and oneover the arguments in the paper -- one of the arguments in the book is that, in fact, these claims while intuitively appealing are actually much more, much more complex and problematic than they first appear. and so, for example, you know, if you, if you make the rich countries pay, it's just much less likely that they're going to participate. and then there's also a problem which is -- because as a general matter, countries only enter into treaties when it's in their interest. if you say, look, i'm willing to into a climate treaty because down the road the benefits of avoiding climate-related disasters are greater than the short-term costs of reducing emissions. but then you say to this country, by the way, you have to contribute, you know, a few extra billion or trillion dollars because other countries are poor. a country is not going to join into it because countries don't do that. countries enter into treaties when it's in their national interests. that's how politicians get reelected. they do distribute through foreign aid, and i think that's a good thing, but that's a much be