mohsen, uh, we've had german chancellor olaf schulz talking about the necessity of working with his partners in order to not let this escalation get into uh get to a full scale war and trying to... achieve truths, how do you think feasible would that be? has actually iran's measure of operation a true promise to been a step towards a peace, permanent peace in the region? well certainly one of the objectives of doing this would was to was to essentially stabilize and to rebalance, recalibrate uh the region, because what israel had done was through its bluff and bluster through netanyahu's lies. and his turn up at the un and his subsequent reveling in the fact that he had committed the greatest terrorist uh series of acts in any one or two days in history basically through the the device destruction because of all this boasting and gloating and before because he was also persuading the americans to give even more money towards the war on lebanon he had been had been drumming up this support to launch his his great invasion of lebanon which still... we're still waiting for, but uh, he he promis

poland and the baltic states arguing for that and others, you know, arguing for what i refer to, olaf schulz calling strategic ambiguity. and i think in retrospect, there's some debate about whether or not that was an effective policy, whether or not a major sanction move in the run up to the invasion would have had an effect. i'm not so sure i do think that putin was intent on invading. one of the things that i detail in the book is that putin doesn't really care about the long term health of the russian economy. he cares about his own wealth and the people around him. but he's not he's not focused on the long term, productive of health of the russian economy. i think that's a very important point. he cares about what happens as long as he's in power, he's around when he's not. he really doesn't seem to have any concerns about that. how difficult was it even in the run up to the war and particularly once it started to get the european on board? and how effective do you think people in the biden administration were in persuading them that they should also these quite draconian. i think on th

poland and the baltic states arguing for that and others, you know, arguing for what i refer to, olaf schulz calling strategic ambiguity. and i think in retrospect, there's some debate about whether or not that was an effective policy, whether or not a major sanction move in the run up to the invasion would have had an effect. i'm not so sure i do think that putin was intent on invading. one of the things that i detail in the book is that putin doesn't really care about the long term health of the russian economy. he cares about his own wealth and the people around him. but he's not he's not focused on the long term, productive of health of the russian economy. i think that's a very important point. he cares about what happens as long as he's in power, he's around when he's not. he really doesn't seem to have any concerns about that. how difficult was it even in the run up to the war and particularly once it started to get the european on board? and how effective do you think people in the biden administration were in persuading them that they should also these quite draconian. i think on th