nixon. some say kissinger. yet others, including myself, view their partnership as both a troubled relationship and complex relationship in which nixon was more the policy strategist and decider, even though sometimes an erratic decider, while kissinger was more the adviser, indispensable tactician and policy implementer. but it's still a debated question, and i do tn't know ift can ever be solved. i said the war was a complicated thing and i can't talk about many other issues. how about the military events, all of those? the strategies, the year-to-year campaigns, what about the other side? this is important in any war, what was the other side side. this is an important part of any war, what was the other side thinking and doing and for that we don't carry as much documentation. very little, indeed and then there are issues about specific events. i'm working on a book with bill burnow in which we have discovered a great deal now about what was called the vance ploy. has anyone heard about the vance ploy? or ope

nixon. some say kissinger. others including myself view their partnership as both a troubled relationship, that word again, complex relationship, in which nixon was more the policy strategist and decider, even though sometimes an erratic decider, while kissinger was more the adviser. indispensable tactician and policy implementer. but it's still a debated question, and i don't know that it can ever be solved. then to -- i said the war was a complicated thing. i can't talk about many other issues. about the military events. all of those strategies. the year to year campaigns. what each side was up to. what about the other side? this is an important part of any war, of course. what was the other side thinking and doing? of course, for that, we don't have as much documentation. very little, indeed. then there are issues about specific events. i'm working on a book with phil burn now in which we have discovered a great deal about operation duck hook which you may have heard about. many other issues including the dom

some say nixon, some say kissinger. others include myself view their partnership as a troubled relationship and that word again, complex relationship, in which nixon was more of policy strategist and decider, even though sometimes an erratic decider, while kissinger was more the advisor, indispense i believe tactician and implementary, still a debated question, i don't know it can ever be solved. then to, i said the war was a complicated thing and i can't talk about other issues, about the military event, all of those, strategies, year-to-year campaign, which each side was up to, this is an important part of any war. what is the other side thing and doing, we don't have as much documentation, very little indeed. then there are issues about specific events by working on a book on bill burn now we discovered the great deal about the vance ploy. operation doug hook, i'm sure you've heard about that. many other issues, including the domestic side of the war, the political pressures on nixon both from the left and right. cong

then of course kissinger came back and there was a period when nixon and kissinger said we will maintain the relationship even though they indicated to the chinese. >> in chinese terms, they were giving it away as an issue. they claimed it as their birth right internally and they were really saying we will let this thing ride for generations. they have. >> they remained in charge of their own deft tee. >> not a bad strategy. it's okay if it takes seven years. >> i think it was done. it was time for more question. who has the question to end-all questions? maybe right here. pretty sure. >> one element that was mentioned was the low key reception. you mentioned it and the cars zipping through, but i thought more of a staged event was more of the chinese or what was going on behind the scenes that caused it to be so low key and what did it symbolize. >> my theory is that the chinese people who are running them wanted to downplay this until they had found out what mao's reaction was going to be. once mao met nixon, everybody relaxed and there was a lot more people around. i remember when we

had to see this in the context of democratic party people trying to take over this issue and nixon and kissinger very cleverly took it away. >> so the price of admission was to give taiwan away and nixon and kissinger were willing to do that. >> that's right. >> how ironic. >> and actually if you read the transcripts which have now basically all been released, it's amazing how blunt they are and how cavalier they are in the meetings with mao and with zhou in sort of saying, well, taiwan's not that important, we'll figure it out, we're not going to make a big fuss about it. and they were really ready to -- and then of course, kissinger -- they came back and for a period -- and both nixon and kissinger said, we're going to maintain the relationship even though privately they'd indicated to the china they were going to dispense with it. >> but in chinese terms, they were giving it away, too, as an issue. this was something that they claimed as their birthright. >> internally, yeah. >> internally. and they were really saying, we'll let this thing ride for generations. >> and they have. >> and taiwan

. >> most of the discussion about vietnam is focused on roles of kissinger and mr. nixon. perhaps less well-known is the role of melvin laird. at least with kissinger we have telephone tapes, we have the white house tapes. what about mel laird? have any of you looked at the mel laird papers? there are surprises in there? are we learning more about his ro role? certainly on capitol hill he was a very astute politician and turned out to be i think a fairly good bureaucratic in-fighter. what insights have you learned? >> yes, i am now with bill looking at mel laird's papers concerning the early period of the war during 1969. let's remember that laird and his biographebiographer, sort o official biographer, argue that secretary laird played an important role in bringing the bar to an end by insisting on the deamericanization which is confused with vietnamization, build up of the south vietnamese and that was his plan and it worked in the end. i'm simplifying the argument, and that was an important role, but at the same time nixon and kissinger bypassed him. they saw vietnamizat

. >> most of the discussion about vietnam is focused on the roles of kissinger and mr. nixon. perhaps less well known are the devil tapes and have any of you looked at the papers? are there surprises in there? are we learning more about his role on capitol hill, he's an as institute politician and turned out to be a bureaucrat particular in-fighter. what insights have you learned? >> yes, i am now looking at the papers. let's remember that secretary laird played an important role by insisting on the de-americanization and that was his plan and it worked in the end of simplifying the argument and that was an important role but at the same time, nixon and kissinger bypassed them. they saw it as part of a solution. that is, you're going to withdraw and if you haven't won an agreement, that is necessary to preserve south vietnam, then there's the danger of south vietnam failing. falling. and therefore you need to build up the south vietnamese on the other side. nixon didn't end it until 1969 and into '70 and even then it was more than laird wanted them to the other strategy was fo

nixon that had the vision. the record at the time is that henry kissinger was surprised that nixon said it, said to haldeman among others, the president wants to go china, what's going on, i think he's lost his senses here. kissinger has now said and said in his memoirs that he and nixon were always at one on this and i think it's absolutely true when kissinger realized that this was in nixon's thinking, he saw the possibilities and he saw the advantage of an opening to china and worked very hard on it, but it was my sense that nixon who was there pushing it. >> you say in the back under interviews and oral histories that you interviewed henry kissinger in paris may 15th of 2003 and may 18th of 2003. what were the circumstances? >> i was at a conference. i'd been invited to a conference by a friend who knew that henry kissinger was going to be there and knew henry kissinger and very kindly sort of said to kissinger, look, this historian would like to interview you and don't worry, she won't ask you impossible questions, anyway, vouched for me. and i met him the very first day of the conference, it was a cocktail

-soviet accommodation, or to the nixon-kissinger view of hard, tough-minded detente. yet on the other hand, if you adopted the distinct mental construct that the u.s.-soviet competition was temporary, that it would end soon with their losing and our winning, since their system contradicted human nature and therefore was illegitimate and our system complemented human nature, allowing the flowering of the human being and therefore was legitimate, then you took a radically different view. this approach, stemming as i say from a different mindset than ronald reagan had, broke with previous presidents, especially nixon-kissinger who felt they had to adopt a realistic foreign policy, one that accepted soviet power forever more, one which would legitimize this predicament and legitimize the soviet government. in contrast with reagan's mindset and policy stemming from it, he would be willing to sit down with the soviets, but you'd also be willing to stand up to them. moreover, you'd be game to adopt the so-called reagan doctrine, a vigorously challenging moscow, rollback as i

i think nixon and kissinger do deserve credit for a moment that was acting on it. nixon's calculation. 60 he talks about having lunch with nixon in hong kong in 1967 and asking nixon about vietnam politically to do it in this is the great step and bringing the chinese in and therefore if we have to do certain things, we have to give them credit. and i was not a fan of nixon, but he is a complicated figure who pulled this off and it was simultaneously pettiy and vindictive and kissinger the same way. it's really a complete split personality. they did this amazing thing with this other side that was not nearly so attractive. >> presumably not pro communist. what was in your head when you were about to go to the land of the anti-christ and bury the hatchet and have your leader, president nixon, embrace these people who we spent decades in opposition to. >> i was pinching myself. i took this as a dream. i have studied chinese in the early 60s. i spent years as a china analyst in hong kong and working with people and the idea that we were going to go to china and now by

of course kissinger came back for the president and nixon and kissinger said we will maintain the relationship and even though five indicated that they were going to -- >> they were giving it away too. >> as an issue. they claimed this as their birth right internally and saying we will let this thing ride for generations. and they have. >> taiwan remained in charge of its own destiny. not a bad strategy. he said it's okay if it takes seven years? >> i think we have time for one more question. who has the question to end-all questions? maybe right here? i'm pretty sure. >> one element mentioned in the film that i never heard a good explanation of was the low key reception. the cars zipping through and i would have thought more of a staged event was more of the chinese. what was going on that cawed it to be so low key and what did it symbolize? >> the chinese people who are running the trip wanted to downplay until they found out what it was going to be once mao met nixon and they relaxed, there were a lot more people around. you can see there were a lot of people halfway down the various blocks

i think nixon and kissinger deserve credit for sort of susing out that there was a moment and acting on it. nixon's calculation was that only a guy like nixon could do this. and interestingly, i interviewed morley safer h talks about having lunch with nixon in hong kong in 1967 and asking nixon -- wanting to ask nixon about vietnam and nixon saying, vietnam is not important, it's a sideshow. china is important. and he wrote a report about it. but what nixon said to safer was, the only person who can do an opening to china politically in the states would be a republican president because he was the one who had credibility with the people who were against it. if a democrat had been doing it, nixon would have been the first one to sort of get on the bandwagon and bait them for betraying taiwan and so on. he was able politically to do it and to sell it to a lot, not all, but a lot of the skeptics on the right by saying, well, this is our great step to counter the soviet union andon side. and therefore, if we have to do certain things. so you have to give them credit. i'm a product of the

could tell me the reaction of the americans, because the state department didn't know that nixon and kissinger were thinking of the only to china, and the official reaction was we wish you wouldn't do it. a couple of them could tell, john frazier, for example, was in beijing when the nixon party arrived, so he gave me sort of an eyewitness account and he also knows chinese and so he could tell me what -- he told me a wonderful story. the night that nixon arrived. the chinese gave a very cool reception because they didn't want i think to look excited by it and they didn't know whether mao would give his sort of approval to it. and the night that the nixon party had arrived in beijing, apparently it was a long news broadcast and john frazier from canada told me this, it was all about the model farms and so-and-so and the women workers of szechwan province had hit a new high. and a little item at the end, by the way, president nixon paid us a visit today. i got some color from the canadians. >> "paris 1919" which i have here, you told us that it had sold well. there's a lot in there about the ott

in the end on simplifying the argument and that was an important role, but at the same time nixon and kissinger bypassed them. they solved vietnamization as part of the solution as i tried to explain. that is, if you're going to withdraw and you haven't won an glaement is necessary to and therefore, you need grow and she was an important part of this, but nixon didn't emsta, and each then they withdrew more slowly than laird wanted them to. the other part of it was force, which is -- if i want to judge in the short time i have here. i think it failed their main purpose which was to force the other side to withdraw north vietnamese troops from south vietnam and to give up their insistence of a unified vietnam. that did not happen. but the point is vietnamization took a long time to come into play, by the time they came into play most american troop his withdrawn. okay, this is complicated. >> i have actually a slightly interpretation of laird's role and by the way. theon

they discuss the partnership between richard nixon and henry kissinger, the president's approach as commander in chief and the pentagon papers and the administration's response to dissent. >> welcome back to "understanding richard nixon and his era," a symposium. i'm ken hughes. i'm a researcher with the presidential recordings program of the university of virginia's miller center. co-sponsor of this, the first scholarly conference after richard m. nixon library and museum. returning now to nixon and vietnam. a tragically timely subject when america finds herself embroiled in an inclusive war or two. and the editor of foreign affairs and the pages of the "new york times" has suggested that president obama model his exit from afghanistan on president nixon's exit from vietnam. we have some amazing, amazingly good scholars to discuss the subject with you today. i'll introduce each one right before he or she speaks. we'll start off with jeffrey kimball. no one has done more to bring richard nixon's te cent integral exit strategy to life than jeff kimball. he has written two pathfinding books on

those three questions were critical to the kinds of transformational diplomacy that proceeded the kissinger-nixon gamut to china and detente. the questions may be asked but is there a to actually operationalize them, a breakthrough strategy when it comes to diplomacy with iran. finally i'll point out the obvious. we as a country have entered the area of incognito. in the matter of a year, we have seen both our friends and our enemies literally go the way of the do do. the arab world is two experience, two authorize taerns, acquiescence, egyptians, tunisians and add ver sarls -- adversarloufriends are gone, traditional enemies with whom we have actually found a way to more or less co-exist. we are in a new experience. the arab world preoccupied as it is may well offer up an opportunity for non-arabs to play a greater role. three countries. frankly right now our position to be much more consequential to the future of this region than any single arab country. israel, iran, and turkey. those three countries are still capable of acting, and i'm not suggesting always for the good, in ways that can chan

actually the last paragraph in the book, and it's a comment that was made by henry kissinger who, of course, was richard nixon'ssecurity adviser and secretary of state, and has joined with these three men and the assistant at stanford to raise the ability of nuclear weapons, to raise the steps that can be taken to reduce nuclear threats and also to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. so the comment by henry kissinger speaks to what the world might think if there were to be use of a nuclear weapon, either by a terrorist group in an american city or a foreign city or perhaps a nuclear exchange somewhere in the world between india and pakistan. there are a lot of different scenarios out there that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. and i think this sets the stage for the discussion that we're going to have. and this is what dr. kissinger said. once nuclear weapons are used, we will be driven to take global measures to prevent it. some of us have said, let's ask ourselves, if we have to do it afterwards, why don't we do it now? so let me begin the conversation by talking about and asking the gentlemen here

it was a comment made by henry kissinger, who was richard nixon's national security advisor and secretary of state and has joined with the these three men and a physicist at stanford to raise the visibility of nuclear weapons issues, to call for steps that could be taken to reduce nuclear threats, and to end -- eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. the comment by henry kissinger speaks to what a world might think if there were to be use of a nuclear weapon either by a terrorist group in an american city or a foreign city, or a nuclear exchange somewhere in the world between india and pakistan. there are a lot of different scenarios out there that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. i think this sets the stage for the discussion we will have. this is what doctor kissinger said -- "once nuclear-weapons are used, we will be driven to take global measures to prevent it. some of us have said, let's ask ourselves, if free have to do it afterwards, why don't we do it now?" let me began the conversation by talking about and asking the gentleman here questions about contemporary threats and

it was a comment made by henry kissinger, who was richard nixon's national security advisor and secretary of state and has joined with the these three men and a physicist at stanford to raise the visibility of nuclear weapons issues, to call for steps that could be taken to reduce nuclear threats, and to end -- eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. the comment by henry kissinger speaks to what a world might think if there were to be use of a nuclear weapon either by a terrorist group in an american city or a foreign city, or a nuclear exchange somewhere in the world between india and pakistan. there are a lot of different scenarios out there that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. i think this sets the stage for the discussion we will have. this is what doctor kissinger said -- "once nuclear-weapons are used, we will be driven to take global measures to prevent it. some of us have said, let's ask ourselves, if free have to do it afterwards, why don't we do it now?" let me began the conversation by talking about and asking the gentleman here questions about contemporary threats and

and henry kissinger told me when he came to the white house that nixon's national security adviser that he met at nixon's request with eisenhower to get eisenhower's point of view about various foreign and domestic problems, and the next day that story ran in "the washington post." and he had not leaked it. but somebody did. and he picked up his phone and it was ike from his hospital bed and kissinger said to me, i have never been cursed out that way in my whole life before or since. i have never, ever been cursed out that way. he cursed kissinger up and down as only an army man can. turned out that it wasn't kissinger who had leaked it. butk kissinger said having ike vent his anger on you was -- and when ike was an >> i and he thought somebody hadn't done their best or tried their best or was not obeying an order of his, his temper could be ferocious, and yet completely concealed. you can read biographies of ike and supposedly he's a smiling and genial fellow, he was. but behind that was something else a much tougher guy. >> 1999 when you were last here, if i'd asked you the same quest

and then that's sort of morphed over with henry kissinger tow policy of peaceful coexistence when nixon got and. going to try to be friends with the communists. and reagan thought that, i want to kill. those people, they treat the people like barnyard animals. people who live under communism live like slaves. he doesn't like it. he made a moral value judgment that he was supposed to make, but he made it. and so he said -- here was his initial problem. all these old guys, whenever it was, everyone, he kept these guys radius of. and finally he got gorbachev. gorbachev was a lawyer, well educated. these other guys educating, and reasonable. reagan got a lot of flak because he came back from iceland to where you is supposed to have a big arms talk to get rid of some of these missiles. gorbachev let al wouldn't do it. well, reagan had from the very beginning when out and made a visit the first year to some place, some mountain out in nevada, idaho or someplace, a big central control, all the buttons the press to blow the world. here is this guy, colonel a general. what are our defenses? we d

i'm the sort of morphed with henry kissinger to a policy of peaceful coexistence when nixon got in.e're going to try and be friends with the communists. and reagan, i want to kill them. the other people or creed of slaves. they treat the people at trying again to malls and people who live in communism live like slaves. he made a moral value judgment that u.s. was to make. but he made it. and so, here was his initial problem and all these old guys, they all died. everyone, the soviet cat taking these guys who are 80 years old all day long. and finally he got gorbachev and gorbachev was a lawyer. he was well educated. a lot of these other guys were communists. the gorbachev was an educated man and he's reasonable. they thought he could reason with them, but it didn't start off well and reagan got a lot of flack said he came back from iceland but they were supposed to have a big arm tzatziki bit of some of these missiles. and gorbachev said i wouldn't do it. but reagan had from the very beginning of his presidency, he would not admit of this is probably the first year to someplace, so

nixon's trip in 1972 ended 25 years of isolation between the two countries. former secretary of state henry kissingerill also speak at today's events. >>> 5:23 right now. sites are buzzing as apple prepares to unveil its newest version of the ipad. bob redell joins us from san francisco with some of the fanfare and some of the features that apple is adding to the device. good morning, bob. >> reporter: good morning to you, laura. anyone expecting what is expected to be the third generation of the i pat to be light-years ahead of the ipad 2 might be disappointed. you might recall that one had two new cameras and was slimmer and lighter in size. but the speculation surrounding what would be the third generation is that it would have perhaps serie, the voice-activated assistant you find on our iphone 4s, speedier access to wi-fi, faster processor and a high definition display leading some to think they'll be calling this not the ipad 3 but the ipad hd. there are some thoughts from our own tech and business guru, scott buznick. >> not a radical change in design but on the inside, a lot of new software, a