i am paul keim, the acting chair of the national science advisory board for biosecurity. i appreciate the opportunity to speak to you about dual-use research and in particular about the board's activities and our recent evaluation of two scientific papers concerning the avian h5n1 virus. it's been recognized for many years that science and technology can be used for both good purposes and bad. it is this two-sided coin that we refer to as dual-use research. the problem is that all biological research can be construed as having potential bad applications, as well as their good ones. the nsabb created a new term, dual-use research of concern or durc, as we've been saying, to distinguish normal research from that with high potential to be misused. the parameters defining durc would include the magnitude any of danger, and the immediacy of any threat balanced against the overall benefits of the work. over the last eight years, the board has advised u.s. government on best practices and policy approaches for the -- for research communication, personnel reliability standards, c

paul keim, acting chairman of the aforementioned national science advisory board for biosecurity. we thank you very much, dr. keim for being here. and please proceed with your testimony now. >> chairman lieberman, thank you for holding this hearing on

paul keim, acting chairman of the aforementioned national science advisory board for biosecurity. much, dr. keim, for being here, and please proceed with your testimony now. >> chairman lieberman, thank you for holding this hearing on biological security, the risk of dual-use research. i am paul come, the acting chair of the national science advisory board, for biosecurity. i appreciate the opportunity to speak to you about dual-use research, and in particular about the boards activities at a recent evaluation of two scientific papers concerning that avian and h5n1 fires. it's been recognizer many years that signed second on different -- good purposes and then. this two-sided coin we refer to as dual-use research. the problem is that all biological research can be construed as having potential bad applications as well as there are good ones. the nsabb created a new term, dual use research of concern, or durc, as we've been saying, to distinguish normal research from that with exceptionally high potential to be misused. the parameters defining durc would include the magnitude of any

keim said. this is a strong board. a really good board. we've worked with them for a long time, so if they did, i believe as paul has done in the past, if you have an issue with something, you bring it up. the letter was sent to the executive secretary at the nih, dr. patterson. we responded on a point by point basis to everything in that letter. so we'd be more than happy to make that response available to you so that you could see the point by point discussion. again, there were important ibs about looking forward. there were several things in there that i must say quite frankly, mr. chairman, that i disagree with. one about the security briefing. as you know. i have a great deal of trust in the director of the national intelligence to tell us what we need to know. so that's just one example. the idea is as you mentioned, the idea about the picking of people who would be on. we did not get any indication of people he wanted to see. i can just say that i think the general principles brought up by dr. keim, i totally agree with. i just have to say for the record, i disagree with many of the things in his letter. >> no, i appreciate it and i