the reason the previous four field wasn't because people didn't pete al qaeda. it was because there were not enough to protect them when they turned against al qaeda said they would turn against them and be killed. what we were able to do is provide security so they were able to sustain that movement against al qaeda and throw the al qaeda guys out and getting back to the accidental guerrilla thing, again, 90% of the people we were fighting or accidental guerrilla fighting because their community was that threat from another community in the cycle of violence provoked by al qaeda in iraq which is a tiny group of externals fighters led by turks and syrians and foreigners who had come in and provoked the war. we had to make it safe enough they would feel able to reject those guys and get back to political dialogue with other communities. >> you talk in your book about the fragility what we have accomplished in iraq. you just said we have another five or ten years. my colleague is in the audience and said the decisive defense in iraq lie ahead of us, not behind. so