given that those resolutions have failed, we should do exactly what prof. meltzer and professor stiglitz have suggested -- which have higher capital in these banks. his astonishing, but unfortunately true that basel 3, with all of the supplementary questions and implemeation we will see for systemically- important institutions, will, i believe, leave us with a tier one capital requirement below that which lehman brothers had the day before it failed. lehman brothers had 11.6% tier one capital, and we will end up between 10% and 11%. how can this make sense? the swiss national bank is acquiring 19%, the bank of england is actively pursuing and try to implement closer to 20% requirements? -- requirements. it is not socially-costly. i know bankers claimed to the contrary, but they are wrong. you should consult research at stanford and other leading and universities from the top people in finance are not captured by the industry. they say we need more capital, it is not costly and we need a version of what prof. meltzer just laid out for you. we are not going to do it.

given that those resolutions have failed, we should do exactly what prof. meltzer and professor stiglitz have suggested -- which have higher capital in these banks. his astonishing, but unfortunately true that basel 3, with all of the supplementary questions and implementation we will see for systemically- important institutions, will, i believe, leave us with a tier one capital requirement below that which lehman brothers had the day before it failed. lehman brothers had 11.6% tier one capital, and we will end up between 10% and 11%. how can this make sense? the swiss national bank is acquiring 19%, the bank of england is actively pursuing and try to implement closer to 20% requirements? -- requirements. it is not socially-costly. i know bankers claimed to the contrary, but they are wrong. you should consult research at stanford and other leading and universities from the top people in finance are not captured by the industry. they say we need more capital, it is not costly and we need a version of what prof. meltzer just laid out for you. we are not going to do i

given that those resolutions have failed, we should do exactly what prof. meltzerrofessor stiglitz have suggested -- which have higher capital in these banks. his astonishing, but unfortunately true that basel 3, with all of the supplementary questions and implementation we will see for systemically- important institutions, will, i believe, leave us with a tier one capital requirement below that which lehman brothers had the day before it failed. lehman brothers had 11.6% tier one capital, and we will end up between 10% and 11%. how can this make sense? the swiss national bank is acquiring 19%, the bank of england is actively pursuing and try to implement closer to 20% requirements? -- requirements. it is not socially-costly. i know bankers claimed to the contrary, but they are wrong. you should consult research at stanford and other leading and universities from the top people in finance are not captured by the industry. they say we need more capital, it is not costly and we need a version of what prof. meltzer just laid out for you. we are not going to do it. in

. >> prof. meltzer, you're suggesting that we have size adjusted capital requirements. as i noted in the prior panel, it was one of the recommendations of this panel in our regulatory reform progress to congress. >> good for you. >> thank you. it seems the most obvious idea to me and i'm heartened to see some of your experience having recommended it. >> said vitter introduced a bill to do it. >> i have also been involved in the arguments on the hill that prevented it from being mandated it in dodd-frank. i find it is being treated as though you're suggesting a perpetual motion machine in the political process. can you explain to me why something so sort of straight forward cannot seem to be taken seriously? >> yes. the bankers do not want it and they come down with the lobbyists and hordes to tell the congressman that you are facing disaster. there will not be loans for the public or capital to build industry, all of that stuff. >> the me ask and then i will stop. >> we got to the 1920's with capital requirements. >> since we're talking about size-weighted capital requi

provided to them through a substantially higher reserve requirements, which has been advocated by prof. meltzer and others, by requiring firms to have alternative reserves against systemically risky holdings, as has been proposed, by challenging terms in the bailout and turns along the lines offered by the president of the federal reserve of minneapolis, or to have to pay the cost of the insurance that is currently being paid for by the american taxpayers. only by ending the taxpayer- funded survival guarantee for large firms, both domestic and foreign, will we return basic market discipline to wall street and ensure that large financial firms face the same competitive pressures faced by firms operating on main street. in turn, this will ensure that future financial crises will be less severe and that the fixes to these crises will not involve putting trillions of taxpayer dollars at risk. since this is our last year, there are some people i would like to note and thank for their work. i would like to thank the panel staff and our executive director for their work. looking over the totality of

. >> prof. meltzer, you're suggesting that we have size adjusted capital requirements. as i noted in the prior panel, it was one of the recommendations of this panel in our regulatory reform progress to congress. >> good for you. >> thank you. it seems the most obvious idea to me and i'm heartened to see some of your experience having recommended it. >> said vitter introduced a bill to do it. >> i have also been involved in the arguments on the hill that prevented it from being mandated it in dodd-frank. i find it is being treated as though you're suggesting a perpetual motion machine in the political process. can you explain to me why something so sort of straight forward cannot seem to be taken seriously? >> yes. the bankers do not want it and they come down with the lobbyists and hordes to tell the congressman that you are facing disaster. there will not be loans for the public or capital to build industry, all of that stuff. >> the me ask and then i will stop. >> we got to the 1920's with capital requirements. >> since we're talking about size-weighted capital requi