then reporting back regularly to the osd on the progress. the osd goes forward to the congress and announces the opening of positions. i'm not sure that some of that has not happened, but it hasn't been clear to me that there is a process in place that everybody understands. this goes back to the questions earlier about open transparency and of studies, of the methodology in what is going on. it doesn't appear -- i understand why they want to keep some of the results close, as they're readying, but how they're setting up the overall framework, i think has not been clear. finally, because i know there are researchers in the audience there are things that once we get past this, and we will to consider. for instance, and i'll just throw one out, the path to senior leadership in the services is through the combat arms. the three-star four-star. there are some non-combat arms but most it comes that way. i think there needs to be work on, what are the valid leadership skills you need in those positions, in a three and four-star level positions. as

we had a core team, core community of state cia joint staff osd, bureau of justice. everyone knew everyone's telephone numbers. you pick up the phone in the middle of the night, have an issue, on a phone call on a stoop in 15 minutes and everyone knew what the mission was. everyone knew how to go forward. everybody had the same goal in mind. it is. it's personality dependent. the people working the issue are all mission oriented. they know what they have to execute. they know what they have to do. it's been done before. we can do it again but takes leadership. it's leadership challenge and formidable force to remind agencies there's only one aspect of the entire piece. the nsc is the honest broker. i came to the nsc from an agency so i was a career civil servant. i might have been aghast if at that time i said nsc looking at budget on emergency response to see what we were spending on what and if it was in our mission. i look at it now and say, you know what, somebody has to do it. i can't depend on the bureau to do it. i can't depend on dhs to do it. somebody has to

we, my task is to support the taiwan relations act and to provide my advice to the, up to the osd and up to the president for him to decide what kind of things we provide. i know that they have requested our assistance in submarine programs, and we're contemplating that at this point in time but have not committed them one way or the other. they are particularly interested in us helping them in cybersecurity areas that allow them to pursue asymmetric capabilities that will improve their defense and improve their confidence that they can make decisions on their own and not be coerced. >> can thank you. >> colonel graham. >> thank you, captain. admiral, would you describe china's behavior toward their neighbors as provocative? >> i would call it aggressive and i guess provocative would be in the eyes of the beholder. but from my view it's aggressive. >> from the eyes of the japanese would you say it's provocative? >> i think they would say yes. >> okay. north korea general, would you say the regime on a good day, is unstable? >> no, sir. i'd say, i'd say the kju's in control. we see now

the counterterrorism experts but we had a core team, community of the state, cia joint staff, osd, the bureau of justice everyone knew everyone's telephone numbers. you had everyone know what the mission was, how to go forward everyone had the same goal in mind. and it is personality dependent. all mission oriented. they know what they have to execute. it has been done before and we could do it again. it is it is a leadership challenge and it takes the formidable force to remind agencies that they are only one aspect of the entire peace. the nsc is the honest broker i was a career civil servant i might have been a gas. see what we were spending on what. i look at it now and say someone has to do it because i can't depend on the bureau i can't depend on dhs. someone needs to be an honest broker to say this is our mission this is our goal. who has the capability, responsibility, budget authority and if you don't commit is within your mission, we will get it the budget and the people to execute so we have across and coordinated interagency effort to execute this important national securit

to provide my advice to the osd and the president for him to decide on what kind of things we provide. i know that they have requested our assistance in submarine programs. we're contemplating that but have not committed them one way or the other. they are particularly interested in us helping them in cyber security are areas that will imimprove their defense and improve their confidence that they can make decisions on their own and not be coerced. >> thank you. >> colonel graham? >> thank you, captain. would you describe it as provocative? >> i would call it aggressive and i guess provocative would be in the eyes of the beholder, but from my view it's aggressive. >> from the eyes of the japanese would you say it's provocative? >> i think they would say yes. >> north korea, general, would you say the regime on a good day is is unstable? >> no, sir. i'd say -- i'd say that kj yu is in control. we see no indications of instability at this time. >> so you think we don't have to

rich mat lock working with osd and secondly retired admiral archer macy. mr. matlock, why don't we get started with you. >> thank you. >> good afternoon. i'm rich matlock, i work at the missile defense agency and i'm the program executive for advanced technology. that means i've got the best job in the agency. most exciting job in the agency. so, i want to spend just about ten minutes or so talking you through some of the challenges we're facing over there for the future and what we think we're going to do about those challenges. i came to the missile defense mission just a few years after president reagan challenged the nation to look at ways that we might solve the problem of defending our nation against ballistic missiles as opposed to avenging our nation. and so i came back as a young rocket propulsion engineer from the air force with about 130 of my comepatriots, i see several in the audience here today with the goal of sponsoring research and really capitalizing on the creativity and innovation in our industry, in our academia and our national laboratori

learned that opr when he did finally get these allegations were never turned around and sent them to the osdwhat do you say about that ms. leonhart? >> that's one of the changes we put in place. >> went? >> november. november of last year. we have never had in history of dsa can, we've never had a formal neck mechanism for the security glances, review upon an opr investigation. >> you i did minister, deputy administrator and acting administrator for almost 10 years at that point and you never have that policy in place? it seems like -- >> we never had a formal policy. it would be up to the office of professional responsibility to flag an internal investigation that had security issues and then to refer that over to security programs. so we have set up a mechanism for that to happen automatically automatically. >> so were those recommendations made before or after the draft report from the inspector general? >> the recommendation that 30 programs that office of professional responsibility flag security violations and give them the security programs was happening long before the. what we did i

provides a good forum to pull together a number of senior leaders within osd and, frankly, on the joint well coordinated within the building. and getting both oversight and advocacy for our activities. >> let me ask an additional question. you have to talk about it in your prepared remarks. the campaign plan for global special operations, which of necessity has to interact with the campaign plans of sentcom and north com and south com, et cetera, et cetera. so can you comment about how you manage this plan. and just quickly because my time expired. might make a comment, too. >> absolutely. so the campaign plan for global special operations is really designed to support my principle task of supporting my geographic partners out here, and designed to synchronize our activities to help prioritize our resources and where we are putting them in support of the gcccs. it's designed to address the partnerships we need to have in place. it's designed to look at the things that we will do to shape the environment for the geographic combatant commanders, and it ensures we have aligned to those spe

that opr, when they did finally get these allegations were never turned around and sent them to the osd mr. chaffetz: what do you say about that, ms. leonhart? miss leonhart: that's one of the changes we put in place. mr. chaffetz: when? miss leonhart: november. november of last year. we have never had in history of dsa can, we've never had a formal neck mechanism for the security glances, review upon an opr investigation. mr. chaffetz: you i did minister, deputy administrator and acting administrator for almost 10 years at that point and you never have that policy in place? it seems like -- miss leonhart: we never had a formal policy. it would be up to the office of professional responsibility to flag an internal investigation that had security issues, and then to refer that over to security programs. so we have set up a mechanism for that to happen automatically . mr. chaffetz: so were those recommendations made before or after the draft report from the inspector general? miss leonhart: the recommendation that 30 programs, -- security programs, that office of professional responsibili