the north vietnamese were chasing us again. we had to spend another night in the jungle. this happened to be the night that we started hearing the noise. we were in the south vietnamese border in a shau valley. was a 400we heard pound indonesian tiger. the tiger stopped us. fortunately, the tiger had been feeding on the bodies of the dead. the tiger stopped us that night in the north vietnamese soldiers were more afraid of the tiger than they were of us. they backed off to get away. katie lamar jackson: the tiger did not bother you, did it? bennie adkins: that tiger saved our lives. i love cats. [laughter] katie lamar jackson: [laughter] you just wanted to get out of the jungle. bennie adkins: we did. then the weather broke enough that they could send aircraft in on that side of the jungle in a short time period. i determined that i had 18 body wounds from the combat. we spent tough days on the hospital shift. a short time later, i was in another camp. katie lamar jackson: there is not much rest for the weary. bennie adkins: not at all. katie lamar jackson: after that, you

north vietnamese from march 9 to march 12. he tells the story of a tiger that saved his life during the battle. the national archives hosted this hour-long event. >> i ask all vietnam veterans or united states veterans who served on active duty in the u.s. armed forces at any time during the period of november 1, 1955-may 15 1975 to stand and be recognized. [applause] as you exit the theater after this program, national archives staff and volunteers will present you with the the unum veteranole -- vietnam pin. on the back of the pen is embossed a grateful nation thanks and honors you. the united states of america vietnam memorial commemoration and a national initiative and the pen. this program is for remembering vietnam. our staff combed through the national archive records and across the country to find events that tell the stories recounted in the 12 episodes of the exhibit. one of the most powerful features of the exhibit is hearing the voices of veterans giving visitors a firsthand account of their experiences during the

the north vietnamese were chasing us again. we had to spend another night in the jungle. this happened to be the night that we started hearing the noise. we were in the south vietnamese border, right in the posh on valley. that very -- noise that we heard happened to be a 400 pound indonesian tiger. this tiger stopped us, and unfortunately that tiger had been feeding off the bodies and so forth of the dead. that tiger stopped us that night , and the north vietnamese soldiers were more afraid of the soldier, then they were of us. they backed off from us to give us room to get away. >> the tiger did not bother you all, did it? >> that tiger saved our lives. so, i love cats. >> so, you finally get out of that jungle? >> yes, we did. then, the weather broke enough that they could send some aircraft in on that side of the jungle in a short time period. i had 18 body balloons from that combat. we spent a couple of days in the hospital shift. a short time later, i was in another camp doing the same thing again. >> there is not much rest for the weary, is there? >> not at all. >>

so if anything the viet cong and the north vietnamese troops will try to avoid as much as they can actually engaging americans in combat. they will go after troops of the south vietnamese regime feeling pretty confident about their odds against them, but try to avoid major combat with american troops. so that's why westmoreland develops this whole search and destroy thing. effectively americans will be the ones to have to go out in the middle of nowhere to search for enemy troops. find them and then destroy them. right? so for your typical american soldier in vietnam, the war is -- it's not easy. essentially you're walking around until you make contact, and contact usually means until somebody starts shooting at you. vietnam is very interesting because of that, something like 90% of the cases it's always the other guy's open and fire first and that's ironically enough how westmoreland wants it. american troops have to go out and effectively draw these guys out, make them initiate contact, at which point american troops can fire back and then call for artillery support and air support and de

these bodies are evidence of the miscalculation of north vietnamese star general.eral job was credited with having defensive. saigon, however, has changed. thousands of men and weapons have taught the commonest general a grim lesson. this carefully planned attack by the north vietnamese has been described as their all or nothing go for broke effort. it ended in dismal failure. 10 communists dead, for each soldier lost, is proof of the price they paid for the desperate attempt. side-by-side with the combat soldiers, war teams called on the people to remain calm. >> vehicle civilians ran to soldiers for protection. soldiers rounded those people up to centers for protection. >> doctors and nurses tended to the wounded in the city. civilian ambulances evacuated the seriously wounded. among the real heroes of the day with a firefighting squad. the squad had to be on hand immediately to put out fires and keep them from spreading. >> wherever the fighting was the heaviest, psychological warfare and teams were on hand. they used loudspeakers to tell troops about the attack

but in 1968, the north vietnamese and the vietcong launched the tet offensive against a u.s.h vietnamese, with u.s. troops, responded. the u.s. added more troops in vietnam and increased spending. over the next several hours, american history tv is going to talk about that transforming year of 1968. and then how 1968 changed u.s. politics and public opinion, which led to ending the war. that's followed by a film about the tet offensive made by south vietnamese armed forces at the time of the military drive. this is some of the american history tv programming normally seen weekends here on c-span3. we're able to show it to you while congress is on its august break. >>> this week, watch the first of our series "1968, america in turmoil" where we look back 50 years to that tumultuous year. starting tonight, we'll discuss the vietnam war. tuesday, a look at the presidential campaign of that year. wednesday, civil rights and race relations. on thursday, a discussion on liberal politics. friday, conservative politics. on saturday, women's rights. watch "1968 america in turmoil" thi

the north vietnamese respond this way. the position of the united states remains infinitely obstinate in support of its puppet regime in saigon. does there appear to be a lot of common ground to build negotiations around? so what do you think would be the president's biggest bargaining chip? the bombings. making a good-faith effort to reduce the bombing. the bombing had had heavy effects on the north. it hadn't been proven as nearly as effective as what many americans had hoped, but it was a negotiating tool. what else do we have? we're not occupying north vietnamese territory. the only other one is complete withdrawal, and they know that's not going to happen. so what are your options? and there's also the lame-duck president and the question of vietnam. and it is hanging over the head of vice president hubert humphrey humphrey. humphrey to the right here. he's trying to escape the orbit of the president. but at the same time is being pulled far to the other side by the peace faction. and what do you think his odds of bei

we're not occupying north vietnamese territory. the other one is complete withdraw, and they know that's not going to happen. so what are your options? there's also the lame duck president and the question of vietnam. and it's hanging over the head of vice president hubert humphrey. humphrey to the right here. he's trying to escape the orbit of the president. at the same time, is being pulled far to the other side by the peace faction, and what do you think his odds of being able to pull that off are? good, bad, not possible? i would say relatively not possible. i love this quote. i pulled this one out purposefully. one observer noted for vice president humphrey, "nothing would bring the real peaceknicks back to our side unless hubert urinated on the portrait of johnson on times square in television. then they would say, why didn't you do it before? can you win in that situation? now, here's what johnson really pulls the rug out from under him. you remember in the leadup to the democratic national convention, the committee starts m

we're not occupying north vietnamese territory. the other one is complete withdraw, and they know that's not going to happen. so what are your options? there's also the lame duck president and the question of vietnam. and it's hanging over the head of vice president hubert humphrey. humphrey to the right here. he's trying to escape the orbit of the president. at the same time, is being pulled far to the other side by the peace faction, and what do you think his odds of being able to pull that off are? good, bad, not possible? i would say relatively not possible. i love this quote. i pulled this one out purposefully. one observer noted for vice president humphrey, "nothing would bring the real peaceknicks back to our side unless hubert urinated on the portrait of johnson on times square in television. then they would say, why didn't you do it before? can you win in that situation? now, here's what johnson really pulls the rug out from under him. you remember in the leadup to the democratic national convention, the committee starts m

and there are regular north vietnamese troops here. this demonstrates that even the operational level of infiltration hasn't worked and certainly you haven't enticed north vietnam in any way to stop what they're doing. the tet offensive is kind of -- it's a major issue for the entire war but it's certainly a turning point for the air campaign in the north. so much so that this long campaign is going to slowly but surely come to a close. it's a 44-month on and off, like i said, eight bombing pauses. all the pauses you have for weather but you still fly 300,000 sorties. you lose 922 aircraft in that campaign and the p.o.w.s that come with that, which we'll spend more time in the next lesson. >> they made a big point about the operational metrics being a large reason for the failure of "rolling thunder." would you agree with that? bomb drops or sortie rates? >> that's not telling you about effects. this will come out. the air force starts really kind of going in, like, who cares how much we do, what effect does it have in the end? so that

these bodies are evidence of the miscalculation of north vietnamese four-star general vo nguyen giap.eral giap was credited with having planned the communist tet offensive and is the same officer who was victorius at dien bien phu in 1954. times, however, have changed. the loss of thousands of men and weapons have taught the general a grim lesson. [music] this carefully planned attack by the north vietnamese has been described as they're all or nothing go for broke effort. it ended in dismal failure. 10 communists dead for each alive soldier lost is proof of the tremendous price they paid for their desperate attempt. >> side-by-side with combat soldiers, they entered the dangerous areas. they called on the people to remain calm. [gunfire] everywhere in the city, the fearful civilians ran to government soldiers for protection. the soldiers led them out of the combat areas to safety and temporary refugee centers. [ music ]doctors and nurses from the medial corp came to the aid of civilian wounded in the city. military and civilian ambulances speeded the evacuation of the seriously wound

the vietnamese and the cambodian , the other ones we used. up in the north reuse the same might yards from the brew, said dang and the rise they tried. -- tribe. in some vietnamese. oddly enough, most of the vietnamese were recruited out of prison and they were good week on people. i mean, hard-core. they were in prison for robbery, bank robbery, whatever. we recruited them and god at the same time. that was a prevailing thing but it happened on a couple occasions. i actually recruited by gunnar, and 79 was a former north vietnamese office said he was in the pow camp next door. i recruited him out of the pow camp and he said he wants to come out, work with us if they trust him, i was going to trust him. to this day, we betrayed in the end. not us but the government. basically they signed away our pows and all the other stuff in the agreement with the north vietnamese. they basically gave the north vietnamese license to do what they wanted to do, which was destroyed the people. they were the terms of the yellow rain. they were the victims of out and out genoc

a chronological approach, and we have looked at that period of time from insurgency growing, north vietnamese support of that insurgency in 59, and that advisory role from 61-64. now, we are focusing on airpower against north vietnam. >> just to give some context, a lot of historians when they look at vietnam war, break down the four faces. that airpower that we studied last lesson was in that advisory phase. 56-64, the rise of the advisors watching them in the airpower role. now they are applying airpower in the south but now we are getting to the americanizing of the war. so we will look at the context of the gulf of tonkin, the understanding and the development in the planning for strategic campaign, air campaign against the war. and, how we get into the air campaign in march 1965. >> remember, we are at a very specific time, very chaotic time in the united states, and in south vietnam. so, as we finish up that advisory role, we have had some significant events happening. two major ones. the assassination of president kennedy in the united states. we have a new president, who has taken thi

we have to find ways to stop it and one thing we have to do is stop the north vietnamese support of that insurgency in the south. so we can use bombs, power, to kind of send a message to make -- to persuade north vietnam to stop supporting this insurgency in the south. we want the status quo on north and south vietnam. then, that air power campaign can show to south vietnam, and i put in here, and north vietnam, and even to our allies, look at u.s. resolve when we're in conflict in this cold war environment. this is our resolve against communism. then the more practical ideas are, hey, we need to do some kind of strategic destruction of north vietnamese ability to make war. and as we got in the text, where are all the materials -- where's all the material really coming from for them to make this war? is it north vietnamese industry or not? so, this is the idea, this -- and not only a strategic to go after the transportation system industrial base, but also to prevent that stuff from moving around. so, that becomes -- that transportation line, that's the reason for it is even if stuff is

one thing is stop the north vietnamese. we could use bombs, power to send the message. to persuade north vietnam to stop supporting the insurgency in the south. we want the status quo. the airpower campaign could show to south vietnam and north vietnam and either two allies look at you as resolve that we are in conflict. this is the result against communism. the more practical idea is, we need a strategic destruction of north vietnamese ability to make war. where is all the material really coming from for them to make this war. this is the idea. not only a strategic to go over the transportation system industrial base but also to prevent that stuff from moving around. the transportation line is the reason. even if it is coming from outside to prevent that from keeping north vietnam sustain. make them feel the pain of war. likewise let's do an interdiction campaign that prevents the material from going to the north down to the self and primarily through laos. you have to stop that movement. the development that is happening in 1964, if we do a strategic air campaign. then

. >> the north vietnamese. i'm half awake. the proves the americans can never hold the initiative. no matter how many people, you're never going to hold this country. by doing a mass military engagement you're showing you may lose the battle -- >> but what are the indicators that people are going to rise up? go ahead. >> you have your intelligence network. your network is telling you things. you have to believe them to a certain extent. you can look at your political cadres and the fact they have survived and they have been successful in assassinating south vietnamese officials. we have been successful for ten years. we can just show them we can be here and have success. >> other indicators, 1966, another one of these vietnamese elections where another general strongman takes over. >>> there's an uprising to the points that there's fighting engine the streets of saigon. if i am watching from the outside, what does that tell me? >> the time is now. >> 1967, there's another election. key is the vice president and

. >> the north vietnamese. it prove that is the americans can never show initiative. no matter how many people, you're never going to hold this country. by doing the mass military -- you may lose the battle -- >> what ybut what are the indic that you are going to rise up? >> your network is telling you things. you have to believe them, to a certain extent. you can map your political cadres and how you survive. you have been successful in assassinating vietnamese officials. we have been successful ten years. that he built the large cadre, we can show them that we'll be here with success. >> there are successful indicato indicators. 1966, there are other vietnamese elections where a strong man takes over, president key. president key then starts to crackdown better, proceeds to crackdown on the buddhists. so there's an uprising in sai n saigon. to the fight that our units are fighting each other in the streets of saigon. if i'm watching from the outside, what does that tell me? >> the time is now. >> 1967, there'

it was in the north vietnamese interest to negotiate with the south vietnamese anti-american. but, strangely at the last minute, the south vietnamese walk away from the negotiation and step away from the table. i say no, we are not going to negotiate anymore. these are talks of ongoing, they had been moving towards some concessions, sending closer johnson was hopeful something would be resolved. for a long time, there has been speculation that the nixon campaign had something to do with it, and there was no proof. i want to end with this one piece. here you are taking history class. we have been talking about the past. we always need to remember that the -- our interpretation of the past is never static. history is always an argument over what happens and why people did it. often times, the understanding of past can be changed by evidence. just a few weeks ago, a biographer of nixon whose biography is coming out, john farrell, revealed he had uncovered some notes that hr haldeman, nixon's chief of staff , chief aide in the campaign, had scribbled during a phone call with nixon

that he, it was in the north vietnamese interests to negotiate with the, with the south vietnamese and the americans. but then strangely, at the last minute, the south vietnamese walk away from the negotiation, step away from the table. say we're not going to negotiate any more. these are talks that have been ongoing. they have been moving towards some conclusion and concessions, getting closer. johnson and humphrey were hopeful that something would be resolved before the election, because that would have been a useful thing for them politically. and south vietnam steps away and the whole thing, negotiations fall apart. and so for a long time there's been speculation that the nixon campaign had something to do with it. and there was no proof. and so i want to end with this one piece to show, here you are taking a history class, we've been talking about the past. and we, one of the things that you know sometimes we always need to remember that the past and our interpretation of the past is never static. that history is always an argument over what happened and why people did it. and oft

i talked to some veterans from the north vietnamese side and they told me that they were absolutely terrified of the south korean troops. they were really scary. the south koreans were really ferocious troops. eventually, the communist north create a special unit to deal the south koreans. they are thought to be so intimidating from the perspective of communist forces. also, a little-known fact, 35,000 canadians were volunteered to serve in vietnam. kennedy himself doesn't fight in vietnam but but 35,000 canadians volunteered because they thought it was a good fight. which is probably why he lost the vietnam war. [ laughter ] >> we are great fighters, we are great fighters. here is a slide, 1965. initially 3000 marines land in southern vietnam. they are expecting action, what they get is young vietnamese women with lays. you see that up in the upper left-hand corner. then there is the bombing of the north. in the spring of 65, the war effectively becomes americanized through the deployment of this first contingent of u.s. troops in the form of marines and then the beginning of the sustained b

but, it was in the north vietnamese interest to negotiate with the south vietnamese and the american. but, then strangely at the last minute, the south vietnamese walk away from the negotiation, they said no, we are not going to negotiate anymore. these are talks that have been ongoing. they had been moving toward some conclusion and concession, getting closer, johnson and humphrey were hopeful something would be resolved before the election, because that would have been useful for them politically. south vietnam steps away, and the whole thing falls apart. for a long time, there has been speculation that the nixon campaign had something to do with it, and there was no cream. i want to end with this one piece. here you are taking history class, you have been talking about the past, and one of the things that we always need to remember is that the -- our interpretation of the past is never status. often times our understanding of what happened in the past can be changed for the introduction of new evidence. so, just a few weeks ago, a biographer of nixon this biography is coming out, j

these bodies are evidence of the miscalculation of the north vietnamese jets.dited to having tet offensive and the officers in 1954. times have changed. thousands of men taught the communist general a grim lesson. it has been described as an all or nothing go for broke effort. ended in failure. ten communists dead for their desperate attempts. >>> the combat soldiers entering the danger roous areas. called on people to remain calm. everywhere in the city, running the government soldiers for protection. the soldiers lead them out to safety and refugee centers. -- came to the aid of the civilians wounded in the city. military and civilian ambulances helped the seriously wounded. among the real heros, was a firefighter squad. heavily populated areas covering the streets. each time, the squads had to be on hand to put out the fire and keep them from spreading. me braised the flames in saigon. >> psychological warfare were on hand. using the loud speakers to tell people the truth about the attack and how they can best escape to safer areas. using the loud speakers t

the search for peace though -- the north vietnamese were not interested. they wanted to win on the battlefield. the soviet union was a different matter. the soviet union began to raise the question of these overtures to the north vietnamese. out thesehould put talks taking place in paris. more from 1968 and the johnson white house. [video clip] on march 31, president johnson had avoided a halt to all bombing programs expect over the dmz, an area where massive numbers continue to fall. as a result of this decision, the much awaited truce talks with hanoi began. december, president johnson's chief negotiator at there stillported had been no substantive discussions. the north vietnamese negotiators clung to their long-held demand that all bombing must stop before they would discuss anything else. the president, in close counsel with his top military and foreign affairs advisors for assuranceed of de-escalation should the stop -- be stopped. no such assurance was forthcoming. host: back to your point --mark kramer, but, elizabeth cobbs, you had richard nixon w

you give the north vietnamese the opportunity to get back in your town. and, if you give them all these cool toys, they will want to use them. all of my best army troops are going to go fight the front line. >> what is the biggest problem with the western way of war? >> we are fighting a protracted war. >> how expensive is the western way of war? so, to fight this type of war we are arming and equipping not only requires all the money in education, but a lot of cash to come back in to keep it going. how is the american economy going? that becomes the issue, right, why are you spending money there? our economy is stinking, you should probably be spending it here. tell you what, let's jump through a few things. we will pick up with some of this. sadly, if you are joe, what do you think about vietnamization, the average american soldier? >> i think it is twofold. it is frustrating because the south indians are not going to do what you want to -- them to do. they are not going to have the same heart and will that you have as an advisor. at the same time there

the most famous north vietnamese general, jeff, opposed it.ut there was a stronger side that prevailed. the lunar new year, january 31st, 1968, and what they decided was they would have a massive attack everywhere they could to try to discombobulate the americans and the south enemies and have a publicity effect on everything. it was a debate whether it would be worth it or not. they knew there would be a lot of casualties, which, in fact, happened. in a sense the vietcong and the north lost in terms of the military aspects of it but won in terms of publicity. >> this is the south vietnamese army explaining what happened. it runs about a minute and a half. >> at the end of january 1968. saigon was alive with prospective spirit as everyone prepared for the tech lunar new year. it is both a sacred and enjoyable time of the year. this was to be the first spring of the vietnam. the north vietnamese seemed to promise the people a safe holiday free from the ever-present anxiety of war. people gathered to pay respects to their ancestors. on the eve o

if they killed enough north vietnamese and vietcong, they would win the war. this was a devastating loss to the black lions baa cxsgsufalion. nolan lied about what happened. >> this may be too simplistic. why did president johnson simply not pull the plug? why not say we're leaving, peace with honor, we're going to leave vietnam and let the vietnamese deal with this issue? >> i would say it has to deal with politics in the united states and the democratic party and the way the republican party dominated the notion of patriotism and the cold war through that period. >> just to sort of round this out, in terms of body counts, two things can be said about body counts. first of all, it was a war of attrition. hochimin used to say for every one of you we kill, you'll 10 of us, and you will get tired. it came out pretty exact. 1.4million soldiers dead, whether one battle or another was exaggerated, they were losing an awful lot of people. . so, you know, that just needs t to be said. -- in palm >> frank joining us from palm bay, florida. a lot of vietnam vets on thi

-- north vietnamese was both heavily armed by both the soviet union and china. however, they were bitterly at odds at that point, so they were competing with each other for a greater influence in north vietnam and that worked out well for the north vietnamese because they could play them off and get more weaponry. >> north korea, who was funding north korea at this time and explain what was happening and how that's relevant to what we're seeinged to? -- seeing today. >> in north core e-- korea, the were playing both sides against the middle. they had patrons in the soviet union and in china, but at the same time they were always doing their own thing, so for example, they seized the "uss pueblo". >> what happened there? >> it was on a spy mission in what most people consider international miles beyond the 12 mile limit. what happened in january of 1968 is that the north koreans seized this american naval ship and it was lightly armed, it was ill-prepared and they were unable to fight off the submarine chasers and mig fighters that went after the ship and so -- bu

(mccain on tape): >> narrator: the confeion was broadcast as north vietnamese propaganda. (mccain on tape): "i couldn't rationalize away my confession. i was ashamed. i felt faithless, and couldn't control my despair. i shook as if my diswere a fever." >> he was quite disconsote. but it was the guy in the cell next to him who told him he had done the best he could, gather his strength, go back at them the next day. and i think that was... that was the great moment of self-discovery for him. >> he realizes, you know, what is important in life. you know, you really have to count on yourself. you have to lean on the guy next to you, and he has to be able to lean on you and pend on you. some very, very basic, core, fundamental things in life that neme people go through their whole lives anr learn, he learned at a relatively early age. and i think he went from bng probably a really cocky s.o.b. to being a fellow who's pretty well-grounded in what's important in life. >> narrator: mccain's fellow p.o.ws. point to a key event in his detention. with his father about to take charge

in a sense, the vietcong and north vietnamese lost in terms of the military aspects of it, but won inerms of publicity. >> this is from the south vietnamese arming explaining what was happening in early 1968, the tet offensive. >> at the end of january 1968, saigon was alive with a festive spirit as everyone prepared for the tet lunar new year. it's a sacred and joyous time of the year. this was to be the first spring of the second republic of vietnam. the tet truce proposed by the communist north vietnamese seemed to promise people a holiday free from the ever-present anxiety of war. the people gathered to pay respects for their ancestors. on the eve of the new year, thousands of saigon families prayed before the altars of their ancestors. they prayed that peace might be restored to their homeland. this year, however, the traditional firecrackers of the tet celebration became the fireworks of war. the vietcong taking advantage of the noisy celebration and the savage attacks on saigon, violating the truce that think themselves had proposed. areas of the city became a blazing inferno.

>> the north vietnamese was armed by the soviet union and china. they were bitterly at odds at that point they'll. they were competing with each other for greater influence in north vietnam. that work out well for the north vietnamese because they can play them off against each other and get more weaponry. >> who was funding north korea during this time? explain what was happening and how that is relevant to today. >> in north korea, playing both sides against the middle, they had patrons in the soviet union and china. at the same time they were always doing their own thing. for example he sees to the uss pueblo. the pueblo was on a spy mission. it was in what we consider nash -- international waters. beyond the 12 mile limit. in january 1968, the north koreans ceased this naval ship. it was lightly armed and ill- prepared. they were unable to fight off the submarine chasers that one after the ship. the interesting thing is neither the chinese nor the soviet were aware this would happen. this really, like today was something instigated by the north

the north vietnamese -- i spent a lot of time in vietnam since the war. i've written 10 books. ve met with the leaders in the north and the people fought. he was the kernel who was on palace grounds in 1975. he later said that the rear front of the commonest effort was here to galvanize the antiwar movement and to demoralize the war. that folded into a lack of clarity on the political and strategic objectives. the other thing that needs to be said because it isn't talked about enough is the policy of the communist government since 1958. a classic policy of tracking communism to have assassination as a key element of a strategy. they will go after people who were a part of the leadership of south vietnam. by 1960 whentoday john f. kennedy decided we needed to do something. we didn't know how to do that. we had incidents that were regretful and discussing. generally they were the result peopleional overload and -- they were aberrations from what our policy legally -- that is not true on the other side. when you look at the way it was use as an example in a number of these recent -

but in 1958, the north vietnamese and the viet kong launched the tet offensive. the south vietnamese responded. over the next several hours, american history tv is going to talk about that transforming year of 1968 and how 1968 changed u.s. politics and public opinion, which led to ending the war. followed by a film about the tet offensive made by south vietnames. we're able to show it to you why congress is on its august break. >> our nine-part cspan series 1968 america in turmoil continues throughout the week on cspan 3. we focus on a different aspect of the state of the u.s. 50 years ago. tuesday, the 1968 presidential election as former vice president richard nixon faced democratic nominee, the incumbent vice president hubert humphrey. wednesday, it's civil rights and race relations. on thursday, the riots of liberal politics with a special look at the democratic convention in chicago. friday, conservative politics and richard nixon's rise in the republican party. all are available on spotify or watch any time on cspan.org on our 1968 page. >> cspan, where his

and i was picked up by some north vietnamese and taken to the hospital, where i almost died. >> john wouldn't go to sleep. he's in a cast, his eyes are haverish. he's in bad, bad. i thought he was going to die. an what is your name? >> lieutenant cor john mccain. >> narrator: the north vietnamese had discovered mccain was not just any captive. >> may i know who is your father?me could you im and tell me who is... >> yes, his name is admiral john mccain and he's in london, england, now. >> doing what? >> he's commander-in-chief of u.s. naval forces in europe. >> narrator: mccain's father would soon be in charge all forces in the pacific. >> john was a prize. they referred to him as "the prince." "we've got the prince." >> they realize that they have this exceptional public relationtool. and they say to him, "a-ha! you're the crown prince." >> narrator: the crown prince's grandfather-- they called m popeye-- was a legendary admiral in world war ii, here posing nth mccain's father in ja on the day the japanese surrendered. with the family legacy of service and duty, mccain reluctantly h

everything from a miniature model that the cia built when they were planning a rescue operation, to north vietnamese and south vietnamese propaganda posters. in addition to the records, we have produced films where we have interviewed people who have experienced these 12 episodes, and they talk about their first-hand experience, and it is a wonderful way to view the war from different perspectives. >> it has been portrayed as an exciting adventure. it was none of those things for a moment. i wish people understood better. i wish people had a better understanding of what it does to people who participate in it. >> i think i would like them to remember what it was like during the war. the destruction, the killing, the violence, and think about what it is now, at peace. that was my feeling with the war ended. i did not care who won. i did not care who lost, i only cared that the war ended, and that vietnam now experiences peace. c-span is brought to you by your cable or satellite provider. >>> we are spending the week here on c-span3 while congress is on its august break. showing you some the programs

i think that hurt him more than the north vietnamese did. >> the keating five scandal hurt him more than being in prison for 5 1/2 years and beaten? >> that's how i felt. in his own mind he allowed his honor to be besmirched. and from that came a desire to clean up money and politics. >> mccain dove into his senate work throughout the 1990s. >> key challenge remains getting the deficit under control. >> taking on tough issues. >> what matters to me is the price of a pack of cigarettes coupled with other programs that will reduce teen smoking. >> focussing on fixing government corruption. >> and i think john's feeling was always that the fight is always worth it to fight against the system that is dishonest and corrupt, needs to be changed. even if you fail, the fight is worth carrying on. >> mccain spent the last decade of the 20th century fighting a lot of battles, winning some, and losing others. >> i run because i believe deeply in the greatness of america's destiny. >> and planting seeds for a run for the highest office in the land. that, when we come back. my name is jeff sheldon, a

i think that hurt him more than the north vietnamese did. >> the keating five scandal hurt him more thanng in prison for 5 1/2 years and beaten? >> that's how i felt. >> in his own mind he allowed his honor to be besmirched. and from that came a desire to clean up money in politics. >> mccain dove into his senate work throughout the 1990s. >> the key challenge remains getting the deficit under control. >> taking on tough issues. >> what matters to me is the price of a pack of cigarettes coupled with other programs that will reduce teen smoking. >> focusing on government corruption. >> i think john's feeling was always that the fight is always worth it, to fight against the system that is dishonest and corrupt and needs to be changed, even if you fail, the worth is carrying on. >> mccain spent the last decade of the 20th century fighting a lot of battles, winning some and losing others. >> i run because i believe deeply in the greatness of america's destiny. >> and planting seeds for a run for the highest office in the land. that when we come back. >>> it is because i owe america see that

if john mccain can forgive the north vietnamese torturers, we can at least forgive each other. but that gesture of senator mccain's was not nearly a gesture of conciliation or con si con silllation's take, it's an enemy of unfathomable decency and a deep dedication to another american idea, the idea that character is destiny. and to the eternally optimistic american preference for tomorrow over yesterday. now, i don't know whether or not senator mccain, john subscribed by the great man or woman, that choice of actions by great individuals. i don't know if he believed it or not, but i do know this, he lived it. i know this because it was my great honor of a lifetime to serve in this body with senator mccain as the other senator from arizona. now, long before that privilege was accorded me by the people of my state, i was john mccain's constituent, and when the necessity presented itself to point up examples for my daughter and my four sons of lives lived with principle and purpose, of role models, i had to look no further than my own senator. now, i have a pretty good idea that

the north vietnamese now have a bargaining chip. >> at that point, they invited a french film crew infilm him to sort of use as propaganda, to show that they had captured this famous american and that they were treating him nicely. >> how old are you? >> 31. >> tough watching that? >> yeah, i don't like it. i don't enjoy watching that. >> you're in obvious great pain there. >> yeah. it's a very unpleasant memory. >> are you married? >> yes. >> children? >> three. in the background, the uner the gator is saying, tell them you want the war to stop, and that's why you hear me say, that's all i have to say. and then the interrogator then said, tell him that it's an evil war and you want the war to stop, and the frenchman turned and said, i think he's said enough. >> eight months after his capture, the viet cong make a self-serving offer to send mccain home. it is one the navy captain cannot accept. >> what bothered me most about it was that i knew if i had accepted the release, then they would go to other prisoners and say, see, your country doesn't care about you, they only care about th