and the nsc itself was created by the national security act of 1947. and it was a a established to give -- the people who pushed it wanted to, essentially, to discern the president of forcing him to meet with his primary advisers before he made decisions because they recalled the franklin roosevelt decisions , he made and the way you wanted to commend it did not like that, president truman was created -- was pleased with the national security council was created by law as part of the national security act of 1947, but he did not want it to constrain him. he said the president is president. there is no committee and making american policy. therefore, wendy -- when it came time to have a meeting he could be in the meeting and invite all the senior piece of -- people were basically a handful of people, and then they had another of subsequent meetings that he just decided not to go to. so he would demonstrate his independence. it was only when the korean war broke out the germans started to meet regularly with the nsc. eisenhower considered it rather diffe

this is pretty clear from reading the nsc documents. it is the most striking conclusion that comes from reading through all of them, and from reading his personal diary, which has been available since 2007. third, i think i probably disagree little with other members, not everybody, but with some speakers, is that reagan's decision and the actions that had aministration taook profound effect on what the soviets did. so this was not all big and the cake -- all baked in the cke. it wa-- cake. it was not the soviet union was going to collapse any way. in terms of reagan's strategy i want to read something from the in 1963.that the rohe wrote we are talking even before he gave the speech to barry goldwater. it sums up his strategy. "the only sure way to avoid war is to surrender without fighting. the other way is based on the belief supported so far by all the evidence that in an all-out race, our system is stronger, and eventually the enemy gives {as a hopeless cause. then a noble nation, leaving in a piece extends the hand of friendship,

the nsc was right down the hall and a rookie named madeleine albright worked there. we were good friends because we had worked on capitol hill and together before that, something that stands out to me is that it was a fairly small office. small enough for him to be a hybrid. that job -- i do not think that has ever happened before or science. -- or since. it was a small group of people. now it is enormous. yes, i am sure there has been continuity in many ways, but the growth has been geometric. obviously, i am a member of a totally dysfunctional body called the united states congress. [laughter] feel sorry for me, will you please? i worked on the security committees and certainly, at the dicey period it was 9/11 forward. i intercepted the national- security apparatus of the two bush terms, plus early obama. what stands out as a member of congress is the independent branch of government is supposed to write the laws and do adequate oversight. how hard it is to get information from the executive branch, especially on controversial issues, because more and more of the d

the 49ers faced the cardinals again this season, this time as nsc champs but they still expect a very physical and emotional game. >> defensively, i feel like they're coming into their own, playing outstanding football. evidenced by the fact they've won 4 of the last 5 games offensively. i think they think they're hitting their stride and you see that on tape. they're just playing very good team football. special teams. they are outstanding special teams unit. >> in the last game between the two teams safety desean golson was ejected early for fighting and fined $25,000. the players expect that emotion to carry over into sunday's game and arizona would like nothing more than to beat the nfc west title holders and pick up their third straight win. >> now to some this is an off-season workout video and to others a welcome site. the giants catcher buster posey has improved so much he has moved his off-season workouts from cardio to limited catching drills. buster is still being very cautious. >> i'm definitely not at the point where i could go out and play in a game and probably function

independence, there's always when the korean war broke out at the started to meet regularly with the nsc. eisenhower also was a three much president and saw himself as the decision maker but he placed in much higher value on a regular weekly meetings with this committee. so he convened just about every weekend was in town there was a national security and they would typically consider this policy papers which the been living. it yugoslavia or somewhere and then there would be basically the decision of the move me but desert by the staff essentially saying this is our policy until further dissevered plant through the world. said it was a bitter feeling to have to think whether there's a crisis everyone is going to pick up paper. subpoena the crisis would be different but he thought having paced. believed to say it is worth everything. >> professor destler, but did the whole of the national security adviser -- how is it viewed by the state department originally? it was harder than the state department. now early incarnations of the national security adviser were careful not to that to give

on nsc are thinking about, i think we're talking in hundreds, not thousands. >> is there a danger do you feel that those few hundred could be drawn back into a combat role? >> no, they will not be there in a combat role. if we've made that very clear. they will be training, mentoring, and perhaps support at ministerial level in kabul and strategic security planning. that kind of operation. >> see you do not see the recent events in afghanistan over the last two weeks as hampering progress toward peace and security, bearing in mind the conflicts on the border, the attack on the pakistan border, you do not see any of that as indicating a change toward a dark future? >> i think that is probably rather premature. clearly the last two weeks as seen some significant setbacks. yesterday's attack in particular is of very unwelcome development that effectively on the face of it opens a new front, but i think it would be hugely premature to suggest that that will deflect the process of transition to afghan-led security. on a recent visit to afghanistan, one of the things that's slightly surpri

the national security adviser's role and in some sense the nsc system needs to adapt a little bito the transition. >> it is clearly the case that there is an awful lot of learning on the job. there just is no job before this that prepares you. all presidents have face the enormous challenges in their first year or two. they have had some difficult all comes. i've rd a book before coming into the obama administration about the first year of presidential administrations and foreign policy. if you think about our history and how many perilous moments we have haduring that time. you have learning curves about how you make decisions. you have learning curves about how to work with your team. he have learning curves about how to interact peron the world. what the dynamic is around the world you are living in. you develop a sense of confidence and how what you need, what kind of information you need or process you need and where you want to take them. i think that is why there is a sense in which people really do step up over time. and second terms, the president can then say, i know where i

[applause] [applause] >> let's talk about the organization of decisionmaking in your role in the nsc, the national security con council. that role was almost painful to read it. it was herding cats. if you were to advise now, after your experience in that job in particular, a president of the united states, would you suggest to them that one characteristic of the members of that team, whether it's the secretary of defense, treasurery, even the vice president -- would be, gets along well with others? >> yeah. well, that might eliminate a fair number of people in washington. so, i'd be careful about that criteria. there's no doubt we had very strong personalities, but i hope i gave the impression in the book that they were debates about substance. these were not personal issues. nonetheless, we got along just fine until the most stressful times, and the most stressful times were around the war on terror and around iraq. and so perhaps the lesson is that in so-called normal times, so the degree that anything is ever normal in decisionmaking in washington -- you can -- it is important to

>> the nsc has not had this discussion yet. but if you are asking me for my assessment of what colleagues are thinking about we are talking in hundreds, not if thousands. >> is there a danger, do you feel that those few hundred could be drawn back into a combat role? >> no. they won't be there in a combat role. this is training, mentoring, support, perhaps at ministerial level in kabul and strategic security planning. that kind of operation. >> so you don't see the recent events in afghanistan over the last two weeks as hampering progress toward peace and security bearing in mind the conflict on the border there is an attack on the pakistan border. you don't see any of that as indicating a change towards a dark future? >> i think that's probably rather premature. clearly the last two weeks have seen significant setbacks and yesterday's attack in particular is a very, very unwelcome development opening a new front on the face of it. but i don't -- i think it would be hugely premature to suggest that that will deflect the process

the former nsc was made. a question to you, unfortunately , to his mother could not answer. it pulled up during the course to of course of last year's trial, a divorce on two occasions. swaying court said opinion. @booktv used perry detectives close surveillance, phone hacking as some black hole. that is not the case. the know anything about that? >> what you're referring to is an issue that we have had, and i think i am correct in saying the information commissioner has put out verifications' and explained but there was no issue and that they were entirely comparable with the response from c-span. >> i don't know works if you did not think it was a good idea, why -- >> sorry. >> the melson have since been retrieved, the use of them, any idea why? >> i think the clarification from the of racing commission was, in fact, that what had happened with the editor of this caution is of the world made a comment during a trial which had been interpreted as you're saying now. when he looks into it and asked his initial for exploration. and so there was no such retrieval. >> have you b

state department or the nsc ever got in touch with iran and said, let's talk about this.d i asked some very senior u.s. officials in some encounters that i had with them recently, has there been any approach? no, no, no, we're waiting for the p five plus one. we have to wait for a baron's to answer the letter before american diplomats can talk to iranians? that's why i say i worry we're going right back to the old bush mentality where we set preconditions. the last thing i heard was we'll only talk to them if we think they're serious. how are you supposed to find out if they're serious if you don't talk to them? iran has a new foreign minister, and this one happens to be an mit-educated physicist. who is comfortable in our culture, who has been, who's represented iran at the iaea in vienna. who better to talk to? and are there any efforts going on? maybe there's some little discreet track, but to my mind, you know, we have this leverage now in the form of these terrible sanctions, we should use them to try to get something going with them. if it doesn't work, okay. the wo

state department or the nsc ever got in touch with iran and said let's talk about this. and i asked some very senior u.s. officials and some encounters i had with them recently has there been any approach? no, no, we are waiting for the p5 plus one. hello, who is the superpower here? we have to wait for the baron as catherine ashton to issue the letter before american diplomats can talk to the iranians? that's why i said we are going right back to the old bush mentality we set preconditions. the last thing i heard is we will only talk to them if we think they are serious. how are you supposed to find out if they are serious if you don't talk to them? iran has a now relatively former minister. mahmoud ahmadinejad got rid of the last one last year and this one happens to be an mit educated physicist who is comfortable in our culture, who has represented iran at the iaea in vienna. who better to talk to them ali, and are there any efforts going on? leedy there is a little discreet track but to my mind we have this leverage now in the form of the terrible sanctions and so on

government including as a senior director of for near east and south asian affairs at the nsc during the clinton administration. he was an advisor to the obama presidential campaign on south asia and shared an inneragency review of u.s. policy toward afghanistan and pakistan during the early months of the obama administration. he is the author of his own recent book on pakistan entitled, "deadly embrace, pakistan, america and the future of the global jihad". on my far left is joshua white, the youngster of our panel. he is a ph.d candidate at the johns hopkins school of advanced international studies in the jennings randolph peace scholar at the u.s. institute of peace. he spent extensive time in pakistan doing research and has presented his findings in numerous academic and policy forums and in testimony before the congress. he is also an active participant in several high-level u.s.-pakistani track to strategic dialogues. his current doctoral work focuses on digs-making in islamic parties in pakistan. and last but certainly not least to my right is marvin weinbaum who is a scholar