as part of the 2010 nuclear posture review, the u.s. government is reviewing our nuclear deterrence requirements at nuclear plants, to ensure they are aligned to address today's threats. we are considering what forces the united states needs to maintain for strategic stability and deterrence, and assurance to u.s. allies and partners. based on this analysis, we will develop proposals for further reductions in the nuclear stockpile, which currently stands at approximately 5,000 total nuclear warheads. as the president said recently at the second nuclear security summit in seoul, we can already say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need. approach to the next agreement with the russians. regardless of numbers, the president has stressed that the next nuclear reduction agreement between the united states and russian federations should include strategic, nonstrategic and nondeployed nuclear weapons. of course, no previous arms control agreement has limited or monitored these last two categories. so the next negotiation

the nuclear posture review. the prague speech. where do we want to go? what are the threats that we're trying to address globally and then to figure out what are the questions that nuclear weapons are necessary for hoping then to move the other questions out of the nuclear arena. because as the president has said many times, he, and i would argue correctly, believes that it is very much in the security interest to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons and to reduce the roles in a very much more nonaggressive proliferation policy. one that has as much, even more of a bearing on our security position than some outdated cold war mentality than russia or any other country. i'm sure many of you are pretty steeped in those documents of the npr, but i would encourage you to go back and take a look at those, particularly the five criteria that are enumerated in the npr. those are very much the criteria that we put against how many icbms do you need to have to ensure that they're survivable or submarine or which countries can be on the list. those five questions

as part of the 2010 nuclear posture review, the u.s. government is reviewing our nuclear deterrence requirements to be sure they are aligned to address today's risks and determine what forces need to be maintained to security deterrence and deterrence to u.s. allies and partners. based on this analysis we will develop proposals for further reductions in our nuclear stockpile, which currently stands at approximately 5,000 total nuclear war heads. as the president said recently at the second nuclear summit, we can already say with confidence we have more nuclear weapons than we need. once complete, this study will help to shape our nettigotiatin approach to the next agreement with the russians. the president has stressed the next nuclear agreement between the united states and russian federation should include strategic, nonstrategic and nondeployed nuclear weapons. of course no previous arms control agreement has limited or monitored these last two categories. so the next negotiations will be breaking some new ground in important ways. we

she's played a key role in the administration's nuclear posture review, which we were discussing the morning, the successful review of the amputee conference. we have investor susan burke who was critical to success at that meeting. also the undersecretary has been a part of the ongoing p5 dialogue on nuclear transparency issues, and also helping to revive reconsideration of the conference of test and treaty and much, much more. so we're very pleased that you're here today, rose. and we conclude you up to the podium to give us an update on the progress to date. and the path ahead, and she will be taking a few questions at the end. so, rose, i welcome you up. [ applause ] >> it's always great to be in this room and to see so many friends and colleagues here. so thank you very much for this opportunity to speak to you again today. and to bring you up the to date on where we are on our arms control and nonproliferation agenda items. i'm always glad to be at the arms control association's annual meeting before coming into government i served on the board, and i know from the inside/out h

the nuclear posture review. where do we want to go? what are the threats we're trying to address globally and then try to figure out what are the questions that nuclear weapons are necessary for, flipping them to move the other questions out of the nuclear reach. because as a president has said many times, he and i argue correctly, believes that it is very much in the security interest to reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons and more expanded and more aggressive policy. one that would recognize has as much and probably more of a bearing on our security position than sort of the political mentality of nuclear parody with russia. so, i'm sure many of you are pretty -- on those documents with npr, but i would encourage you to go back and look at those, particularly the criteria because those are very much the criteria of the events how many isms do you think we should have to ensure survival for submarines? or which countries need to be on the targets list and which need to drop off? or do you immediate to cross target in order to achiev

the activists are understandably anxious as a result of the nuclear posture review in this classified u.s. military document the security guarantees that protected countries without nuclear weapons against a nuclear offensive are cancelled a strategy of action is being adopted in addition to deterrence so the arsenals must be upgraded to make them easier to use france and britain have responded with surprising enthusiasm to this nuclear renaissance that the united kingdom is going to pretend that it needs nuclear weapons for its survival or its security who is attacking the united kingdom so i have got the very strange idea that because there is terrorists in the world we need to have nuclear weapons can be used nuclear weapons against terrorists but it would that not be rather like shooting musk eaters with chemicals i think the british would make a much bigger splash in the history of the world if the decider that they let the program expire. we are still fighting the polio war between britain and france because when i finally cornered. any senior british military man these days and

the nuclear posture review, the prague speech. where do we want to go? hat are the threats that we're trying to address globally, and then to figure out what are the questions that nuclear weapons are necessary for, hoping then to move the other questions out of the nuclear arena. because as the president has said sometimes -- many times, and i would argue correctly, believes that it is very much in the security interests to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons and to reduce the roles of nuclear weapons as we pursue an an expanded and aggressive non-proliferation policy. one that we recognize has as much, probably even more of a bearing on our security position than some outdated cold war mentality of nuclear parity with russia or any other country. i'm sure many of you are steeped in those documents of the npr. but i would encourage you to go back and look at those and particularly the five criteria because those are very much the criteria that we put against how many icbms do you think you need to have in order to insure that they're survivable, or su

as part of the 2010 nuclear posture review, u.s. government is reviewing our nuclear response requirements for nuclear manets to ensure they -- plants to ensure they are aligned to the threats, to ensure what the united states needs to maintain for strategic state in this term and to ensure to u.s. allies and partners. based on this analysis, we will develop proposals for further reductions in our nuclear stockpiles which currently stands at approximately 5,000 total nuclear warheads. as the president said recently as the second nuclear security summit in the fall, we can say with confidence we have more nuclear weapons than we need. to complete the study of the deterrence requirements shapes the negotiating approach with the next agreement with the russians. regardless of numbers, the president express the the next agreement between the russians and united states should include strategic, non-strategic, and nuclear deployed weapons. no agreement is limited or monitored the last two categories, and so the next negotiations will be br

level funding that -- with the years of level funding that we put on, that's why the 2010 nuclear posture review concluded that additional funding was essential to ensure that our infrastructure was adequately maintained and that our warheads receive the refurbishment it needs to remain reliable and effective. and there has been strong bipartisan support for carrying out the recommended increases in modernization funding. this amendment unacceptably strikes funding for these which are urgent and long overdue. i strongly urge my colleagues to make defense a pry are the and to vote no on -- priority and to vote no on this amendment and i yield back the balance of my time. the chair: the gentleman yields back. for what purpose does the gentleman from massachusetts rise? mr. markey: move to strike the requisite number of words. the chair: the gentleman moves to strike the requisite number of words and is recognized for five minutes. mr. markey: i rise in support of the polis amendment. he and i are making this amendment so that we can once again demonstrate the lack of compatibility of the prioritie

nuclear weapons, yes, we are in favor of that. we have clearly indicated that, the defense and deterrence posture review. but you can read everything in the defense and posture review. there's no hidden agenda. >> we have time for one last question. afp? >> do you still have to meet mr. putin in the next few weeks, or do you think he doesn't plan or want to meet you right now? >> we have not discussed the concrete calendar issues. as you may recall, i called him and congratulated him on his election a few days after the presidential elections, and we agreed to meet bilaterally in the not too distant future but, of course, at the end of the day it's also a calendar question and no dates have been fixed yet. >> thank you very much. >>> each week washington journal spotlights a recent notable magazine article. on wednesday "vanity fair" contributing editor michael joseph gross talks about the internet, how it was created and regulated. tune in and call, tweet, or e-mail "washington journal" live at 9:15 eastern on c-span. federal reserve chairman ben bernanke is on capitol hill this week. he's testifying be

the defense deterrent posture review by nato in chicago state's the supreme guarantee of allied security are the strategic nuclear weapons of the three countries, the u.s. you can and france. it does not talk about tactical nuclear weapons as being vital for that deterrent capability and the last i noticed our european allies are very supportive of further u.s./russia reductions. jon's of the points? >> jack mendelson explain away this is the world that developed. i remember his lecture on why we had tactical nuclear weapons in the first place which is going back to it outdated thinking that the europeans were worried that we were going to be couple our defense from their defense and we need to have an addition to long-range strike capability the capability on the ground so that when we had a nuclear exchange to block tanks from the boulder gap that russia would not just launched at a sand wouldn't just be a nuclear war in europe. all of that is out the window and useless in terms of american strategic thought. does anybody believe a tactical nuclear weapons from europe on russian territory would not be seen as a

the defense and posture review released in chicago states that the supreme guarantee of allied security are the strategic nuclear weapons of the three countries in nato with strategic nuclear weapons, the u.s., the uk, and france. it does not talk about the u.s. forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons as being vital to that deterrent capability. and the last i noticed, our european allies are very supportive of further u.s./russian reductions relating to strategic nuclear weapons. jon, other points on this? >> i mean, you know, when i was really young, jack mendelssohn used to call me into his office and explain the way the world had developed. of course i remember his lecture on why we have nuclear weapons in the first place, which goes back to really outdated thinking that the europeans were worried that somehow, we were going to decouple our defense from their defense. we need to have capabilities on the ground so that when we had a nuclear exchange to block tanks from coming through the gap, that russia wouldn't then -- you know, they'd have to lunch at us, and it wouldn't just be a nuclear war in europe.

nuclear alliance. we indicated in the defense posture review that we would very much like to see a reduction in the tactical nuclear weapons. but we have added in that case that we have to ensure that such reductions take place in a balanced way and the fact is nato nuclear powers have reduced their stockpiles significantly since the end of the cold war. we still have quite a number of russian nuclear weapons, so that disparity has to be taken into account. in case we could reach agreement on the balanced reduction in the number of nuclear weapons, we are in favor of that and have indicated the deterrence posture review. you can read everything. there is no hidden agenda. >> time for one last question. >> do you think vladimir putin does not plan or want to meet you right now? >> we have not discussed the issues. as you may recall, i called him and congratulated him on his election a few minutes after the presidential election and we agreed to meet in the not too distant future. at the end of the day, it's a calendar question and no date has been fixed yet. >> thank you. >> the ftc is primarily an enforceme

she'll talk about the defense posture review that was issued at the recent nato summit and also her thoughts on possible steps for dealing with the leftover tactical nuclear arsenals of the united states and europe as well as russia. after each of their opening remarks, we'll take your questions and we'll have discussion and so i welcome general jamison to the meeting and to open us up. the floor is yours. >> thank you very much. it's a real pleasure to be here. i note from the smattering of gray hair and talk of some reunions that most of you have lived through a good portion of the cold war and some of you probably are saying what was the cold war. it's also very reassuring to me to know that among all of you i'm probably the least expert of what goes on inside the belt way. i call myself an operator. by some strange occurrence of events, i ended up going through the cold war in positions that gave me i think a unique window on to the operational side of things and in that sense the urgency of finding a new way in this 21st century. i know it's not lost on any of us here that we're -- we're in spite of what i saw on occasion up close and personal, close

nuclear weapons and no one could agree to that to get into the strategic concept. the agreement was then to launch a major review of nato's overall deterrents and defense posture. that was going to be presented at the chicago summit just a few weeks ago. but what happened after that was that it turned it, it started out being quite a public affair. but after a few months, i think nato realized they had bitten off more than they could chew and the process turned into being an almost secret process. a few months into the process, no one in nato would go to gatherings like that and it was published at the chicago summit without as much as press briefing. not surprising, tdpa has had sporadic and limited with gatherings like these. when tfgs announced that many welcomed the process as an opportunity to get a proper discussion about nato's terms and defense posture and particularly, the future of the fort deployed american nonstrategic nuclear weapons based in five european countries. perhaps, nievely, i hoped in light of changes in the international context, in light of nato's redefined low and in light of the additional capability, might also discuss alternative w

nuclear strategy -- in our national security strategy." in 2010, the administration completed a congressional mandated posture review that determined the fundamentalole is to deter nuclear attacks against the u.s. and our allies. the president directed a study on how to implement that strategy. that study is due to be completed very soon. back in march, in south korea, president obama said "that study is still underway. but even as we have more to do, we can only say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need." we will have far-reaching implications for u.s. nuclear policy. and how we can reduce the enormous cost of the u.s. missile arsenal, which according to a new center study published in this month's issue of "arms control today," it is at least $31 billion a year. we have with this dirk jamison. he will give us his thoughts on these issues that i have just introduced. he is now deputy director at the chief martin center for corp. studies beenjon will give us -- cities. -- corporation studies. jon will give us his perspective. hart.so have trina flock par after each of their opening remarks, we will take your questions and

nuclear weapons and no one could agree to that to get into the strategic concept. the agreement was then to launch a major review of nato's overall deterrence and defense posture. that was then going to be presented at the chicago summit just a few weeks ago. what happened after that was it started out being quite a public affair but after a few months i think nato realized that they had actually bitten off more than they could chew and the process turned into being an almost secret process. it has rarely been referred to since then in public. a few months into the process no one in nato would go to gathering and talk about this as it was published at the chicago summit without so much as a press briefing. so not surprisingly, it has only had sporadic public interest and i think the knowledge about it is quite limited within gatherings like this. now, when it was announced at lisbon, many including myself welcomed the process as an opportunity to get a proper discussion about nato and the posture and particularly the future of the forward deployed american nonstrategic nuclear weapons still based in five european countries. perhaps 95ly i also hoped that in lig