and this is helpful to the north vietnamese. plus, if there are chinese troops in north vietnam, the north vietnamese can infiltrate more of their regular units into the south or cambodia or laos. when you think about american options next week, think about american options for dealing with this war, keep in mind the chinese presence here and the factor that that brings to the table. now, in 1964, the north decided that they would consolidate their control over the central highlands and they would extend into other parts of lowland areas of vietnam. and they're thinking that now they're getting prepared for what they think is going to be a final offensive against the south. and after the gulf of tonkin incident and the fact that they couldn't negotiated a settlement, the north decided at this point they really had to start committing regular north vietnamese army units to the south because they're fearful the americans are going to come in. they fear they have to match any escalation that's going to happen in the south. they also

there are 10,000, sometimes over 100,000, north vietnamese regular troops. you have the guerrilla forces, but you also have extremely large numbers of vietnamese troops. keep that in mind. there are multiple pieces to this puzzle here. now, the north vietnamese, their grand strategy really for prosecuting this war is what they call revolutionary warfare. what do they mean by this? well, again, the core of it comes from mao's basic tenets of prosecuting a guerrilla war. you see on the graphics in a moment. the guerrilla points, but this is something mao would agree with as well, you've got to have the idea -- you've got to win the idea war. you've got to motivate the people politically. you do this through indoctrination, terrorism if it takes that. you also have the conventional and unconventional military means that you're going to use. it's very broad-based approach. and you also -- the north also comes to the point where they believe -- that they believed this very early, that you have to mobilize the entire population to do it. everyone is a soldier and e

what seems to be overlooked is the ability of the north vietnamese to escalate this war step by step with washington. you begin to suspect that we've reached our limits when the generals are talking openly about an invasion of the north and the men around con thien are talking about the need for tactical nuclear weapons. >> there seems little doubt that it is the administration's resolve to stay at con thien. the president made that clear last friday night when he pointed to the marines up at the dmz as the real peacekeepers. lyndon johnson understands that a defeat or even a withdrawal now at con thien could be for him a political coup. the president's dilemma is to thousand persuade the vietnamese to quit up there. up until now, pure fire power hasn't tone it. it seems unlikely that he would order troops into north vietnam to do the job. they would react sharply to such an escalation. meantime for the marines at con thien, the months ahead look grimmer than ever, the fall monsoon rains have just begun. they will go on until february. hampering american air power, depriving the men o

north vietnamese regulars. the enemy had struck with a force of 1,200 men. captured enemy weapons would gather from all over the perimeter. the cost to the americans in that first battle at con thien included 124 wounded. of those, 110 were marines. the rest, special forces men. and there were our own dead, 44 americans all together, all of them marines. the first to fall at con thien. for the next few months, there was less action than preparation for action. the marines had come to stay, to take control of con thien from the south vietnamese. the plan was to establish a post on the hill stop that could be more easily defended. that meant more bunkers and well protected gun emplacements. the expectation was for another ground assault. enemy artillery was fairly inactive until july when it got busier. the americans retaliated with air strikes. for the rest of july and august, the marines at con thien used their own guns to good effect. the ammunition, an endless supply, came in daily. and it was used up daily. this was the end of a supply lifeline that arriv

so i spot these two north vietnamese against this little mound there. they were actually down in a creek bed, come up on a flat area, there's a little mound with bamboo coming out of it and everything else. there's two of them on this side. there's an american g.i. on the other side. the mound's only i'd say three, four feet high. maybe six feet diameter. so they're on one side, the g.i.'s on the other side. i don't know if they could see each other or if they saw each other prior to this, what the hell's going on. but that's how close they came. and i'm screaming and yelling. i stopped and i screamed and yelled. they're not very far away. >> what were you saying? >> i was screaming, north vietnamese, viet cong, everything i could say, screaming and trying to point. and nobody could hear me. the noise was very loud. and he didn't look, and i don't think the north vietnamese even seen me because it could have been another one threw the grenade at me. i don't know where that grenade came from. >> can you thinking it's these two guys? >> pardon? >> are you

for the north vietnamese? what are their objectives? now, the vietnamese -- north vietnamese communist objectives are pretty clear. it's not as clear from reading as it should be. they want to take all of southeast asia. french indochina. in particular, the conquest of south vietnam. that's what they want. they tell us the first thing we need to do is figure out the nature of the war. again, for our purposes for this, when you start your study of this case study, you start investigating this case study, think about that. what is the nature of this war? one of my colleagues back in newport, he talks about this being a war within a war within a war. and it's interesting perspective to think of because you have a multilayered series of events and activities obviously that are going on here. and different ways of fighting it. for the communists in many ways this is a revolutionary war. they want to expand communism in southeast asia. again, south vietnam is only the next stop on the road to that. and a regular warfare, guerrilla warfare is

so i spot these two north vietnamese against this little mound there. they were actually down in a creek bed, come up on a flat area, there's a little mound with bamboo coming out of it and everything else. there's two of them on this side. there's an american g.i. on the other side. the mound's only i'd say three, four feet high. maybe six feet diameter. so they're on one

so i spot these two north vietnamese on the -- against this little mound there. they were down in the creekbed and coming up on the flat area, little mound, bamboo coming out of it. anyhow, there are two of them on this side. american gi on the other side. the mound is only like -- i would say three, four feet high. and maybe six feet at diameter. they are on one side and gi on the other side. i don't know if they can see each other or if they saw each other prior to this, what the hell is going on. that's how close they came. i'm screaming and yelling. i stop and scream and yell. they are not far away. >> what were you saying? >> i was screaming. north vietnamese, viet cong, everything i could say, screaming and trying to point. nobody could hear me. noise was very loud. and he didn't look. i don't think the north vietnamese -- could have been another one throwing another grenade at me. i don't know where it came from. >> are you thinking it is these two guys? >> well, those are the two guys i saw. place is polluted with them. they are everywhere. up in trees. s

the americans, outnumbered by the north vietnamese army prevailed, but at a heavy cost. enrique pujals was a second lieutenant and a platoon leader with the 2nd battalion, 7th cavalry in the fall of 1965. his platoon got into the fight at landing zone x-ray where his men were first hit with friendly fire. up next, excerpts from his oral history interview. immediately following this 30-minute program we'll hear from tracy black enders, the daughter of a newspaper reporter who was embedded with the 7th cavalry. now, enrique pujals. >> i was platoon leader just about two, maybe three days at the most before we set out on operation. we set out on that operation on or about the 8th or the 9th of november. my company. >> okay. and in your operation between somewhere between the 8th and the 14th, did you guys make enemy contact? >> not us. >> not your unit? >> no. >> so then you come back, so on the 14th, you are still out in the boonies, conducting operations, and -- in the is it the general vicinity of x-ray? i'm trying to think of where -- >> i don't know exactly where we we

he died when he hit the jungle or was captured by the north vietnamese. i don't think they ever found his body. they found the plane. that was an incident that happened when i was up there also. frightening, shocking scenes, you know out of hollywood, you know. i watched a lot of world war ii films and stuff. that was always like -- since i didn't participate in world war ii or korea, that was like a movie to a kid, too. kamikaze planes. to see this. but to see it live right in front of your eyes, i mean, man. that never leaves you. >> watched the movie before vietnam growing up? >> kid, yes. black and whites. yes. all those great movies and stuff. >> yeah. >> to this day i'm -- i'm a historian in the sense that i love documentaries. you know. i like -- i like watching anything real. i won't watch a fiction movie. you know. i like the documentaries, history channel, stuff like that. but -- yeah. but when it happens in front of your face, you take a snapshot of it in your brain. it is with you for life. you never forget it. yeah. >> you make your way over

>> well, he knew that the north vietnamese forces were still there. that we needed to first of all do some policing of the battlefield to try to recover as many american soldiers, bodies as we could, try to get them back inside the perimeter. go through normal routine as a company once you go in line. establish your positions, put out listening posts, do all the kinds of military tactical things that a unit should do. and then establish good communications with the unit on the right and the left and the battalion headquarters. >> you stay there in the day and a night. before you're walked off. what was that night like? >> there were a number of probing attacks. at least along the sector that we were on. as i recall, we were on the -- probably the western side of the perimeter. no real heavy probes because they were looking for weaknesses in the line. my company being fresh, we had ample supply of ammunition. we were a solid company. they didn't find too many weaknesses. so they obviously probed some place else. >> tell me about your general feelings a

was not only the viet cong in the south and the infiltration and in the end invasion by the north vietnamese, it was the weakness and corruption of the south vietnamese government. as the vietnam war went on, mcnamara had less and less time for other matters. so the decisions were often passed down to the deputy secretary of defense. and they didn't have quite the same quality. my conclusion from all of this is that four years is long enough. there's an old saying that, for a secretary of defense, there's an old saying that in washington, friends come and go, but enemies accumulate. and when they accumulate enough, your effectiveness goes down. moreover, as time goes by, you come to think that you've seen it all, and you mistake your familiarity with wisdom. it's hard to rethink things. it's hard to clean up your own mess. and i think bob mcnamara was a very successful, almost unprecedentedly successful secretary of defense in his four years, and the last three were a tragedy. i have very little to say about clark clifford. he was only secretary for a year. and he devoted himself almost enti

our response will depend upon the action of the aggressors, in this case the north vietnamese. the key to the situation remains the cessation of infiltration from the north into the south. >> we seek no wider war. but we find ample evidence that there is no relenting on the part of the north. in this one captured shipment of vietcong arms, there are a million round of small arms ammunition. 3,500 rifles, submachine guns, and some 4,000 anti-tank and mortar rounds. and there's no doubt about the source. the chinese markings are unmistakable. in meeting the aggression so clearly evidenced here, we have sent strength to meet force. but we have also repeatedly sent word that we are willing to talk, as secretary of state dean rusk makes plain. >> our war aim in south vietnam is peace. >> last year, we brought the vietnam problem before the security council of the united nations. at the time of the gulf of tonkin affair. but hanoi refused an invitation to come to the security council to talk about it. the distinguished secretary-general of the united nations considered a peace mission

the americans outnumbered by the north vietnamese army prevailed but it was at a heavy cost. up next, an interview with the medal of honor recipient captain ed "too tall" freeman, helicopter pilot who flew his helicopter in to help deliver ammunition, supplies and to rescue wounded soldiers. >> a video or history interview with major ed freeman. we are commemorating the 40th anniversary. thank you for doing this. i want to ask you about your memories of your days and if you could before we get to some of the specific things that happened, can you tell me about your training for those type of conditions and i know talking about the pilots had you to throw things out the door and improvise. can you tell me what you brought into this battle? >> experience. >> i was already an experience ed pilot. i ran a year of mapping. i had been in south and central america for four years doing the same basic job. same basic job. >> right. >> so i had quite a bit of experience. >> and you had some interesting experience in korea. >> yes. and as far as battle is concerned, war is concerned, i

the americans, outnumbered by the north vietnamese army prevailed but it was at a heavy cost. up next an interview with medal of honor recipient, captain ed "too tall" freeman, a helicopter pilot who flew his unarmed helicopter into landing zone x-ray to help deliver ammunition, supplies, and to rescue wounded soldiers. this is about 40 minutes. today is veterans day, november 11th, 2005, we're in washington, d.c. in the crystal city and we are commemorating the 40th anniversary of the battles of the ia drang valley back in november of 1965. major freeman, thank you for doing this. and i want to ask you a little bit about your memories of those days in the ia drang. and if you could, before we get to some of the specific things that happened could you tell me about your training for those type of missions, and i know talking to other pilots, you had to throw some things out the door, you know, and improvise. but could you tell me what you brought in to that battle? >> experience. i didn't -- i didn't have the privilege of training with 11th air assault. now my commander bruce

we became in the view of the north vietnamese the occupying force, so it seemed like a good place and then 75 of course is when we had that ignominious retreat from saigon. >> your book talks a lot about people. and you've got a lot of pictures in your book. and combat to the early days of vietnam, we have a picture of dwight eisenhower and john f. kennedy explain the transition between those two presidential administrations and the status of vietnam. >> well, at that point, kennedy had won with a very narrow electoral -- welcome a large electoral victory but a very narrow popular victory. really about one-third of which could turn out to be in this election. so he's aware that he needed legitimacy and he appointed a number of republicans to his cabinet. when he went for the transitional meetings when there were two of them, with eisenhower, both sides were determined to make it pleasant, agreeable, reassure the country that there was no friction because when ike had taken over from harry truman there was a lot of bad feeling was the height of that mccarthy kind of name-calling and th

completely to take into account the unyielding, unremitting determination to prevail of the north vietnamese. johnson and mcnamara violated what many consider the first rule of war. the strategy and they managed the process of escalation and sending and receiving of nuanced signals that was fundamental to the escalation and in fact, drey observes a momentum of its own. that mara feared but was unable to check. in his handling of the signals, they were supposed to either intimidate or entice them into negotiating a settlement and was often marked by the role. individual still counts. that's how they explain the repetition 40 years later of this same experience by simply the fact of another texan in the white house and another slicked back secretary of defense. is there something more in the national character that lead us to behave in this way? without providing a way to pay for it. to be fair of course, this again is more lbj's doing than mcnamara's. primarily to protect his domestic programs. as drey points out, the president's economic advisers also naively believe they could manipulate th

it was after thiz battled in 1965 that the north vietnamese forces began to engage in guerrilla warfare. the americans prevailed but at a heavy cost. next an interview with tony nadal. the only commander with vietnam combat experience. this is about 50 minutes. >> tony, i'd like to start with you just kind of identifying for us what your responsibilities were, your m.o.s. november 14th, 1965. >> i was the captain commander of company a, 1st battalion up 7th cavalry. >> so knowing that that's what you're going to be doing, leading a company into the valley on november 14th, let's back up a little bit. >> okay. >> let's go back to when you first joined the 1st air cav. what month and year? >> i joined in august of '65. i had been in graduate school in oklahoma studying -- no, wait a minute. let me back up. that was wrong. i had just finished the armored career course. i'm an infantry officer but i was sent to the armored career course. i had finished that course, had gone to ft. benning for pathfinder school and was on home on 30 days leave in oklahoma when orders to korea came in, a rifl

reporter: from the official citation rose will hear how les's bravo company was ambushed by north vietnameseow he led repeated forays and how he her husband used his own body, shielding another soldier from a grenade blast. and how those seriously wounded with shrapnel, sabo charged an enemy bunker, drawing fire and retrieving ammunition from the fallen so the battle might continue the young soldier from ellwood city saved a lot of lives that day. >> and any one of them would have done what he did. you know, they loved each other so. >> reporter: promoted to sergeant posthumously, les was recommended for the medal of honor on the battlefield. the long delay? the result of lost paperwork. >> i never dreamed i wasn't going to spend my life with him. i never dreamed it. i just knew he was going to come home. but he didn't. >> that report from mary robb jackson of cbs station in pittsburgh. >>> straight ahead, your wednesday morning weather. >>> and in sports, veteran pitcher jamie moyer claims a major league record that has stood for 80 years. 80 years. ♪ [ lopez ] the red white and blue means

as a soldier in the north vietnamese army. he lost members of his friends and family in the war. he has bitter memories of that time. he takes care of a village temple dedicated to those who died in the r. he has mixed feelings about vietnam joining hands with the u.s. he finds it hard to forgive the former enemy, but says cooperation for the benefit of both countries. >> translator: frankly speaking, i still bear a grudge against the u.s. but when looking five or ten years ahead, it might be a good idea to cooperate with the u.s. >> reporter: the two navies are taking those mixed feelings into consideration. the training does not involve military maneuvers. instead, they are practicing disaster response and civilian rescue. the crews are also visiting each other's vessels. >> translator: learning about the u.s. fleet's devices is very significant. >> reporter: vietnam and the u.s. are eager to include cooperation in a bid to protect china's growing maritime power but those efforts will require more work to enhance public understanding. akiko ishihara, central vietnam. >>> myanma

what happened then was congress began to cut off all the military equipment until a north vietnamese said, the congress forced the south vietnamese to fight a poor man's war. it was not richard nixon who marched us into vietnam. he tried to get us out with other than. honor. he succeeded in doing so, quite frankly, against the opposition of a lot of people who were responsible for having all those guys over there. >> the controversy continues. it's useful to be reminded that this is a terribly controversial time. there were many advocates on the other side. controversial time, there were many advocates on the other side, and people gathered here were all at one time or another advocates on the other side, so it's natural that you've gotten a certain interpretation. i suppose there's a larger question for speech writers, that is, how do you assemble a coalition of speech writers who have different views and how as a writer do you always agree with the principle you are writing for. when you don't agree, how do you handle that in your own mind. at what point do you leave. at what point

completely to take into account the unyielding, unremitting determination to prevail of the north vietnamese. johnson and mcnamara then violated what many consider the first rule of war, know your enemy. i would also suggest, just in passing, that drea's argument here begs the comment of, was there a workable strategy, and i'm inclined to agree with secretary brown on this, that there most likely was not. mcnamara prided himself on his ability to manage the process of escalation and sending and receiving of nuanced signals that was fundamental to the strategy escalation. in fact, drea observes, the war gained a momentum of its own, that mcnamara feared but was unable to check. in his handling of the signals that were supposed to either intimidate or entice hanoi into negotiating a settlement was often marked by ineptitude and outride bungling. the way johnson and mcnamara went to war was then notably idiosyncratic, suggesting that even in the complex world of the 20th century, late 20th century, i suppose this is reassuring. the role of the individual still counts. two different leaders migh

as i was on the phone, two north vietnamese soldiers walked in to our offices on the fourth floor ofhe eaton building in the heart of saigon. peter, matt and i offered them cokes from an old rusted white refrigerator and some stale pound cake, all that we had left in the bureau. we took out some maps and they showed us the attack roots they had followed in to 150i gone. they took out their wallets and pulled out some family photos and talked about how long they had not seen their loved ones. and it struck me then that they were no different really than the south vietnamese, nor for that matter the americans. all of whom had been killing each other. they all carried snapshots of missed wivean

it was after these battles waged in november 1965 that north vietnamese forces began engaging in gorilla warfare ri gorilluer. enrique pujals was a second lieutenant in the fall of 1965. his platoon got into the fight at landing zone x-ray where his men were first hit with friendly fire. up next, experts there his oral history interview. immediately following this 30 minute program, we'll hear from tracey black enders, the daughter of a news paper reporter who was embedded with the 7th cal vvarcalvary. now enreky enrique pujals. >> i became a platoon leader maybe two, three days at the most before we set out on operation. and we set out on that operation on or about the 8th or 9th of november. >> and in your operation, did you make enemy contact? >> no, not us. >> not your unit. so on the 149, you'th, you're conducting operations. is it the general vicinity of x-ray? >> i don't know exactly where we were. we were in the general vicinity. i had a map. i don't remember very well. just going out there and just -- actually, just going fast because i was the platoon and i was doing what i lea

attacks, i will on my own authority, without consulting congress, send in the planes, bomb the north vietnamese army tanks. i'm here for you. well, nixon was not there for them in 1975. and that deal. so i think president nixon inherited a bad situation. and in many ways, made a number of things worse. but that's something we need to debate further. yeah. >> i was just wondering, a lot of people say that vietnam was a pointlesses war. but if had not occurred, could it -- we have ended up in a bigger war with china over taiwan or japan? >> right. that was one of the arguments that -- which johnson sort of half heartedly made, or not very persuasively, that if we do not stop them in vietnam, they'll be in san francisco. well, we have a partial answer to that. in the actual historical record. the retreat from vietnam, kind of the collapse of america's confidence following the war, saw the soviet union become more aggressive. saw adventures for the soviet union and cuba and angola, africa. so we actually did see further aggression until the soviets had their own vietnam in afghanistan. so the probl

and north vietnamese are dropping out of trees and stuff. they are firing down here. this guy is dropping out of trees. everybody is firing at their own targets, you know. guys are firing at the same target. you know, whatever you see. whatever you feel comfortable with. i have this machine gun. job of the machine gunner is to spray the area and keep their heads down so we can advance. i see i have like 30 rounds of ammo left on my belt. that's it. i went through everything else. this is what i have on this first assault. i thought hell, you know, would two pulls of a trigger and this is gone. so on the initial i had already fired, you know, 50 rounds. i'm left with 30 rounds. i'm standing like it was -- with the captain about 20 yards out, i'm guessing. he looks over at me and screams and yells at me. god damn it, fire that machine gun, lay down fire! i thought -- he doesn't know i only have a couple of rounds of 20, 30 rounds of ammo here. he can't see it. i leave a little burst off to please him. i want to use the machine gun as a rifle in a round about sense. i wa

if everyone on the gun -- or on the plane had had a gun -- >> if only the north vietnamese had more gun> unless it ricochetted and killed everyone on the deck. stuff happens. even children should have gun. and you are glad the people on the titanic died. >> 9/11, 9/11, 9/11. >> what? i have a headache. back with representative john yarmuth next on the "stephanie miller show." ♪ ent 11-0

once that was done, it became not the south vietnamese war against the north, it was our war.he albatross was around our neck, and it was always from then on. c-span: who was the last gentleman? >> guest: the last gentleman was hugh tovar, a legendary cia station chief operative in indonesia, laos, extraordinary individual. really cut out of the same cloth as my father to be a tremendously loyal, diligent, extraordinarily intelligent, extremely well connected, just a judgment and the sense of history. can you imagine cheri picking the jury this in america to study their history, speak the language and sent them here? and they'll get to know the generals, they'll get to know the police. actually one of my dad's friends, robert myers, former deputy chief of the far east division and publisher for the new republic and many other things in washington, one time told me -- i said well, what about the diplomats, don't diplomats do a lot? and he says diplomats aren't worth anything. the only people you really need to talk to and want to talk to in these countries are the military and

the north vietnamese knew all they needed to do was wait and american public opinion is going to forcexactly the same situation we're facing where our own government didn't want to be part of the fight and the u.s. soldiers ended up doing terrible, terrible things. not because they're bad people, they're good people, but this is what happens in every single war. that's why the standard for going to war needs to be really, really high. and unfortunately, barack obama decided to plunge us further into the war at a point, if you look at woodward's book, he himself did not really believe we had a significant chance of success. >> we had 30,000 troops announced in the surge. that will end by the end of 2012 and the current sort of projections that will get our troops out by 2014. but a lot will hinge on the election. because mitt romney has been -- >> let me throw out a difficult. >> i want to you do that after we take a break. i want to talk about theç romn doctrine and what it will look like if it becomes president. i went to a small high school. the teacher that comes to mind for me is