there are some are that are equally -- there are some that are equally nonbeneficial and you have to reassess. >> what did you disagree with in this report? >> on this point of there's a continuumf risk, so currently the national security agencies are at one position on this risk continuum. there's diversity within it, but collectively they are around some value. part of the reason that you're writing this is that you think that they ought to be someplace else; right? that the risks from accidents are being too highly discounted or just not considered at all so they are discounted infinitely; right, in favor of immediate operational use or whatnot. so a question that i have, though, is very much like jim just said, about where do we want to be? right? how will we know when we're done? how will we know when we're appropriately balanced; right? what will be the point at which you would be comfortable writing the counter to saying we're doing too much now; right? and i don't feel like we yet have a principaled way of answering that question other than hearing which voices are yelling th