robert mcnamara does not that it was a mistake all along. what do you think motivation was back here in? washington to push this forward. you know, i don't know. i don't know if it was just inertia that we were so locked into our antics mentality at that that we we couldn't quit because it would be a defeat for american prestige and american around the world that allies would not respect. what we did. and, you know, there could have been that kind of damage to america's reputation role in the world. but i still think that would have been less deleterious than just causing more suffering for several more years, because we couldn't end this war. and of course, the you know, there were all these missed opportunities the way. ho chi minh had been helped by the offiategic services at the end of world war two, when declared independence for north, he used some words from declaration of independence. he had worked as a dishwasher here in new york. he knew something about america, and they had a lot of admiration for americans. but like all vietname

robert mcnamara does not that it was a mistake all along. what do you think motivation was back here in? washington to push this forward. you know, i don't know. i don't know if it was just inertia that we were so locked into our antics mentality at that that we we couldn't quit because it would be a defeat for american prestige and american around the world that allies would not respect. what we did. and, you know, there could have been that kind of damage to america's reputation role in the world. but i still think that would have been less deleterious than just causing more suffering for several more years, because we couldn't end this war. and of course, the you know, there were all these missed opportunities the way. ho chi minh had bedy the office of strategic services at the end of world war two, when declared independence for north, he used some words from declaration of independence. he had worked as a dishwasher here in new york. he knew something about america, and they had a lot of admiration for americans. but like all vietnames

but had robert mcnamara come into my class a few years ago, mcnamara said that mcmahon was a former secretary defense. that was also considered the architect of the vietnam. more american marriage said that he accepted that 3800000 in viet nam may just died in that fighting 3800000 and kissed dry the hand in a lot of that. and so when the he and nixon get in there, they immediately have this very, very aggressive policy operation, doc hook, which is going to be a massive bombing policy that was described as a savage bobby policy. and there were even options for use of nuclear weapons. unfortunately, there was such huge protest in the fall of 1969 that nixon was forced to or is actual. yeah. was it that the fall that next was forced to abandon that policy, but kissinger was all in on this viciously savage policy. but everything about the vietnam war was average and then later the united states is going to begin bombing the north again. so the kissinger's policy with nick's in was one of the vietnam ization. the idea was, if we can po, most the american troops out and let the vietnamese take ov

secretary of defense robert mcnamara and nsc advisor walter rostow asked dr. kissinger to make one more attempt. the north vietnamese response, and i quote, there is no reason for us to talk again. what we soon learned was that hanoi was planning a massive, all out assault throughout vietnam. a sledge hammer blow designed to shatter the north vietnamese army. and for them hopefully to drive the united states out. on january 30, 1968, hanoi launched its tet offensive. it was much more massive than the cia or our military leadership had anticipated. president johnson and virtually all of us around him were shocked. the north vietnamese and the viet cong attacked 36 of vietnam's 42 provincial capitals and five of its six largest cities. thousands were killed. but united states forces prevailed and won in every single battle, including a messy battle at way. despite his best efforts and the efforts of the french millimeter, harry, the kissinger, paris channel, which was codenamed philadelphia, was killed as well. in my opinion, no. two man show wanted an honorable

secretary of defense robert mcnamara is in the tetons the cia director, john mckone is at his estatein san marino, california. and dean rusk, the secretary of state, is at a yankees game and at that point, the highest ranking u.s. official in the state department is undersecretary of state george ball. and he is getting in a golf game and he sees two other second levels. state department guys, undersecretary of state averell harriman and assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs is the guy in charge of vietnam, roger hillsman show up at the at the golf course and they want his help and approve a coup d'etat in south vietnam. and these second and third tier officials will fairly high up. they're not the deciders on rice. they're not the michael forrestal who is the deputy national security adviser. this sends a draft cable up to jfk in hyannisport and says, look, we want to we want to give this, okay. to a coup. what we're basically saying is, you know, we will if you if the if gm doesn't get rid of madame nu and nu, if he doesn't get them out of the country, then we can't

i mean, go back and look at his editorial about robert mcnamara having lied about the war in vietnam. i mean, it was just i mean, the words will just stick with you forever. so i you could understand where a reader or somebody buys or follows the new york times would say, hey, this guy who had such strong opinions running the editorial pages all of a sudden running the news department, why should we not take that seriously the way he's running the newspaper? but that's a fair question. i mean, i think it's one of the things that you think about it and but, you know, again, there's a history of editorial page editors who work really close with the publisher becoming executive orders as well. yeah. and i wanted to ask about that. but just to follow up on the previous point very quickly, do you think that in that in that kind of coverage of iraq that did turn out to be credulous and booster, that there any sense of a sort of overreaction on how overcorrection i should say, on howell raines is part to the perception he was, i guess, squishy in the eyes of neocon pundits pundits. i, i do t