pbd 6 calls for the elevation of development as a core pillar of american power and provides specific policy guidance on implementing it. the judge concluded that pbd 6 is a nonclassified districtive that has been distributed broadly within the branch and has been distributed to decide decision making. in the judge's view as policy guidance to be implemented by agencies, pbd 6 has the force of law and is the functional equivalent to executive order. the judge reasoned that the availability of the presidential's privilege ensured confidentiality and here found no such need particularly given that pbd 6 does not involve a uniquely presidential duty which is a little bit odd reasoning. the court went onto say that based on the reading of the document, the judge found it was forward looking and didn't reveal the president's deliberative process. in short, the judge concluded that the president's ability to communicat communicate his final decisions privately is not implicated. there are other cases involving the deliberative process privilege but i will leave those to be covered by the ma

in the judge's view, as policy guidance to be implemented by recipient agencies, pbd-6 had the force of law and was the functional equivalent to executive order. the judge's reason that the availability of the presidential communications privilege turns on the need for confidentiality to ensure advice and herein found no such need, particularly given that ppd-6 does not involve a uniquely presidential duty. which is a little bit odd reasoning. the court went on to say based on the reading of the document, the judge found it was forward-looking and didn't reveal president's deliberative process. in short, the judge concluded the president's ability to communicate his final decisions privately is not implicated. there are other cases involving the deliberative process decision, but i'll leave those to be covered by the materials and gwynn the shortness of our time, i want to move on to exemption 6. exemption 6 allows agencies to withhold records whose closure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. it's often raised in conjunction with exemption 7-c which says somet

one thing that i will sort of mention kind of big picture about pbd 28 is that the efforts of the administration and the director of national intelligence here are entirely focused on minimalization rules and restrictions on the use of data that they have collected. it's the administration's position that with respect to data communications data acquired outside the united states, not on specified individual persons, that they basically don't want any restrictions on collection. so they are focusing all of their energy about talking about restrictions on the use of that data, how that data might be minimized or sort of processed after it has been collected. but they don't want to accept any restrictions on their ability to collect that data. moving on to what's happening in congress right now. originally, following the snowden disclosures, there were two bills that were competing bills that were developed in the house and senate coming from different sides. one coming from intelligence community proponents and the other from liberals and other anti-surveillance members. now what we have had is a