had petitioner believed that the policy that u.p.s.ich was to provide accommodations to employees who are injured on the job but not provide accommodations to any employees who sustain a condition incurred off the job, she could have brought a disparate impact claim. we believe she would not have succeeded. but she could have and she did not. she attempted to bring one late in the day. it was dismissed by the district court because it had not been exhausted. >> miss halligan can we talk about the claim she did bring? >> yes. >> you are reading the statute. it basically makes everything ( z after the semicolon completely superfluous. and i think you would agree with that >> absolutely not, your honor. the reading we propose is very straightforward. what congress said in the second clause, the key words are the same as other persons. what other means is simply distinct from whatever is mentioned first. so employers have to treat pregnant employees the same as some distinct group of nonpregnant employees that are similar in their ability

petitioner would even cut out recklessness. even if the speaker was consciously aware that it was likely to cause fear, petitioner -- >> can you go back? that's exactly the point that's bothering me. i'm with you down to forget the purpose. i'm with you there has to be a true threat. assume that. but now the question is knowledge. and that's the general requirement for mens rea where there's just a general -- that's the normal rule. knowledge. and you have to know those portions that make up an actus reus. you have to know the elements. one of the elements is a true threat. so i thought what do you say you have to know there? and when i read your brief you first said he has to know, he has to understand the meaning of the words he speaks in context and must intentionally speak them and is showing that the defendant acted knowingly in transmitting a true threat requires proof the defendant knew he transmitted a communication and he comprehended its context and context. now, when i first read that i thought, well, that means he h

it was made on the record and it differentiates arkansas from every state mentioned by the petitioner and the united states. >> but you have no example of that ever happening. >> i have no example of a -- well, let me say this. in our brief on footnote 13 and on page 26 of the 18 states amicus briefs there are examples. there are no record -- >> examples of what? >> opnobody interprison identification problems. in the prison, a beard being used to thwart identification, and -- >> do you have that same concern with the prisoners who have a very short beard for medical reasons? >> no, and let me explain why. there is confusion about what this so-called medical beard is. there is no exception of practice of a quantitative matter for medical beards. it is a means of shaving exception. our policy changed to reflect our actual practice about a year ago. what the practice is is that when a doctor's order says a person has a dermatological condition or some other scarring or skin condition that needs a shave they use barber style clippers, electric clippers, without a guard and they're used d

what if we began where the petitioners did? in bodies connected to other bodies, and then moved to our ideas about whether the nation is or is not christian or religious? from this vantage point, starting with bodies, i would like to suggest that glenn beck, senator john danforth, and barack obama stand together. they respect bodies. in faith and politics, senator danforth expressed profound frustration with the use of teri schiavo, the florida woman who remained hospitalized in a vegetative state for 15 years to make political hay. his concern was for the sanctity of her body and the well-being of the bodies around her, family members, friends, doctors. danforth was not interested in this case with the body politic that was the republican party. glenn beck cherishes the founding fathers like george washington in part because he sees george washington as a defender of jewish americans and their right to their religious freedom, and that defending their religion is also about defending their bodies to practice that religion. fin

under petitioners view, even 30 seconds of a dog sniff would be unreasonable in ef casevery case. >> what your rule will lead to something along the lines, everybody will decide 30 or 40 minutes is something you said in your brief is reasonable for a traffic stop. and if you see a tail light violation, that's 40 minutes of free time for the police officers to investigate any crimes that they want because they can do it all in the range of what you've decided is kind of the reasonable traffic stop. >> i don't think that's how we envision the analysis going because the ultimate length of time has to be within the duration of a routine traffic stop that doesn't involve a traffic sniff. that will vary based on the circumstances. so what we think courts can do is they can look at what the officer actually did and look to stops involving similar circumstances but not dog sniffs and determine whether the officer was able to do the whole thing within a reasonable amount of time. i think that's essentially what the court contemplated that with these fourth amendment inquiries that they are fa

again, acknowledged this morning by the petitioners.e are plenty of places in society where first amendment notwithstanding we compel people not to say certain things or we compel them to say certain things. this is easy to see in the world of finance, for example. you can't put out a securities offering without including certain information, or you won't get registered. there's a penalty for doing that. lawyers and judges consent to these requirements when we decide to become members of the bar in the first instance. so that there are ways in which a lawyer's speech is limited. a lawyer can't stand in front of a court and knowingly speak falsely about the record, or about the fact. he may not end up in jail, but he's certainly going to have a problem with his law license. and he ought to. and the same is true with respect to judges. now, does the first amendment apply to these situations? yes. white and caperton tell us that it does. and what we're really about this morning, the court was about this morning, was finding what parts real

chief justice, and may it please the court, we agree with petitioners that respondent's ordnance here is unconstitutional, but we think that the context-specific intermediate speech should apply in exceptions to a sign ordnance where those exceptions are based on the same longstanding traditional rationales that justify the sign ordnance as a whole. a wooden application of strict scrutiny in this context would suggest that it's presumptively unconstitutional, for example for a town to limit signs on public property but have an exception if you want to paint your street number on your curb. now, that doesn't make a great deal of practical sense and that's not an example i just made up. that's essentially the ordnance this court upheld albeit without addressing this particular issue in taxpayers for vin sent. on a three -- vincent. on a theoretical level, the normal reasons for deep judicial skepticism of exceptions to a regulation of speech don't apply in the context of that street address exception, exceptions for danger or safety signs or other types of exceptions that track the norm

in the solicitation, the petitioner was a candidate. there was no response. i think __ >> i'm talking about this prohibition. this dealing with an issue that does happen in the vast majority of cases. >> here's the contrast, your honor, if i may. i guess my question is what is the difference between that letter and the following letter that is signed by the members of the committee __ which is permissible under florida law. dear joe, judge jones asked us to serve on the campaign committee and we are writing to ask you to contribute to his election. as you know, florida law permits judge jones solicitors. the solicitation really does not make that much of an __ >> that's what you think. i can actually see how receiving a signed letter from the judge saying __ or a telephone call, or personal meeting, has an incrementally greater impact than a letter. today, i even get a whole lot of campaign committee letters. i just throw them out. if a candidate calls me, or reaches out to be, i tell them i can't talk to them. i have a reason, and an excuse, a lead is not ha

in this in this solicitation although petitioner was a candidate, there was no response. >> well, i -- >> but i think -- >> because she was unknown. >> even when she -- >> but i'm talking about this is this prohibition is dealing with an issue that does happen in the vast majority of cases. >> i guess, here's the contrast your honor, if i may. i guess the question is what's the difference between that letter and the following letter that's signed by the members of the committee, which is totally permissible under florida law -- dear joe, as an attorney frequently appearing before the county court, we're sure you're concerned with the quality of the judiciary. judge jones personally asked us to serve on his campaign committee, and we're writing to ask you to contribute to his reelection. as you know, florida law permits judge jones to thank contributors. i think once all those things are permissible, who makes the solicitation really doesn't make that much of an incremental difference -- >> well -- >> in an area where we're talking to about compelling interest. >> that's what you think

the presence of family members was evidence of how meaning in law full this experience was one petitioner said i quote this has brought out the best in enjoying my daughter we thank you for allowing my students to have a positive experience in this time of their life we look forward to working with you in the future thank you. >> thank you so much. >> art taylor. >> good afternoon, commissioners informative my voice i've got a little bit of a voice aim art all the citizens advisory committee are represent in district 10 i want to let you know that the presentations the cac has benefited the staff and my participation in many of the activities and events in particular the southeast working group all of those kill matt from the commitment from the puc all of that combined just railroads to me the need for the community benefits program i trust it will continue because it strengthens our community and that's all i have to see. >> is it true, mr. taylor and tom birmingham. >> good afternoon, commissioners i'm tom birmingham a consultant with before a and caldwell we have two contracts with th

that said, as matt pointed out the particular petitioner in this case who has been penalized below did not engage in anything that could remotely be called person-to-person solicitation. she sent out a single mass mailing and something about the power of mass mailings in my own organization organization. so i think there's a good question whether the court will even address this broader issue on whether this rule against personal solicitation is constitutionally permissible or not. it is possible that the court might say indeed i think some of the parties urge this, that whether or not this general rule violates the first amendment it can't constitutionally be applied to mrs. williams because of conduct she engaged in is nothing of the sort that implicates the quid proe quo concerns. it is possible the court could dismiss it as improfitly granted because it doesn't provide an opportunity to solve it but that with mean her loss would remain in effect even though the underlying reasoning of the court would be so clear that she wins and on the side of the broader issue. but it said it wou

. >> would you recommend to people you just meet to be petitioners in a major precedent-setting national case? sounds like a great idea. >> if you feel deeply passionate about an issue and you can see no other path forward, i think it's a great option to exercise and again, you know, i have said i have never been a terribly patriotic person because i felt discriminated against my buyer life and it wasn't until we took prop 8 to federal court and i stood in that courthouse, i took an oath and gave testimony under the american flag that i felt like an american for the first time because it was the first time i felt like i was able to express a grievance in a place that was established to resolve them and that i was getting the same access to that institution for that problem as anybody else and i have felt so excluded from other institutions. i never wanted to be in the military but if i had, i wouldn't have been able to be myself. i felt excluded from marriage. in so many places, i felt i shouldn't try to work there? >> does it operate when you hear kris talk about a whole lifetime of ass

i find it curious that a petitioner would suggest if we take restrictions off incumbent judges who are free to call lawyers before them that they wouldn't give the incumbent an enormous advantage over non-in non-incumbent judges. we're dealing in an area where there is no evidence. >> up to this point you've been saying whether it's a significant difference it can make whether someone solicits in person or not. now you're telling us it doesn't make much difference at all. >> it seems to me social security self-evident prohibiting form of raising funds is to the great advantage of the incumbent because the only way in most judicial races they will be challenged is if you have somebody who can get their own distinct message out. >> i have two. excuse me if i didn't clearly express myself. when you tell an incumbent judge that they judge can solicit money that's going to give an incumbent judge who has far more intimidation power and as to weighing which will give more or less advantage, it's difficult to answer that question. i don't know it makes any difference. we have no evidence in t

and and if that's what this case is about acknowledged by the petitioners to be of a different character. a lawyer and judge speech really are different. we compel people not to say certain things or we compel them to say certain things. this is easy to see in the world of finance, for example. lawyers and judges consent to these requirements when we decided to come to the bar there the first instance. so there are ways in which a lawyer's speech is limited. a lawyer can't stand in court and knowingly speak fashionly. he may not wind up in jail but he's certainly going to have problem with his law license. and he ought to. now, does the first amendment apply to these situations? yes. what the court was about this morning what was parts really matter. there are federal laws and federal rules that apply to people like congress. and federal judges. those are really quite serious. members of congress are prohiblted from soliciting from federal employees. well why is that same reasons that were lifted up this morning for this rule about judges selectively soliciting. lawyers or people who mig

in florida which prohibits all forms of personal solicitation, such as the solicitation that the petitioner in this case sent out. it was a mass mailer saying i'm running for judge, please contribute to my campaign. in this case it did not actually result in any contributions. so, from the perspective of coming at this issue this is maybe not the ideal case to test the core of the issue of whether a judge walking up to a lawyer or litigant who has business before them right before their case starts outside of the courtroom and says hey, i noticed you haven't contributed money to my campaign yet raises concerns. so i think we believe this is a little more towards the outer edge of where the -- this comes from a judicial code of conduct, which we call the cannons, the primary means by which the judiciary regulates itself. one of the questions that i get asked a lot is why did the supreme court take this case? and i think the main reason is that there has been a pretty stark circuit split of federal courts that have considered this this four courts of appeal have struck down some sort of -- so

and in each of those cases we had a plaintiff or a petitioner, probably, who was a prisoner in guantanamo. and the respondent or the defendant was the president of the united states or the equivalent. now you have a person like bin laden's driver. bin laden's driver was not the most popular person in the united states. against george w. bush, the president of the united states a very powerful individual. in each of those four cases it was the person -- the prisoner who won. the last case, which i think was the most important, washere the question was could congress suspend the writ of habeas corpus. it is the writ, not from the magna carta but soon thereafter over the years. and it means that if you get to a judge, anything -- i had a case where there was a rock thrown out the window of someone that was being detained, the husband of a woman from dominican republic was being detained by a customs officer in puerto rico. he threw a rock out the window says bring me to the judge. the judge says bring me the body and let that jailer explain himself to see if that person is being held under t

every year on that day, the halls of congress are filled with petitioners, kind of grassroots lobbyists to members of congress going to senators, their senators members of congress lobbying against illegal abortion in this country. every year congress does nothing about it including the republican congressmen who swear that's why they got elected, to do something about it. that vote tomorrow was supposed to be that symbolic something. this would have never made it to a vote in the senate. they couldn't have gotten by a filibuster by democrats. so it was a purely symbolic act and now it turns out the republicans aren't capable of that. >> well look they have a huge problem, and it shows up every presidential election cycle, which is they have driven off young people they have driven off women voters in large numbers. they have driven off hispanic voters in large numbers. as i said before they seem intent on compounding all of those problems in the first weeks of the -- of this congress. if i were a candidate running for president on the republican side, this is my worst nightmare, which

a group of petitioners, including the legal aid society and the new york aclu request for the disclosure of information, including trance transcripts, presented evidence and the instructions that were given to that grand jury. and if you're looking for warmer weather, head west. most of the country can expect brutal cold to kick in as temperatures begin to plummet on the first full week of the new year. two rounds of arctic cold will move through much of the country, spreading east and into the midwest and the northeast. >>> the weather channel's mike betters is in chicago where the windchill is minus 16. >> reporter: well arctic air has invaded here in the midwest to start the brand new year 2015, as everyone is heading back to school and work today, brings in below zero temperatures here in chicago. 3 below is what we bottomed out at in single digits throughout the afternoon. on top of that some snow is coming. we'll show you something very interesting here over the chicago river. the river's unfrozen still because temperatures have been so mild for most of the season. but now we have

that said, as matt pointed out the particular petitioner in this case, who has been penalized below, william julie did not engage in anything that could be called person to person solicitation. she sent out a single mass mailing. i had not realized it resulted in no contributions, but that says something about the power of mass mailings. something i've learned about the hard way, as well, with my own organization. [laughter] so i think there's a good question whether the court will even address this broader issue, whether this rule against personal solicitation by judicial candidates is constitutionally permissible or not. it's possible, in other words that the court might say indeed, i think some of the parties are urged this. -- of the parties urge this -- i think the aclu urges this. that whether or not this general rule violates the first amendment, it can't constitutionally be applied to ms. williams, julie, because the conduct she engaged in was nothing of the sort that implicates the quid pro quo concerns. might dismiss the case as granted. precisely because it doesn't provide

the supreme court there also said the petitioners might well defend their claim of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate community values. even more importantly, the supreme court noted that removal from the library of a book based solely upon the educational suitability would be "perfectly permissible." that is why think this court should be guided by its decision in downs where it recognize that curriculum is government speech. and a fifth circuit decision from 2005 where they recognize that curriculum is government speech and the government need not share his podium with another speaker. the court is to be guided as well by epperson, the case involving the teaching and arkansas of evolution. the statue that prohibited that teaching. there, the supreme court found that the restriction on curricular speech constituted an independent constitutional violation of the free exercise in establishment clause and struck it down. here we have no independent violation of any students right to receive information. are there anymore questions? >> if

i believe what the amendment is trying to get at is there ended up being wait times for other petitioners and that was unacceptable. however, the amendment ignores the fact that they are in a much better position to avoid delays than in 2012. it is also very broad. it handles many petitions filed by people in unlawful status. asylum applications, adjusting to status applications, people married to american citizens requests for visa for people who are victims of sex trafficking or crimes -- these are all people who would be harmed by the amendment. i cannot believe that was the intention but that would be the impact. i believe congress into have a discussion about immigration policy. i'm always open to that discussion. i was part of a bipartisan group that met for 4.5 years to try to draft a bipartisan bill. but, i don't think these amendments really solve our needs to reform our immigration system. last time in committee, the chairman asserted he did not want to the portal 11 million people. that is exactly what these amendments would accomplish. only if you'd abort the parents of americ

represent embryos or in the words of alabama's legal code the interest of the unborn child of the petitioneron can essentially be put on trial, the fetuses lawyer can across examine the minor, can call witnesses against her, they can drag out by asking for more time to gather evidence and the local prosecutor can do the same. if the minor goes through all that and is granted permission to get an abortion it's not necessarily over. the embryo's lawyer or the local prosecutor or the minor's parents can appeal. just how does an attorney represent the interests of an embryo or unborn child? our next guest has been that attorney and can explain. joining me from montgomery alabama, is julian mcphillips, a former democratic senate candidate. i am so looking forward to this conversation because i, i am so interested that you are a civil right's lawyer, you do a lot of work around people who you see as the underdog so talk to me about how you see this kind of representational work. what is it that you're doing in this case? >> well first of all, the greatest underdog in life is a baby sitting in a mo

to get at is this: when daca was initially implemented there ended up being wait times for other petitioners and that was unacceptable. however, the amendment ignores the fact that usces is much better positioned to avoid delays than it was in 2012. the amendment also sweeps far too broadly. uscia handles many petitions filed by people in unlawful status that we would never want to put at the back of the line; asylum applications adjustment of substitute applications people married to american citizens, requests for t visas for people who are victims of sex trafficking or crime, these are all people who would be harmed by the amendment. i can't believe that was the intention, but that would be the impact. i believe congress needs to have a discussion about immigration policy. i'm always open to that discussion. and as you know, i was part of a bipartisan group that met for four and a half years to try and craft a bipartisan bill which we finally actually did. but i don't think these amendments really solve our need to reform our immigration system. last time in committee the chairman asserte

not forget it was iran who made it fashionable first to target for death in the name of islam the petitioners of the free press in free speech. when salman rushdie published the second verses in 1988, it was iran's supreme leader ayatollah khomeini issued a fat while calling for the killing of rushdie and his publishers. think about that for a moment. and estate put a bounty for murder on the head of a celebrated and prominent author. ayatollah khamenei has reiterated this yet this outlaw regime is now negotiating partner with the united states. this catalog of iran's crimes against the united states and the civilized world was -- totally assembly, demands imposed of strength and courage towards iran. president obama's policy has been marked by weakness and appeasement. of course, then senator obama foreshadowed this policy in the 2008 campaign saying that he would meet khamenei without precondition to here are his words. we are willing to talk about certain assurances in the context of them showing some good faith. i think it's important for us to send a signal that we are not hell bent on r

in florida, which prohibits all forms of personal solicitation such as the solicitation that the petitionerthis case sent out. it was a mass mailer saying , i'm running for judge, please contribute to my campaign. in this case, it did not actually result in any contributions. so, from the perspective of coming at this issue, this is maybe not the ideal case to test the core of the issue of whether a judge walking up to a lawyer or litigant who has business before them right before their case starts outside of the courtroom and says, hey, i noticed you haven't contributed money to my campaign yet raises concerns. so i think we believe this is a little more towards the outer edge of where the -- this comes from a judicial code of conduct, which we call the cannons, the primary means by which the judiciary regulates itself. one of the questions that i get asked a lot is why did the supreme court take this case? and i think the main reason is that there has been a pretty stark circuit split of federal courts that have considered this this, four courts of appeal have struck down some sort of --

we see this with self petitioners.any folks, although eligible in theory were not able to do so. they ended up in the permanent limbo of deferred action status. now, the title of our panel asks whether they are lawmaking or not. the law provides stability allows people to govern their lives by calculating what consequences will pertain to their action in the future. typically typically it lasts for one or two or three years and to this day if it wishes to do so it can revoke nonstatus. between lawmaking and nonstatus the latter is much more ephemeral. over the years the implementation has often been arbitrarily. for many years the ins offed ebd but refused to give it to salvadorans. challenges were filed. people quickly realized it was difficult to challenge because they are completely discretionary and there is no real process. a formal adjudicatory system there is no real way to challenge the grant of nonstatus. an arbitrary or discriminatory way. generally eligible for benefits. the specific exclusion. conversely th

that said as matt pointed out the petitioner in this case did don engaged in anything that remotely couldbe called person to person solicitation it was a mass mailing about the power. [laughter] something i learned the hard way. [laughter] so i think there is a good question if the court will even address this broader issue with this rule against personal solicitation by a judicial candidate if that is constitutionally permissible or not. it is possible that whether or not this general rule violates the first amendment it cannot constitutionally be applied to miss williams yulee because that is a implicate the quid pro quo. but it is all flexible that they may dismiss the case precisely because it does not provide the opportunity to resolve the of class a would be unfortunate for williams-yulee because her loss would remain with the interlining reasoning that if she wins we don't decide the broader issue. and it takes results for these issues. >> she did not win the election either? >> she lost the election then she lost the case. >> right. i a emphasize all my views on the case, the aclu

amendment is trying to get at is when it was initially it implemented there is a big wait times for the petitioners which is unacceptable. however, the amendment ignores the fact that us eis is much better positions to avoid delays than it was in 2012. they handle many petitions filed by people in unlawful status you never want to put at the back of the line. line. asylum applications, people marry to american citizens requests for visas, these are all people who would be hard by the amendment. i believe congress needs to have a discussion. i am open to that discussion. i am part of a barb -- bipartisan group that tried to meet for five years. i don't think they solve our need to reform our immigration system the chairman did not want to deport 11 million people but that is what these amendments would accomplish. >> thank you very much. i said i did not want to throw them out. when i was in reference to -- i am a party of abraham lincoln, teddy roosevelt and -- >> i did not mean to mistake >> digital woman does understand what i'm saying and i appreciate it. you're normally appear in appropriations

that said as matt pointed out the particular petitioner in this case who has been penalized below, williams-yulee, did not engage in anything that could be called person-to-person solicitation but she said at a single mass mailing. no contributions but something about the power of mass made. something i've learned about the hard way as well with my own organization. [laughter] so i think there's a good question whether the court will give an address this broader issue, whether this rule against personal solicitation by judicial candidates is constitutionally permissible or not. it's possible, in other words, the court might say indeed i think some of the parties are just, aclu urges this that whether or not this general violates the first amendment they can't constitutionally be applied to ms. williams-yulee because the cottage engaging is nothing of the sort that advocates the quid pro quo concerns. it's also isolate possible the court might dismiss a case as granted, precise because it doesn't provide an opportunity to resolve this clash. it be unfortunate for ms. williams-yulee because it woul