branch, very small highly secret branch of the navy that was doing some deep-sea work but admiral rickover he was the guy. they had almost tied it from him him. my subs only go to 200 or 300 feet and everything under that is a relevant. they almost had to quietly work on an office that he didn't know about. when he found out he was like why are you wasting would have my submarine's? i think this soviets couldn't find it essentially. >> they did have an idea where to start. they just said they were on a mission to get xyz and it was a last call. it might be harder to identify a rough area. >> five years to the contractors. the ship was built in the in little over a year. things happen they happen very quickly. >> how many russian sailors were there? >> 98. like i said they brought up three bodies and parts of others. i'm not sure once they found out where the site was it's unclear favor went back and recover the bodies. i'm not sure. imagine the u.s. would not have accepted no explanation we would have wanted to have made every attempt possible. it's just really hard to operate operate. the

if you don't have a budget, if want to know why shriver and rickover and all the people that ame forward, big advantage of going fast, in the first year they had a budget and they knew what they could get done. budgets, budgets that are sufficient, that's a critical enabler. then the requirements process. would it take three years to build a requirements process? i can sit down with a piece of not in this ow, room because it would have to be classified but i can write down of the next nts generation. a communications satellite. i know what they are. i don't need three years of analyst to do that. he acquisition process is broken. because a program manager spent all of their time in the pentagon. they run to the pentagon all the approval. they don't actually execute their programs. we have to give them the authority. hey should spend time in the factories. number four, we have to have a test process that's efficient need for speed and that means we have to understand how to take risks in failured that sometimes will be okay. and then number five, operators have to understand how to take c

lieutenant rickover was contributing to the debrief for one of the flight problems as a debrief.c had this kind of luxury of being able to do experimentation and trial and error that we can do today because of our operational units, but we could do it if we built the right kind of networks capability, we have all these trainers out there, but the report touches on this a little bit, but if you had, let's just hypothesize for a second, you had a capability of taking a trainer system that not only does tactical training but ties you to your own ships plant status so that you can't just wave a way that generator that's been out of commission for three months because you're waiting for parts, that's real stuff, that the force commander can't waive away the fact that his magazines just got emptied her that the ship just got damaged and he had to figure out how to get that ship back out of the danger area without significantly degrading his capabilities and back to get repaired so you can do everything from what we do now with bridge trainers and combat systems training, you integrate