differences among the nixon memoirs, as you can imagine, nixon painted his actions as being statesman like. saffire, price, garment and shuls portrayed nixon as pragmatic in his approach to the south and school desegregation. the president rode white southern backlash to re-election in 1972 while at the same time doing more to desegregate southern schools than any previous president. one thing the nixonian accounts had in common, none of the memoirists, with perhaps the exception of garment, made civil rights the tom nant or lead subject in their books. the third school of thought the scholarly revision of the civil rights policies of nixon had its origins in the 1980s and 1990s and first decade of the 21st century. why did it happen? well, documents opened. tempers and passions cooled at least somewhat. there was a wistful longing for liberal policies after the conservative administrations of ronald reagan and george bush the first and the moderate administrations that bracketed them by democrats jimmy carter and bill clinton. and in domestic policy in general and in civil rights pol

differences among the nixon memoirs, mixon painted his actions as being statesman-like. others portrayed him as being pragmatic in his approach to the south. ehrlichman probably the most critical depicts nixon as wiley and effective. the president rode white southern backlash to re-election in 1972 while at the same time doing more to desegregate southern schools than any previous president. one thing the nixonian accounts had in common, none of these memoirists made several rights policy the dominant theme or the lead subject in their books. third school of thought would be the scholarly revision of nixon's civil rights policies. has its origins in the 1980s, continues through the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century. why did it happen? well, documents opened. tempers and passions cooled, at least somewhat. there was a wis.ftful longing f conservative policies. and in domestic policy in general and in civil rights policy in particular, here was an opportunity to say something fresh about the nixon presidency. major works in this school of thought include hue da

>> i started with reading nixon's memoirs and then reading the steven ambrose biography of nixon. i thought i knew about him because i was growing up when nixon was president and i remember watergate very well, but when you're a historian you've got to really study it in more depth instead of having vague impressions. i started studying that and i found a wonderful archive at georgetown and it's online and they had declassified or asked for declassification of all sorts of documents including the transcripts of the conversations between nixon and mao and between nixon and kissinger and li, so i started reading all that and gradually stuff was declassified because the foreign relations of the united states was just doing the nixon years and a whole bunch of stuff was coming out, so i began to collect whatever i could in north america and then i don't read chinese, so i got a couple of chinese graduate students to start going through the chinese sources for me and translating those for me. >> did it make a difference? >> it did i think. the chinese still have not released nearly ast

now, of course, richard nixon addressed dissent in his 1978 memoir defending the administration's practice of wiretapping as a legitimate response to, in his words, unprecedented levels of domestic terrorism. the administration's dissent policies, the president insisted, quote, did not involve the use of any measures not previously employed by federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. indeed, the president expressed no concern, no remorse rather, excuse me, no remorse, and revealed no inner conflict over his administration's reliance on questionable methods to achieve desired results. in the 1990s as scholars gained access to more white house materials such as presidential recordings, important presidential recordings and documents, their work began to emphasize the personal role that president nixon played in shaping, encouraging, and in some cases demanding that his aides go after first dissidents and later political enemies. these more recent works have held nixon personally accountable for the political culture of the era. and while recent scholarship has introduced new and ex

documentary declassification of the mid 1990's after, could rely on memoirs, interviews bureaucratic information and surmise, remember nixon and kissinger made the key decisions often in secret. this absent of the evidence for these authors i mentioned unavoidably restricted their understanding of this counter intuitive and highly secret exit option and i don't have time to discuss the misunderstanding. working with an abundant tapes, i argued from late 1970 to 1971 when the nixon-kissinger strategy had clearly failed to force the other side to make vital concessions, the ones nixon and kissinger wanted and nixon and kissinger prioritized the decent interval option. it had evolved, in other words, from one designed in 1969, for the purpose of providing two with, in kissinger's words, a decent chance of enduring for an in determi period to provide with sufficient military assistance and equipment to survive for in kissinger's words, a reasonable or decent interval of at least one to three years after the american departure, long enough to dilute the perception of nixon and kissinger's responsibilities, such as it was, one w

1990s and afterwards could only rely on memoirs, interviews and bits of bureaucratic information and surmise to inform their discussions. remember, i mentioned nixon and kissinger, you know, making the key decisions in secret intent. this absence of key evidence for these authors i mentioned unavoidably restricted their understanding of this byzantine counterintuitive and highly secret exit option. and i don't have time to discuss the misunderstandings. working with an abundant cache of declassified documents and tapes, i've argued from late 1970 to 1971 when the nixon/kissinger strategy had clearly failed to force the other side to make vital c concessi concessions, the ones nixon and kissinger wanted, and as the administration continued to withdraw troops unilaterally, nixon and kissinger prioritized the decent interval option. it had evolved, in other words, from one designed in 1969 for the purpose of providing queue with in kissinger's words a decent chance of enduring for an indeterminate period after a u.s. exit to one designed after 1970 to provide him with sufficient -- to provide ku with sufficient military assistance and equipment to su