the real order came from general handy, while marshall was in potsdam.nd he authorized the 509th composite group to use bombs as made ready. as made ready. and general groves, being a good army officer would supply bomb number three, bomb number four, bomb number five, if needed. so there was an assembly line in process in which more bombs beyond the nagasaki bomb would have been used. but truman interjected himself and stopped that assembly line, stopped that pre-delegation, which had been granted in an order which i don't think he ever saw. i mean, i don't know. he did interject himself into stopping the use of the bomb, and with good reason, because there were feelers out to have the japanese unconditionally surrender. every one of these days is crucial to the way things turned out. counter-factual history is sometimes a dangerous occupation, but sometimes it's useful. and it is, i think in this case useful to consider what would have happened had the bomb not been used in the early days of august, august 6th and august 9th. it was mentioned that on a

at potsdam he accepted a spear of influenced peace, which largely accepted the soviet's domination ofastern europe and harry truman endorsed this approach. they hoped that this would secure a workable and stable post-war settlement. now burns assuredly hoped that america's possession of the atomic bomb might add some weight to his side in future diplomatic bargaining in the post pottsdam period. but let me be very clear. truman authorized the actual use of the bomb to defeat p japanese. it was not a part of some anti-soviet strategy. truman had gone to potsdam and was intent on gaining soviet participation in the war against japan, and he wanted that participation.bbbbb/g it's very important to appreciate this point because fanciful notions of so-called atomic diplomacy, pushed by those who have followed him on the revisionist side that dr. walker mentioned in his introduction, that notion has to be put aside. what i think is striking about america's sole possession of the atomic bomb is how little u.s. officials sought to use it for diplomatic ends and purposes in those initial stage

truman had gone to potsdam and wanted that participation. it's very important to appreciate this point because fanciful notions of atomic diplomacy pushed by those who have followed him and the revisionist side that dr. walker mentioned in his introduction, that notion has to be put aside. what i think is striking about america's sole possession of the atomic bomb is how little u.s. officials sought to use it for diplomatic ends and purposes in those initial stages. let e me move then and make some fairly brief statements about truman's motives. these are the arguments that i concluded from my book, the most controversial decision. this book i should add, the title has certain irony to it. the decision was not controversial for truman at the time. it's subsequently that the controversy emerged. truman authorized the use of the atomic bombs to force japan to surrender and with the deep hope of saving american lives. he was primarily concerned, of course, with american lives. this is what moved him and the american military effort. it must be

truman had gone to potsdam and wanted that participation. it's very important to appreciate this point because fanciful notions of atomic diplomacy pushed by those who have followed him and the revisionist side that dr. walker mentioned in his introduction, that notion has to be put aside. what i think is striking about america's sole possession of the atomic bomb is how little u.s. officials sought to use it for diplomatic ends and purposes in those initial stages. let e me move then and make some fairly brief statements about truman's motives. these are the arguments that i concluded from my book, the most controversial decision. this book i should add, the title has certain irony to it. the decision was not controversial for truman at the time. it's subsequently that the controversy emerged. truman authorized the use of the atomic bombs to force japan to surrender and with the deep hope of saving american lives. he was primarily concerned, of course, with american lives. this is what moved him and the american military effort. it must be

maintainill wanted to decent relations with the soviets by reaching practical burnsments at potsdam, pursued a quid pro quo approach seer of influence piece which accepted the soviet's emanation of eastern and harry truman endorsed this approach. they hoped this would secure a workable and stable postwar settlement. america'sredly hoped possession of the atomic bomb might add some weight to his side in future diplomatic targeting in the post pots down time. let me be very clear. truman authorized the actual use of the bomb to defeat the japanese. somes not a part of anti-soviet strategy will stop truman had gone to pot them intent on gaining soviet participation in the war against japan and he wanted that participation. is very important to appreciate this point because fanciful notions of so-called atomic those whopushed by were following their visit with -- revisiting side dr. walker mentioned, that notion has to be put aside. about think is striking america's sole possession of the atomic bomb is how little u.s. forcials sought to use it diplomatic and send purposes in those initi

bomb came from general handy, who was the acting chief of staff in washington while marshal was in potsdam. he authorized the group to use bombs as made ready. as made ready. and general groves being the good. army officer would supply bomb number three, bomb number five, if needed. so there was an assembly line in process in which more bombs would have been used. but truman interjected himself and stopped that assembly line. stopped that predelegation, which had been granted in an order in which i don't think he ever saw. i don't know. so that is something to keep in mind about truman's role in the bomb. he did interject himself into stopping the use of the bomb beyond nagasaki. and with good reason because there were feelers out to have the japanese unconditionally surrender. just one final thing in my remarks, having to do with the timing, every one of these days is crucial to the way things turned out. counterfactual history is sometimes a dangerous occupation, but sometimes it's useful. and it is, i think in this case, useful to consider what would have happened if the bomb had not be