plutonium. plutonium. pu239. and you know what plutonium will do? plutonium as well as uranium 235 will undergo fission when a neutron taps it. and so this is used for power production. u235, used for power production. historically, when the bombs were dropped back in world war ii, the bomb that devastated hiroshima was a uranium 235 bomb. you know how much uranium 235 was left after the bomb was detonated? almost none. the united states shot its arsenal, one bomb, none left to speak of. you know what the bomb that hit nagasaki was? plutonium. plutonium. does the same thing. plutonium is made from uranium 235--238, very plentiful, but you got to bombard it with neutrons so you can make it. you can make plutonium. now, why do we get this 200 million electron volt? that's what i want you to know. you--all you guys know that uranium splits into elements and you get a lot of energy off, and you all know that the neutrons will cause new reactions. niceroony, that's junior high school knowledge, yeah, anyone takes a science course. what we wanna know is w

they built a plutonium production reactor in the syria. what was that for? to produce plutonium. what for? one purpose, to make nuclear weapons. so do you think they could get a baseball out? do you think they would do it? i think the answer is, clearly, yes. the only reason that isn't pumping out plutonium now, five years later, is because of the israeli version of non-proliferation policy. take another case. take iran. i'm not going to talk about the iran case here except to make one point. everybody's focused on iran with nuclear weapons and what it means for stability in the middle east. it's all serious stuff, i take it seriously. but states with nuclear weapons are open to deterence. iran is open to transfers to terrorist groups. once iran would have fissile material. again, prescription here for this case, that's another topic. i'm saying if you're going to look at these cases, the north korea case, the iran case, in addition to thinking about nuclear weapons and instability in northeast asia and the middle east, think about this issue, right? transfer. the second image i

it is plutonium fuel. in part to burn up the plutonium, but in part to reprocess the plutonium. we see the dangers in this in the japan earthquakes last year. it raises environmental concerns is that fuel -- that particular fuel, a was spread over many square kilometers over japan, adding a new and unnecessary poison from the already added degree of that plan. it is understandable that the administration is under constrained about pushing plutonium, but it is also because the administration has a very weak internal policy on plutonium. you heard sharon bring the quote up from the president's speech, talking about new fuels of the future. these are not fuels of the future. the plutonium fuel is the failed fuel of the past. but the administration is committed to building a new plutonium fuel factory in the united states. in the united states. this is a multibillion dollar was early that is supposed to be -- facility that was supposed to be part of the nonproliferation facility. it is paid for under the nonproliferation funds out of department of energy. it is supposed to take uran

that means no plutonium used in the current generation of thermal reactors, no, i commission a plutonium with separation for future fast reactors, no reprocessing of spent fuel for radioactive waste management. none. no research reactor fuel with highly enriched uranium for radioisotope production. no naval reactors fueled by highly enriched uranium or additional highly enriched uranium. and it. the proposition here is that if we are serious about this being the greatest threat to national security, let's act as though it were. thank you. >> thank you. good morning. i'm going to switch gears here a little bit and talk about the soul nuclear security summit and provide some general and specific comments and also some observations. in essence, seoul was about president obama passing the baton on nuclear security. did that work? i would give you a qualified yes. yes, because seoul got country there, pull it off as and then and there were strong support for this process. and it's important not to underestimate this for two reasons. one is that nuclear security is not president box strong int

do you anticipate any future weapon tested will be plutonium based? or will it kb triggered by highly enriched uranium demonstrating an alternative nuclear weapon system for pyongyang? and what should the u.s. response be to such a test. and then following that china's influence. as we read in press reports, china provided that mobile long-range missile launcher, km north korea put on display, this would obviously be in violation of u.n. security council resolution 1874. and china as a permanent member of the security council is only sgated to uphold sanctions. how involved is the people's liberation army in the development, in the supply of weapons to the north korean military. and do we suspect chinese technical support for the development of north korean missile technology? and lastly, cooperation with iran. japanese media reported that a 12-member iranian delegation missile and satellite development specialists secretly visited north korea settlement report says that this is by no means a recent occurrence or an isolated occurrence. what other act

they may have amassed more weapons with plutonium since may 2009 the. we now know after years of arguments within the u.s. government, north korea has a uranium enrichment program. this program was worked on over an extended period according to the director of national intelligence. it could be the source of weapons grade fuel. the wmd program is also a sfeshl concern as is its reactor, which it helped build in syria. i finally want to note that i believe north korea and iran closely watch each other's diplomacy with the united states. if israeli prime minister netanyahu's claim is accurate that recent talks on iran's nuclear program gave iran a freebie, it will have a significant effect on north korea's negotiating posture when u.s. officials try to resume diplomatic talks. the reverse is probably true. too generous a deal with north korea will probably. bolden iran to push for tougher talks. >> thank you for inviting uls to testify today on some important subject. i have a concern about the human rights situation and humanitarian food aid issues but w

he had developed the plutonium -- the explosive wrapper around the plutonium bomb, the nagasaki bomb, he played a critical part in building the atomic bomb in the manhattan project and he had great prestige, and schreiver recruited him. >> they had been told by the national security staff that they were restricted to a half an hour for the three presentations. tyler who was he? >> he was the head of the air force research and development command. he'd been lamay's deputy at strategic air command. he'd been lamay's deputy since world war ii. he flew over tokyo during the famous firebombing and had been made head of the air force or the technical command, the air force research and development command. but he was -- although he was lamay's protege, he was not locked in and schreiver recruited him to the idea of building these. >> but you also mention in here charlie wilson. >> he was the secretary of defense who was opposed to the program but they overcame him. they had enormous obstacles to overcome. they had to intrigue their way into this briefing. because they knew they had to get t

if they do a nuclear test and if it is plutonium base, we will learn a lot. the first two tests yielded about one killick ton and about four kelli tons. the nagasaki bomb by comparison was 20. it could be a test on the uranium richard -- uranium enrichment program, which many commentators said could not be real until the north actually showed exports their centrifuges. your brain tests would be very dangerous it -- a uranium test would be very dangerous. i would encourage a focus on the danger of transfer. 2003, the north korean delegation told the american delegation that if we did not in our hostile policies, it would transfer their nuclear weapons -- nuclear weapons capability to a third country. we found the uranium hexachloride traces from north korea. in 2007, a nuclear reactor complex was bombed that was built by the north koreans. there were discussions between burma and north korea on nuclear connections. the north is clearly heading towards a nuclear weapons capability, deliverable for ballistic missiles or your country transfer. our efforts have sl

as a result, they have had several more weapons made from plutonium.w know after years of arguments within the u.s. government, north korea has the uranium enrichment program. this program could be a source of weapons grade fuel. north korean program is also of special concern, about its reactor, which it was helped build in syria, which could lead to a breakdown of the syrian state. i want to note that north korea and iran watch diplomacy with the united states. if the israeli prime minister's. [inaudible] -- it will have a significant effect on north korea's negotiating posture when u.s. officials try to resume diplomatic talks. the reverse is probably true. too generous and too quick of a deal will probably emboldened by ron to drive a hard bargain in those talks. thank you, madam chairman, and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much. doctor green? >> chairman, members of the committee, thank you for inviting us today. i have a concern about the humans rights situation and food aid issues. but we would like to focus on three issues

the iaea that it's building a heavy watt reactor to iraq which is another concern because of its plutonium production capabilities, the argument at this time was they needed this heavy reactor because the tehran research reactor is aging, it's not any more safe. and then besides that, they also acknowledge that it's located in earthquake-prone area, and almost in the middle of town because tehran has grown tremendously since 1960s when this reactor was built. so in 2003, they felt that this reactor is not needed. and i think it's in a way true still today, because if you think this has been built in 1960s, the location is not the best. so if i had to do this, i would build a reactor somewhere else. outside of tehran. i don't need to produce 20% enriched uranium to have a fuel for that. russia has still as a legacy from the cold war 100 tons of highly enriched uranium and i'm sure they're happy to sell it if they find a client. and you have 100 tons of highly enriched uranium. you need only to take 20 kilos of that and then dilute it to 20% level, then you will have fuel for tehran research

>> we know that they have a plutonium program that has produced enough fissile material for 5 to 9 nuclear weapons. they have tested to of those. they also have some uranium program, which we cannot know the full scope. that is something we would like to enter negotiations, to try to figure how far advanced that is and what we can do to roll back or contain it. >>> two small bombs have exploded near the u.s. embassy and the colombian capital bogota. it took place after president obama crofton columbia for a summit of the americas. the police said a small bomb exploded in a city where the summit is taking place in colombia. >>> the u.s. has recalled several secret agents providing security for president obama following allegations of misconduct. a spokesman said they had been replaced by other personnel. >>> formula one says next sunday's bahrain grand prix will go ahead, despite calls for -- from pro-democracy protesters for to be canceled. last year's race was called off after a crackdown by the authorities and widespread violence. air security correspondent reports. -- our security corre

there is some evidence north korea is developing another nuclear bomb, using uranium instead of plutonium. officials are worried north korea could follow this failure by testing a new weapon. it took just 81 seconds for the rocket to break apart and fall into the sea, but it took hours for the north korean government to admit it. "scientists," she says, "are looking into the cause of the failure." now, this is the third attempt by north korea to launch a rocket into space. but this is the first time they admitted it. in fact, many north koreans do believe that the last time they were successful, and therefore, they have a satellite traveling around the earth, which, of course, is not true. diane? >> and, of course, no access to outside information. thank you, so much, bob woodruff. >>> and now, we return here at home, to the man they are calling the super mayor tonight. the mayor of newark, new jersey, cory booker, through the years, he's carried people's groceries and foiled a robbery. but last night, he ran into a burning building to save a neighbor, and abc's dan harris talked to him a

pakistan is now building two more heavy-water plutonium processing plants, a second chemical processing plant. so within the context -- you know, the nine countries are within the context of u.s./soviet competition. now we're within the context in the middle east in the sunni/shia froserocity. doesn't that change the likelihood of more countries getting nukes? >> you know, it could, although i think we have to be very careful. one country you mentioned was the uae and we should hope every country in the world develops its nuclear program the way the way they did because they've given up the right to domestic enrichment so there's no possibility for proliferation as long as it sticks to that agreement. look, a lot of countries have nuclear programs. it's allowed under the npt. that was the bargain, in exchange for not building nuclear weapons, you're allowed a civilian nuclear program. the npt has built into it the risk of nuclear hedging. as long as the treaty is the way it is, you'll have actors engaged in nuclear hedging. the question is whether they'll push that into developing an ac

be tested and it could happen sometime soon, only this time, it may be a uranium bomb instead of plutoniumour judgment, and what then? >> it's impossible to know for certain but yes, it looks pretty likely, the way this usually comes out, south korean intelligence starts leaking information to the south korean press. that has happened. it looks like preparations are underway. the uranium bomb is a little scarier of a prospect because it's the simpler design of pru tonium bombs that north korea has tested before with mixed results. our first bomb was a uranium wuks the first one we dropped in combat so you likely have the evolution of the north korean program, so we step look at this and it looks like a failure by northie contraof its rocket --o north korea of its rocket but it's power by the jeem. gregg: and engineers always learn from the failures in terms of tell emmettry and so forth -- telemetry, in terms of advancement of the program. given that, should president obama consider changing course and restoring investments in missile defenses as many members of congress have urged him to

>> well, the tests in 2006 and 2009 were plutonium devices.november, 2010, north korea revealed to an american scientist it's uranium enrichment program. i expect the next test will be one with a uranium core. >> you feel the united states should send a message by shooting the missile out of the sky when it's launched later this month and there is un back being through various un resolutions for us to take this move? >> no i think i don't think we should try to shoot it down. but we should do is immediately after it is launched is to impose the sanctions that the bush administration put in place in 2005. we cut north korea off from the global financial system and we should also impose the sanctions on chinese banks of that been involved in the sale of missiles and nukes to iran and syria. if we within to get beijing's attention, we need to do something to make them sit up and take notice. >> what is your view of the negotiations if you want to call them that thus far? >> well, we've been talking to the north koreans since 1993. we've had the s

technology to make plutonium in an area that the iaea could not detect. i think this is a dangerous situation. but concerning the issue of a third nuclear test, i just any it's hard to judge. >> thank you. do any others -- yes, dr. green. >> what we don't know, the historical pattern suggests they will do a nuclear test. the propaganda of recent years, declaring 2012 the year north korea will be a full nuclear weapon state, the birth of the great leader, would also suggest it. when experts were shown the uranium enrichment facility saw 300 centrifuges spinning and probably the tip of the iceberg. so technologically i would say it is possible, perhaps probably they are close to ready to do uranium tests. it would up the ante on us considerably and raise the price for future negotiations. if i were betting i would say we may be looking at a uranium test but we don't know. particularly with uranium because it's much easier to hide. it doesn't give a signature in the atmosphere the way that plutonium has. it's been sometime since they have been involved. minu

they'll enrich plutonium, uranium and yesterday an aborted missile test. >> with the embarrassment that is this failed launch, what is the white house saying? what are people expecting to battle back having egg on their face? >> reporter: that remains the question. in the past they have not reacted well. we talked about the attack on a south korean ship several years ago, killed some 40 south korean sailors. many people fear that north korea will retaliate, will lash out. will sort of try to change the sub after this international embarrassment. the international media was there and north korea was under a virtual blackout as this launch ultimately failed. so meantime on the international stage, there is coordination among all the nations. japan, south kree, the united states. everyone has a stake. and even china, the ally of north korea that fought on the side of north korea in the korean war, a war in which there is no official armistice. and working to try to get north korea off their ultimately destructive actions on the international i know at a. >> mike viqueira at the white house

by urging a ban on the production of materials that would end the separation of plutonium from the nuclear spent fuel and enrichment of uranium to a high levels. yesterday's global security newswire, there was a report that the u.s. nuclear regulatory commission's deferred action on a petition from the american physical society and urging that they should receive licensing. informed opinions are converging on these topics, but disagreements remain, framed by differences in the perspective of different expert communities. it is our objective in the series to bring peace together. we abroad over 200 nuclear policy experts to campus in the last three years as part of a nuclear policy talks series ranging from gw elliott school alumnus and acting undersecretary of arms control and international security, senator richard lugar, you and secretary general ban ki-moon, and a professor of mechanical and aerospace engineering, mary snyder. we are engaged in research on the topic. the book was co-edited by the dean of the school, michael brown. and we are developing new course offerings in this area

they've conducted previous nuclear tests, and there are fears they could conduct a third one not with plutoniumuranium, potentially. this is an embarrassment to the obama administration. just in february they hammered out a deal with by pyongyang to provide food aid in exchange for north korea not launching any missiles, but the administration was double crossed in a similar deal in the 1990s. we could expect just a slap on the wrist. former u.s. ambassador to the u.n. john bolton told fox news, quote: >> reporter: so, indeed, there will likely be some type of statement or presidential statement, not another resolution or, certainly, not more sanctions as long as china is calling for restraint. back to you in the studio. jenna: already more on this as we get it. thank you very much. you know, one of the things we have to mention when we talk about north korea is we don't have a whole lot of information about what's happening inside the country. and so we have a treat for you a little later on this hour, we're going to talk to the author of a new book about the brutal conditions in north korea's

if he will open up to inspection of your nuclear program, if he will stop reprocessing uranium or plutonium, then we will give you food aid or another was try to be helpful to your development. each time the deal breaks down the obama administration is once again showing that diplomacy does not work. we are in a situation probably where containment and working with the chinese who are into the leadership, hopefully the chinese will convince a new generation of leaders that has just taken hold that their approach is not working. host: that is the headline on north korea we showed you were as the headline on the situation in syria with cross border attacks yesterday into turkey and another country. is the usip working in north korea and syria as a way of talking about what is the role of the united states institute of peace? guest: we were set up by congress, primarily the senate, in the early-1980's. we were set up in the shadow of the vietnam war. the feeling was if only we could strengthen our diplomacy, our use of political measures, we would not always have to send in the troops. in the

pakistan is now building two more heavy water plutonium processing plants, a second chemical processing plant. within the context, the nine countries in the context of the u.s. special bid competition, now we are in the middle east with the sunni-shia ferocity. does that not change the likelihood of more countries getting nukes? >> we have to be very careful. you mentioned the uae. we should hope everyone develops their program the way the uae has. they have given up the right to domestic and richmond. there is no possibility for proliferation if they stick to that agreement. a lot of programs have nuclear agreement. that was the bargain. you're allowed a civilian nuclear program. they have built into it the risk of nuclear hedging. it is part of the treaty. you will have factors engage in nuclear hedging. the question is whether they will push that hedging strategy into an active program to develop nuclear weapons. we have not seen that historically. we have seen countries do the hokey pokey of moving forward and back, but not actually go all the way. there were a handful of states tha

plan and to upgrade would be called c m rr or the chemical and metallurgical building to process plutoniumis not in place that has been split fairly far to the right, five to seven years depending on which of the documents you look at. i'm concerned about that. i am concerned about our ability to provide for the deployed stockpile and that is my number-one concern here, so i have some concerns we owe you some answers. the departments are working together we are participating in that review and the customer if you will for all of this at the deterrence end of the street. until anyone presents a plan that we can look at and be comfortable with and understand that it is being supported so i am not saying there isn't a way forward. i am hopeful that there is we just do not having yet and until we do, as the customer i will remain concerned until we go a little further down the road. >> thank you. you are the customer, you are the person for whom these weapons are delivered, and you need to share with us, and i believe you have honestly both of a good and that needs, and i believe it is at the

pakistan is now building two more heavy water plutonium processing plants, a second chemical processing plant. within the context, the nine countries in the context of the u.s. special bid competition, now we are in the middle east with the sunni-shia ferocity. does that not change the likelihood of more countries getting nukes? >> we have to be very careful. you mentioned the uae. we should hope everyone develops their program the way the uae has. they have given up the right to domestic and richmond. there is no possibility for proliferation if they stick to that agreement. a lot of programs have nuclear agreement. that was the bargain. you're allowed a civilian nuclear program. they have built into it the risk of nuclear hedging. it is part of the treaty. you will have factors engage in nuclear hedging. the question is whether they will push that hedging strategy into an active program to develop nuclear weapons. we have not seen that historically. we have seen countries do the hokey pokey of moving forward and back, but not actually go all the way. there were a handful of states tha