we were aware, i'm sorry after was made public in may so we were aware of the rtm portfolio. are analysts read the financial statement as part of our procedure. they did in this case and they told me they did. we believe that all the information around that portfolio was factored into our reading and we called the portfolio so. >> when he first learned of a multibillion-dollar off-balance-sheet risky investment they wouldn't change her opinion at all? >> it is and whether not it's in off-balance-sheet but what is in the investment itself and how much risk does it pose? our valuation of the risk was it was made up of five european sovereign bonds. those tended to be very highly rated european sovereigns. 80% of the exposure. >> didn't argue at all that somebody that was supposed to be telling you everything hadn't bothered to tell you this? it didn't strike you as not good? >> sir, we believe that transparency is a very good thing and we would push for more transparency and in financial reporting, absolutely. >> but when you have the transparency didn't change her opinion? >>

cornize betting the house with european debt, rtm portfolio? >> as i mentioned before, through the genesis of the nine months that i was there, first three or four months, i would have to say the idea of betting the house was inaccurate or not a depiction that i would represent and that as the risk profiles changed in the mark can ket place, that the same transparency and assessment and analysis and informed business judgments were made at that senior management level and let's not forget about a sophisticated board being, you know, the balance between jon and these decisions. >> i mean, i would certainly suggest that the ability of the company to handle the positions was pushed to the maximum and as i outlined before, under adverse lick quit tea conditions or scenarios, it would put towards the company in harm's way. >> okay. i yield back. the gentleman, mr. rois, is recognized for five minutes. >> mr. roseman, let me ask you about the leverage ratios if i could. the 30-1 leverage ratio has been cited in the press. and mr. roseman said that he

corzine betting the house with european debt, rtm portfolio of? >> as i mentioned him as i mentioned before, through the genesis of the nine months i was there, the first three or four months i would have to say the idea of betting the house was inaccurate or not, not the depiction i would are present. and that as the risk profiles changed in the marketplace, that the same transparency and assessment and analysis and informed business judgments were made at that senior management level. and let's not forget about the sophisticated board meetings, the balance between john and these decisions. >> i would surely suggest that the ability of the company to handle the positions was pushed to the maximum, and at the -- as i outlined before, under adverse liquidity scenarios it would potentially put the company in harm's way. >> okay. i yield back. no further questions. i thank the gentleman. now the judgment from california, mr. royce, is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you. mr. roseman, let me ask you about leverage ratios, if i could. 31 leverage

securities underlying rtms has defaulted or been restructured and all of the securities in the rtm portfolio that reach maturity have been paid in full. i am, of course, aware and deeply saddened about the numerous press reports of the more than billion dollars in customer funds that are missing and unaccounted for. i have no personal knowledge of any missing funds or unrec sized customer accounts. while at mf global i did not have responsibility for treasury functions such as fund transfers and the maintenance of segregated customer funds. like everyone else, i'm truly hopeful all the missing customer funds will be located and promptly returned to their rightful owners. that concludes my statement, and i look forward to being as helpful as i can today. >>> thank you. we'll go into questions. mr. stockman, in a march 2011 memo to the board, you highlighted some of the market risk associated with the firm's european rtm trades. under the heading market risk you identify liquidity risks associated with potential haircuts from mf global's counter-parties. one scenario i think that's in that rep

so that was months before the rtm of portfolio. was made public and the 10-k filing. >> and so, my final question is, did you, after you read the 10-k, ask mf global for detailed on their off-balance-sheet activity? >> i didn't personally, sir, and i'm not aware if they asked that question directed? >> did moody's ask -- you say you now testified you all did readers. did you ask them for details on that off-balance-sheet activity? >> no, we did not. >> okay. i think that's, it looks like i've run out of questioners. if that's okay with the witnesses. we appreciate you coming. you know, i think one of things you probably hear from colleagues is that we are concerned about every aspect of this but certainly there's a responsibility, we believe in the rating community to make sure that if people are going to continue to have confidence in the system, that we feel like, and the public more importantly feels like the appropriate amount of due diligence is being done on your part, and i think today we have some concerns about that. so we

it was months before the rtm level portfolio is made public in the 10 k. filing. >> my final question is when you read the 10 k., did you ask mf global for detail on their off-balance-sheet at charity? >> i didn't personally, sir. i am not aware if they asked that question directly. >> you said you not testified y'all did read it. did you ask them for detail on that off-balance-sheet activity? >> no, we did not. >> type inc. i've run out of questioners. i'm sure that's okay with witnesses. we appreciate your coming. you know, one of the things you probably hear from my colleague is that we are concerned about every aspect to this, the search only if there is a responsibility we believe in the reading community to make sure that if people are going to continue to have confidence in the system, that we feel like in the public more importantly feels like the appropriate amount of due diligence is being done on your part in making today we have some concerns about that. so we thank you and the witnesses for being here. we remind all members issue of 30 days --

the collapse was not caught by the exposure to the rtm portfolio are down spiraling confidence, we questionedtransparency and the ability to generate revenue. i will be happy to answer any questions you have. >> i thank the gentleman. mr. kantor, you are recognized for five minutes. quite good morning. i am richard cantor. i am the chief credit officer for moody's investment services. i lead the credit policy group. i share the credit policy committee. we are responsible for the approval of moody's ratings. thank you for this opportunity to address you today. long before the collapse of mf global, moody's regarded the company as they franchise that was reliant on customer and counterparty confidence. our rating reflected our view that its credit profile -- for several years, moody's viewed mf global one of the riskiest credits. one -- today i would describe the ratings actions before the bankruptcy, which was broadcast on by the revelation that customer assets were -- -- which was brought on by the revolution the customer assets were missing. moody's credit ratings are forward looking opinion

maturities underlying the rtm's has defaulted or been restructured and all of the securities in the rtm portfolioad that have reached maturity have to follow. i am of course aware and deeply saddened about the numerous press reports of the more than billion dollars customer fund missing. i have no personal knowledge of any missing funds for unreconciled customer accounts. while at mf global, i did not have responsibility for treasury functions such as fund fares and segregated customer fund. like everyone else, i am truly hopeful that all of the missing customer funds will be located and promptly returned to their rightful owners. that concludes my statement and i look forward to being a south as they can. >> thank you. mr. stockman, in a march 2011 memo to the board, you highlighted some of the market risk associated with the firms, rpm trades, you identify liquidity risks that are associated with potential haircut from mf global counterparties. one scenario i think in that report requires that if that scenario were to play out that the company would have to come up with about 761 million additi