nsa must serve as the nation's center from a technical standpoint on cyber matters. i think he talented enough to parlay that tremendous technical confidence in serving the broader issue here of support. the response has been to establish cyber commence by joe heading the director of nsa as the commander. in a war fighting context, that is how we organize to do that because we need something to fill the void. i think it ministration is trying to figure out what to be the best combination. the bill that i think they have sponsored -- >> what will your role be in this? it is to ensure that the intelligence support cyber protection is provided. and that is visible to the government structure, whatever that turned out to be. i do not believe it is the dni's problem is to decide what that should be but rather to ensure that it gets sufficient and adequate timely intelligence. >> water advisory role did you play to the president? -- what advisory role do you play to the president. when it gets to the department of homeland security, what gateways to they have? >> one solut

government -- the state department, the fbi, the cia, the nsa, all across the u.s. government.ey knew that he was a known or suspected terrorist. it was in the database created to solve some of the 9/11 problems. although there were some failings in individual agencies providing bits of data to other agencies, first of all, there are mixed material values. those mistakes were very different from 9/11. they were not policy choices. they were silly, technical glitches. that is very different. that is a failure of omission vs commission. you can have the same tragic consequences, but you have to understand the difference because the demand different responses after the fact. is likely reject the view that these are the same problems. there are still -- by slightly reject the view -- i slightly reject the view that these are the same problems. there are still problems. we have to get the right solutions. >> the christmas day incident brought a lot of attention on a yemeni cleric, who is said to have encouraged and inspired abdulmutallab in his attempted attack. he had communication

nsa is understandably conscientious about the protection of potential data on u.s. persons, are very sensitive about compliance. that is one inhibitor to collaborative, full sharing. it is an area i intend to work on it, if confirmed he. >> you said you will achieve progress of the discipline application of incentives, both for words and consequences for information-sharing. what do we just need a directive by executive order? why do we need incentives, rewards, and consequences? >> is one way of inducing change in the culture. to provide rewards for those who collaborate, and penalties for those who do not. and the directives are also affected. >> should they be needed? >in this kind of setting where t has been going on for so long? >> yes, sir. i will look at it if confirmed, to see if there's a need for further direction, or look for another possible remedy. >> him relative to related subject on the minds here in the congress, the need for a single repository of terrorist they did. an integrated repository of terrorism they capable of ingesting terrorism-related

there is one nsa employee who's being prosecuted, but we need to see a lot more people in orange jumpsuits because these leaks can significantly imperil our troops in the field, our allies and harm our national security. that's what the 911 commission said, and when i interviewed general mike hayden several years ago before his confirmation as director of the cia, i asked him about the leak of information including the president's surveillance program and he shook his head and said, now, we're only catching the dumb terrorists. when we start leaking sensitive and particularly top secret and classified -- highly classified information, which give our enemies all the tools they need and we send a message to our allies that we can't be trusted with their secrets so they're less likely to share with us. which is a disaster all the way around. >> senator reed, you mentioned senator kerry and we mentioned this all in the set-up piece, he said something today but he did say that the documents raise questions about the reality of america's policy toward pakistan and afghanistan. do you agree with

if you look at the international threats that we deal with, we have nsa and cia, more capability and externally to the united states monitoring what is going on than we could possibly hoped to have internally. internally, it seems like a lot of our ability to catch up terrorist threat in the making comes from a hint from an informant reaching out to someone, or light up worked dix six, because they screw up. is that if sufficient strategy? what other tools should we look at? we just went through a bloody battle looking at fisa. >> this is what we're thinking about right now. the tools that work abroad, they may not be the tools that perfectly translate into a domestic environment. we have several of them. we have the tools at the border. we have law enforcement, both federal and state and local. they have enormous information and knowledge of their communities. they recognize and they understand when things are very badly wrong. we need to engage them and connect them beeter through a fusion centers and other processes for information sharing so that people have the information they

the concentration there is based on the needs of the nsa, so you have hundreds of contractors that have gathered around the national security agency to serve the agency. so between the agency, other secret government organizations in the area, contractors that have come to help the agency do what it does, the largest concentration in the country. it is an interesting way to look at the country. we have sort of called this the top-secret genome project. we did not know this was going to happen, but we found this concentrated area around fort meade. host: 854,000 that have top security clearance. how did you get to that? guest: that is one number that the government does not have. one shocking thing to me was how little the government knows about the system over all. in this regard, we took what we knew about the different agencies, and what we calculated was each of their individual top secret employees. then we took those calculations to some of our best sources who knew parks of it, they looked at our methodology and they said you have this correct. the government has contractor split

nsa work has doubled since 9/11, yet there are still close calls.f there are all these people working on this, how come we cannot catch the christmas bomber, as he was dubbed? guest: the director of national intelligence actually called me in one day with other individuals who had experience with the business to take a look at the case. we produced a 90-page study. it was myself, and fbi former official, a senior scientist from google who looked at the information technology, and a civil liberties of journey. you have not heard about this because it is still classified. we took a cold-eyed look and we made recommendations that i cannot go into in detail, but which were generally accepted and are being implemented, as we speak, in four different areas. the post touches on a couple of days, but the context, the recommendations we made were in the areas of information technology. it needs to be smarter than it is. host: are you talking about eavesdropping? guest: know, the government's use of computers, databases. you see, one of the problems today is

i wrote about it as a private citizen as nsa was given this job. we went at it and with the support of my then counterpart general petraeus we made literacy training a mandatory part of the effort but how could that have been allowed to happen? how can you have a policeman who can read an i.d. card? you mentioned marjah. marjah is uniquely difficult because as those of you have been there no, while it has a long legacy of interaction with the u.s., it was the area where the kennedy and johnson and eisenhower kennedy johnson and nixon administrations really put in the effort and the people down there remember america very fondly. it has also been ground zero for the taliban and it is a very difficult area to operate them. with the taliban has done mr. chairman is targeted assassinations. it is a very tough problem. so, the effort is multiple. now what are we doing about it? we have sent-- we have more than tripled the american civilian presence and we are always mindful of the issue we discussed earlier of avoiding the dependency trap. we have parti

if you look at the international threat that we deal with, we have the nsa, the cia, we have more capabilities and externally to the u.s. monitoring what is going on damage possibly hope to have internally. internally, it seems like a lot of our ability to detect a terrorist threat either comes from a tip from an informant because a terrorist decided to reach out to someone or come in the example of the [unintelligible] because they decided they wanted to turn a vhs into a dvd. is that a sufficient strategy? what other tools should we let that? we just look that the international nexis and and not a strict internal lexis. >> this is what we're thinking about right now. the tools that work abroad may not be the tools that perfectly translate into a domestic department. we have several of them. we have the tools of the border, we have law enforcement both federal and state and local. state and local have enormous information and knowledge of their communities. they recognize behavior and they understand when things are very, very badly wrong. we need to engage them and connect them a better thro