alarms continue for a sustained period of of time it goes to a much more critical alarm which we call poodu. the computer will go to halt and await further instructions. if this happens up and away you won't land on the moon that day. they gave us the series of alarms we had never seen them before. my guidance officer steve bales was flustered, he calls the abort. i feel we executed the right decisions. and in the training debriefing they come back and said no, we don't think you exercised the right decisions we think you could have landed. we think you should have looked beyond that alarm to see if you could figure out what was happening in the guidance, navigation, were the displays updated, et cetera. you acted prematurely. we didn't believe it. but steve bales, you never leave anything untested. he says hey, flight, i'll look this overnight i'll call together a bunch of people from mit, draper labs, we'll find out what we should have done here. i got a call about 10:00 that evening that said the training people were right, we had made the wrong decision, and they wanted to do more train