rademaker? is that how you say that -- said negotiating would be easy, my words if we rolled over and played dead and if we give them everything they want. was it you that said that? >> yes. >> you know, my opinion is if we're not careful in these negotiations we're going to get what we got in the guantanamo trade. we get to keep one conventional weapon. they get five nuclear weapons so it turns out adam kinzinger is correct. negotiations have not been kind to us during this administration if i can put it rather glibly. if we don't realize that there's a danger in negotiating with iran we're fooling ourselves. anybody here on the panel remember when the first time that iran referred to the united states as the great satan? anybody? >> was it -- '79. >> november the 5th, 1979 when ayatollah khomeini called us the great satan so for 35 years they've been exporting terrorism calling us the great satan -- i don't know what time it was then israel was the small satan. so should we be saying -- when w

rademaker? >> mr. chairman, i think you put your finger on what i see is the biggest single verification challenge before us and that is it is really conceptual challenge, the concept of the joint plan of action is that there's this workout period where iran is to behave and fulfill its obligations and if they are not caught cheating during that time, then all of the limitations come off and they are treated like any other country. given iran's track record, the clear evidence that for decades, the current government has been in concerted effort to -- has pursued a concerted effort to develop a nuclear weapon. if they behave for five or ten or 15 years, are we prepared to say, okay, we will let bygones be bygones and going forward you'll be treated like any other country. that's the promise. what i suggest in my testimony is that logically, for the iranians, that's an incredibly good deal. this is a get out of jail free card. all they have to do is behave. if what they want is a nuclear weapon,

rademaker? i just wanted to interject a point, that regrettably this is another area where the jpa is deficient. the jpa, there is one sentence in the jpa that talks about the history, it doesn't use the term military dimension, but that is what they're talking about. let me read you the sentence. this is how this question, this critically important question is addressed inn' the jpa. it says, they create a joint commission of the two sides. the, the p five plus one and irrather thannians. -- p5-plus-one. and will work with the iaea to work with past issues of concern. that is all this says. there isio a mechanism to work with the iaea to try to figure this out. nothing? the jpa depends on this working out. if this mechanism utterly fails to achieve sat faction for the iaea. that is unfortunate but doesn't stand in the way of the rest of the jpa. what is going on here, i think regrettably what happened our negotiators found this to be a very hard issue. i think iranians have a lot to hide. there

rademaker? >> mr. chairman, i think you put your finger on what i see is the biggest single verification challenge before us and that is it is really conceptual challenge, the concept of the joint plan of action is that there's this workout period where iran is to behave and fulfill its obligations and if they are not caught cheating during that time, then all of the limitations come off and they are treated like any other country. given iran's track record, the clear evidence that for decades, the current government has been in concerted effort to -- has pursued a concerted effort to develop a nuclear weapon. if they behave for five or ten or 15 years, are we prepared to say, okay, we will let bygones be bygones and going feared you'll be treated like any other country. that's the promise. what i suggest in my testimony is that logically, for the iranians, that's an incredibly good deal. this is a get out of jail free card. all they have to do is behave. if what they want is a nuclear weapon, y

rademaker. spain mr. chairman i think you put your finger on what i see as the biggest single challenge before us and that is it's really a conceptual challenge. the concept of the joint plan of action is that there is this workout period where iran needs to behave to fulfill its obligations. if they are not caught cheating during that time than all the limitations come off and they are treated like any other country. given iran's track record the clear evidence for decades the current government has been in concerted effort as has pursued a concerted effort to pursue a nuclear weapon. if they behave for 510 or 15 years are we prepared at that point to say okay we will let bygones be bygones and going forward to be treated like any other country. that's the promise. what i suggest to my testimony is logically for the iranians that's incredibly good deal. this is a get out of jail free card. all they have to do is behave so if what they want is a nuclear weapon they have been struggling. they have been und

rademaker. >> the question is how long should we expect to be compliant before we can trust them?>> i have a hard time answering that. it's sort of like the supreme court. i will know it when i see it. i don't think you can measure this by a timeline for it i think the measure of whether you can trust iran will be the totality. >> okay i've got you. >> who is in power there and what policies are they pursuing. >> what do we catch them with if we are diligent enough? i'm almost out of time. let's go to mr. lauder for a minute. >> i agree with some of the comments mr. rademaker made earlier that we have to be about this monitoring and verification regime for the long-term. >> six months karen bass bass asked the question six months is long -- not long enough for great? >> has to be longer. >> very quickly because i'm out of time. what do you think the length of time out to be? >> more than six months but it's how the compliances dealt with. what kind of process will have in place when something comes up when we see iran has not complied. the track record is fair. >> forgive my. >> i

rademaker. i couldn't agree with you more wholeheartedly. if it's a five-year deal, if it's a ten-year deal, if it's even a ten-year deal it's not a deal. i mean, that is a bad deal. this is a situation where you have to make sure you can force them to comply all the way out. because otherwise, they will just simply play cat and mouse and outlast us ten years, and then they'll get on with their nuclear program. so where do we go from here? meaning we're approaching this point. i don't think we're going to be -- >> the monitoring and verifications, congressman. there's no question about it. and we've talked about unfettered access, anytime, anyplace, access to all the facilities. concern about covert facilities, concerned about weaponization. these are things that need to be drilled down and pursued with great vigor indefinitely. >> right. but i believe we're going to get to the six-month -- assume for a second we get to the six-month and they want more time. i think that's -- what do we do? at that point what do we do? mr. rademaker, you loo

rademaker if you would summarize your remarks we will begin with you. >> thank you mr.hairman and congressman congressman engel. it's a real pleasure for me to appear before the committee. it's always nice to come home to an office building. i joined the committee staff in 1993 and one of the foremost issues of concern of the members of the committee in 1993 was the risk that iran might acquire a nuclear weapon and to me is really astonishing here we are more than 20 years later and this remains one of the foremost threats to national security. i just want to observe at the outset that i think this committee has consistently paid attention to this problem for more than two decades and he provided extraordinary leadership to our nation and i think the american people are very well served by the leadership that this committee is provided under a number of chairman over the last 20 plus years. i'm glad to see you're continuing to pay attention to the problem is demonstrated by today's hearing. i have submitted a prepared statement and so perhaps i will just summarize the k

rademaker? >> israel is obviously concerned about the iranian nuclear program and with good reason. iran and iranian need leaders have made comments about how israel should be wiped from the face of the earth or wiped off the map of the earth. so for a country like israel that's obviously alarming that you have those kinds of statements coupled with technological activity that seems aimed at producing a nuclear weapon which would enable them to do precisely what they are saying they would like to see happen. so the united states has a lot to be worried about and iran's other neighbors in the persian gulf region have a lot to be worried about. israel has a lot to be worried about. israel is paying a lot of attention to this problem. my understanding is there's a great deal of apprehension and israel about the current course of the diplomacy. as i said earlier its eyes been possible to negotiate a deal with iran just agree with what they're asking for and we can have a deal. i think the israelis are concerned that the deal that was struck last year leans too far in that direction of i

rademaker. mr. rademaker served for international board of security and nonproliferation and staff director and chief counsel of this committee and we welcome him back. let me say that without objection, the witness' full prepared statement will be made part of the record. that's to encourage you to synthesize this and give us five minutes and members here will have five calendar days to submit questions and any extraneous material for the record. mr. rademaker, if you would summarize your remarks, we'll begin with you. >> thank you, mr. chairman, congressman engle, it's a real pleasure to appear before the committee. always nice to come home here to the raeburn office building. i joined the committee staff in 1993. and one of the foremost issues of concern to the members of the committee in 1993 was the risk that iran might acquire a nuclear weapon. and to me it's really astonishing here we are more than 20 years later and this remains one of the foremost threats to u.s. national security. and i ju

rademaker, take 30 seconds and let's go down and by the time anyone has done that i'll be out of time >> i don't know what checks might be within the administration. every president can structure decision-making on foreign policy in his initiation into what he sees fit. i'd like to think that their people and the defense department that are vigilant, people in the intelligence community drawing attention to problems but i don't know. i think the ultimate is the united states congress, and this committee -- >> perhaps that might have been helpful as the president was considering exchanging bergdahl for five taliban terrorists. >> well, the. >> well, the good news here a thing for the congress is that i think one of the things that arenas are demanding is in all your sanctions. in fact, they were promised that in the jpa. i don't think the president has the authority unilaterally to get rid of all of the sanctions. eshe has some waivers, has authority not to enforce certain laws but i think at the end of day there are certain things that only the congress can be able to do. and so for t

rademaker if you would summarize your remarks, we'll begin with you. >> thank you, mr. chairman, congressman engle, it's take real pleasure to appear before the committee. always nice to come home here to the raeburn office building. i joined the committee staff in 1993. and one of the foremost issues of concern to the members of the committee in 1993 was the risk that iran might acquire a nuclear weapon. and to me it's really astonishing here we are more than 20 years later and this remains one of the foremost threats to u.s. national security. and i just want to observe at the outset, that i think this committee has consistently paid attention to this problem over for more than two decades. you've provided extraordinary leadership to our nation and i think the american people are very well served by the leadership that this committee has provided under a number of chairman over the last 20 plus years. i'm glad to see that you're continuing to pay attention to the problem as demonstrated by today's hearing. i have submitted a prepared statement and so perhaps i'll just

rademaker put it to iran is on the path from nuclear pariah to partner and i don't think any member of the committee is comfortable with that given the supreme leaders comments in may in particular about the expectations to limit the ballistic missile program that this was a stupid and idiotic expectation but i did not give you the rest of the quotation which is very revealing. the revolutionary guard should definitely carry out their program and not be satisfied that the present level. they should mass produce ballistic missiles. he is not referring tompgug space program. and adding those juicy 19,000 ignoring what the leader is saying on this subject as they move forward with their program is very concerning to me and especially wanted to thank the members of this committee and witnesses for the chance today to take a good hard look at the on the wing negotiations thank you very much. we stand adjourned. [inaudible conversations] >> president obama giving the commencement address at uc irvine. and then the iowa public convention. then your calls and comments on "washington journal."