable partners and even though they have -- they send some very, very good people there. a little aside, i loorked around the airport in kandahar and i had

the future of al qaeda, of the nato alliance, of possibly nuclear war and peace in south asia, all of these issues are coming together. on the 27th of march, obama focused american forces in the combat zone on disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al qaeda and destroying the sanctuary along the afghanistan-pakistan border. it was clear that while there was a specific mission, to get there we had to stabilize afghanistan and pakistan. that is a much broader mission. the reviews i gave to the president which he endorsed had 20 major recommendations and 180 sub-recommendations and i will not go into them. i want to stress this point. this is resource intensive. this is going to come with a big cost. to send one american soldier to afghanistan for one year costs $1 million. if you think this cost is it to scale, forget it. to send 30,000 that will cost more than $30 million. it does not get cheaper sending more troops. the non-military side is expensive as well. this legislation triples assistance to afghanistan to more than $1.50 billion per year. wow, that is a lot of money. now they a

and i think that appeals to the european allies and nato.ere there to enable the afghani people and their institutions to say no to taliban and al qaeda. and that why we're there. and if they can do that and we can limit this fear of influence that is poisonous philosophy has, and hopefully, limit it to an area where we can monitor and contain it. hopefully it will wither and die like a plant without water. two questions real quick. on the civilian surge, talking with some of my colleagues and people who have been there. there seems to be a bottleneck on the civilian side with respect to getting projects actually on the ground. you get people there but they can't get through the maze of a okay or whatever. i know we have stolen blind in iraq sometime, because we didn't have some protections. but if you could really take a close look, both of you, at the coordination of the commanders, that serve money and how that can be straight in line with the civilian money and coordinated, i would really encourage you to do that. because i think that is