the company would have 30 days to challenge the receivership. even 24 hours is too long a delay when the distress or -- distressed or failed company could destabilize markets, parties could figure out the company is troubled and flee, or it could trigger the systemic event or benefit those who have inside knowledge. there is really not much that a court can do to make a reasoned review of this within 24 hours anyway, so we think this is not a good way to do it. we think that allowing the receivership to go forward, yet giving the company, if they have a concern about it, the opportunity to raise it after the process starts is a better way. with that, i won't belabor the point. i'll just yield back and hope that my colleagues will support the amendment. >> is there further discussion? my understanding is the gentleman is offering this on behalf of the judiciary committee. if not, the question. those in favor say aye. opposed no. the eyes have it. the amendment is agreed to. the gentlemen from california is recognize the. >> i have an amendment at

we should put them in receivership, then things are off, you know. and who knows what would happen to those assets. i mean atlas ca pipeline that b.p. owns half of could wind up being the china pipeline or the prudho ebay could get sold to the russians. there are all sorts of things that we could do that would disrupt the-- you know, disrupt the energy economy of the united states. >> woodruff: gentlemen, we are going to leave there, byron king, here in the u.s. and mr. fleminging joining us from london, thank you both. >> lehrer: still to come on the newshour: new tensions in u.s./turkey relations; the kick-off for soccer's world cup; and shields and brooks. but first, the other news of the day. here's hari sreenivasan in our newsroom. >> sreenivasan: flash floods in southwestern arkansas killed at least 20 people today. heavy rain touched off the torrent early today. with no warning, a pair of rivers rose more than eight feet an hour in remote valleys. state police captain mike fletcher said campgrounds were hard hit. >> trying to get everybody ide

is a detailed description of how this company will be disassembled and broken down and put into receivershipin a way that will be quick, clear, clean, but will not destroy the financial system. too big to fail is the acid test and if we can make sure that does not exist, we will have eliminated the most dangerous aspect of this. >> you think this will be more helpful overall? >> i do. there are many different parts to it. i would not deny that there are some things i would change. overall, i think it does address the too big to fail problem. part of this is the legislation but there is also what the regular as are doing and they are working right now to raise the amount of capital requirements and liquidity that banks have to hold. the regulators with the congress and between them can toughen up the standards quite a bit and that is what is happening. >> when you are going to raise rates, if i could ask you, when you think you would raise rates? >> in the future. [laughter] >> what would be assigned to you and your colleagues that it is time to r4>zeq that part of the stimulus and begin to r

bachus: i don't care whether they're in receivership or not -- mr. frank: mr. speaker, please let's get this on the right point and instruct the gentleman as to the rules. i thought he was going to ask me about what he said. he has consistently read a part of this section, lead -- leaving out the part that would help members understand it. he didn't say what he just said, he said he read these in general. the powers he talked about come in the section, they are subsets of the section, funding for orderly liquidation, and those powers are upon the appointment of a receiver. so this is not to keep an institution going, this is not a.i.g., yes, he can be critical about the bush administration on its own without congress -- with regard to what congress did with a.i.g. we repealed in this bill the power under which they acted, with the federal reserve's concurrence. and by the way, it says also in here, those powers are subject to section 2 of 06. again, i don't know why the gentleman would read this, but let me read it because it corrects entirely the whole >> inac

but the chairman well knows, as he looks into the bill, that that receivership isn't for a day or two, it's for a year or three or four or five years that we can continue to see american taxpayers putting out their money to bail out these failed risky institutions. you know, it seems that every term that the democrats who wrote this bill chose to endow the same failed regulators who failed to perceive the last crisis with more and more power. at every single turn the democrats chose more government bureaucracy and more government outreach into our economy. and at every turn the democrats drew up policies that will kill jobs and restrict credit. now, on the one hand this isn't surprising. we've seen this all before, when you think about it, whether it was in the area of cap and trade or in health care proposals, among others we saw before it. on the other hand, it is disappointing that -- mr. bachus: i yield the gentleman an extra minute and a half. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized for a minute and a half. mr. garrett: on the other hand it is disappointing when you

, the standards by which they may to set the conditions of that receivership. they can determine the success or order. if a financial institution should be shaky or deemed shaky, then the secretary of the treasury with the assent of the fdic and the fed, can close down an institution, they can turn it and sell it, they can take it other themselves and run it and operate it as a federally operated institution simply by determining that. maybe it's not too big to fail, although they will make that determination too, but it might be an agency a company that is essential to the low income communities, low income minority or underserved communities that gives them the latitude to treat it differently than any other financial institution. when government gets involved, huge money gets lost. and when liberals get involved and progressives get involved, huge principles of liberty and freedom are sacrificed away to try to reach some kind of formula of what they think that america should be like. martin luther king never asked for this i read almost every one of these sp

. >> all possible receivership for bp, what you think of that? >> i am not entirely sure what legal mechanism would have to do that. maybe i misunderstand. under what what did he ask that done? >> i am not sure legally. >> before i way again, i just told you i was not an international law expert. i am not a domestic law expert either but i would have to look at whatever mr. rice said. >> on the flow rate projections you have put together, is it possible that this maneuver does not succeed and the cutting of the riser, could that increase for some period of time the flow rate if it does not work? is there a bad possible to the american people should brace themselves for? >> one group estimated 12,000- 19,000 barrels of oil a day. we believe that that could increase 20% with a cut of the riser. that puts the bottom -- i can do the math quicker. 15,000 for the bottom end of that. i think cutting -- there will be time between the cut of that riser and the placement of the cap. i've seen varying estimates, but let's assume several days of increased hy

is a detailed description of how this company will be disassembled and broken down and put into receivership a way that will be quick and clean and not destroy the financial system. too big to fail is the acid test. then we will have eliminated by far the most dangerous aspect. >> so you believe the bill overall will be more helpful than not. >> yes, i do. there are lots of different parts to it, and i would not deny that there are some things that i would change, but overall, i think it does address the too big to fail problem. part of this is the legislation, but there is also what the regulators are doing. the regulators are working right now to have liquidity that they have to hold. and the regulators can toughen up quite a bit, and i think that is what is happening. >> if i thought you were going to raise rates again, i would ask you. you will not tell us, will you? >> in the future. [laughter] >> tell us precisely what we are looking at. to what will be assigned to you and your colleagues to raise the interest rates? >> the reason we do not tell people is not because we are perverse. i

congress has been working on alternative mechanisms for safely winding down putting into receivership a critical firm so that it can fail without bringing down the rest of the system. i think we are making progress. whenever eliminate financial crisis, but we need to make sure that they are much less frequent and that they have less effect on the economy. >> thank you very much. mr. bryant? >> some countries bond yields -- i think spain and italy raised fresh highs this week. in your opinion, is the ecb doing everything from a policy standpoint to extend this crisis? how do you risk it -- how do you rate the risk of contagion? >> this is a joint effort of a number of authorities including the european union and the european commission. it is a complicated problem because there are a number of countries to have a difficult fiscal situations. the concern is that these countries cannot manage their fiscal positions on their own and they might be a contagion -- own their own and they might be a contagion to other systems. i am encouraged by the response of the europeans. although they lac

, a detailed description of how the company would be disassembled and broken down and put into receivershipn no way that would be quick, clear, clean, and will not restore the financial system. too big to fail is the acid test. if we can make sure that there is no concern over too big to fail, then we will limit the aspects of this. >> so you see this as being more helpful than not. >> i do. there are lots of different parts to it. i would not denied that there are some things that i would change, but overall i think it does address the too big to fail problem and it does -- and i think i should say that part of this is the legislation, but there is also what regulators are doing. regulators are working right now to raise capital and liquidity. and the regulators together with the congress and toughen up the standards quite a bit and that is what is happening. >> if i caught -- if i thought you could and would tell us when you could raise rates, so in the future. [laughter] tell us precisely what you're looking at. when will it be time to remove that part of the stimulus and raise interest

large firms which would merely ensure the fdic has the necessary resources and, at the moment of receivership, the fdic would submit a plan for bankruptcy liquidation by the management, wipe out shareholders, handle losses to creditors, and sell off the assets of the firm. the orderly dissolution fund would only be used for a shutdown, not keep it afloat. does the exact opposite of what happened in this most recent crisis by preventing american taxpayers for palin for the bailout. under thh senate bill, the fdic would have the ability to liquidate large firms and reduce their credit line from the treasury department to cover any cost. any losses the fdic and counters would supposedly -- encounters with supposedly be recovered as the sell-off assets of the failed firm. why my friends on the opposite side of the aisle insisted on holding up this bill and the senate until the pre-fund was is a bailout by the dissolution by a line of credit from the treasury is not is also a mystery. again, i hope we preserve the of pre-fond of the house bill and i stand strongly on the side of consumer advocates