we spent a lot of time with nctc talk by the dh operational components. to be able to provide information and access to nctc so they cannot reach into it. mike is leading the effort to be able to access that kind of data as different changes and becomes more important have access. it's come along way, have a long way to go. none of that is too surprising. even setting aside the obvious physical difficulties of the electronic infrastructure we're talking about which i think, it's been well reported and well understood that it is in the difficult. >> can i add, pat, and maybe phil, since you work this really down in the trenches. looking ahead, what do we want to define as a real constructor role for dhs and fbi? >> one of the things i think to be specific on this, we could and should do better in both organizations, when i went to the bureau in 2005, career for an intelligence officer, i look at the people involved in intelligence reform in washington and virtually all of them were many, most, probably 80% or more, were specialize in overseas foreign intel

he manages nctc sharing initiatives. he's been there since the beginning. to the right of him is kirit amin. he's the director of the counselors at the state department. he managed all of the information technology systems, no small task. next up is gil kerlikowske, director of the drug control policy. we know what the drug czar does. we are honored to have him back. also for repeat performance, is bart johnson. he's principal deputy undersecretary at the department of homeland security. : >> some like to talk about pipes. some like to talk about business culture, and some like to talk about all three. i'll try to be concrete and focus on nect's role specifically and address what i believe to be the current state of information sharing across the community. i think it's an important question because if you go back to the attempted bombing of northwest flight 253 on christmas day, there was talk of information sharing, but frankly, i think it was pretty muddled and that information sharing was worse now than it was before 9/11, and i flat out disagree with t

and then finally the third external actors i was a has a pretty profitable in this is the head of nctc, michael leiter. mike now has a challenge, i think basing it on my testimony two weeks ago that i referred to earlier, it's the flavor of the threat is changing, mike has to change the nctc. he has cut you change that's due out there and begin to put more domestic labor into it as opposed to foreign, more law-enforcement flavor into it as opposed to intelligence, more domestic information from the nsb, into this overall mix. i think he will try to do. i think mike knows that. he will run smack and into what the dni, pointed out in his opening remarks. current restrictions, current policies are at least current culture that makes it more difficult to mingle those kinds of information. but i think mike's job in his, the service for both the nation and also the maturation of the national security branch, is to point out those conflicts, to point of this tension and tort points to policymakers. not necessary to win all the arguments, because, frankly, he may lose him because we are going

and we partner with the fbi and nctc to do that type of dissemination.t's a very difficult process to do. but if they simply flows willy-nilly out to the public at large, what you do an effective stress caused alert fatigue because the average person out there in the street, how are they supposed to react to a constant stream of intelligence leaks about domestic threat? what are they supposed to do with? that's why we have government and policy officials who are supposed to book for what it is will do and how respond to it. so there is a larger role for context perhaps in terms of strategic documents. but i don't think we are under serving the public are maintaining the intelligence of the classified venues. >> john, there's an issue filled race which is an important issue here and that is the question of at what point is it appropriate to collect intelligence and analyze intelligence before someone is at the point of thinking of committing a crime. and it is true to traditional model is you don't have a basis to even forget what happened and require sup

nctc, everybody, saying okay, what is the next possibly and then what do we do with that to inform ther interesting, just several pages. what if and how can they do that? given what we know, how they are using the atp, 12/25, and the most recent. what is the next type of device that we are looking for? >> that's exactly the kind of thing that i was hoping to here. we are doing the kind of reds, military says med teaming, you are saying red selling. but it's the same basic idea. i thank both of you for your testimony. i thank you for what you are doing. i think it would be a good idea. first i'd ask you to respond as soon as you can to the few questions that we ask for more information. and perhaps when we come back after thanksgiving, we don't know exactly how long we will be here. it'll be helpful to do a closed meeting with the two of you. do either of you want to say anything finally before we adjourn the hearing. >> i was just -- i'd like to take the opportunity, mr. chairman, in an appeal to the american people traveling with next week, thanksgiving, all of the people going home t