if it is removing saddam hussein, how do you do this.e last thing i said, which became kind of a theme of up virtually all the reporting and sent back to london that year, was, above all, and i think i use that phrase, "of all," get them to focus on the aftermath. because of it comes to war, what is next? and the other thing at that time, which people tend to forget, actually what was blazing hot at the time, far more immediate problem, it was not iraq, it was the middle east. hideous things were going on it on the west bank, the israeli army was on the west bank, and we had prevailed upon the americans as one of the influences working there to put out a really tough statement before tony blair arrived in crawford, telling the israelis that they needed to withdraw from the west bank and soon. now, but maybe quite frank about this, crawford was a meeting at the president's ranch. i took no part in any of the discussions, and there was a large chunk of that time when no adviser was there. when david comes in, he will tell you. he went ther

if it is removing saddam hussein, how do you do this.d of a theme of up virtually all the reporting and sent back to london that year, was, above all, and i think i use that phrase, "of all," get them to focus on the aftermath. because of it comes to war, what is next? and the other thing at that time, which people tend to forget, actually what was blazing hot at the time, far more immediate problem, it was not iraq, it was the middle east. hideous things were going on it on the west bank, the israeli army was on the west bank, and we had prevailed upon the americans as one of the influences working there to put out a really tough statement before tony blair arrived in crawford, telling the israelis that they needed to withdraw from the west bank and soon. now, but maybe quite frank about this, crawford was a meeting at the president's ranch. i took no part in any of the discussions, and there was a large chunk of that time when no adviser was there. when david comes in, he will tell you. he went there for a discussion about israel. itÑi

if you excepted -- and i was in favor of removing saddam hussein. i thought, so you can understand where i am coming from, you didn't even need weapons of mass destruction as a clear and present danger. there was a very strong argument for confronting saddam hussein because he had not lived up to the commitments of resolution 687 after the 1991 war. he had thrown around the inspectors effectively at the end of 1998. we still know that he had the means and the will to concoct weapons of mass destruction at a later date. there is a british interest, we should have done it in 1999. it would not allow the security council to do it. it would not have damaged the british in -- british interest if we had gone and your numbers. it would have damaged our relations in the united states if we actively opposed it. and we could have done more on issues which some may have regarded as minor, but were important to us. i'm not sure i said anything more than what i said the first time. >> i have one more question that i wanted asked, about the aftermath planning. do

. -- saddam hussein. >> well, it focused on financing iraqi dissident groups.hill, as we did quite frequently, what you would hear from republican senators and their staff was there's some really good dissident groups out there. we need to finance them and arm them and shake saddam's foundations. now, the group of choice was something called the i.n.c., the iraqi international congress. most of the members seemed to be located in london and who were led by tal bee talabi. and he and his people were really in opposition to hemolytic uremic syndrome. they would -- despite a -- opposition to saddam hussein, and that they should be able to do the trick. if you went to the state department, in particular, colin powell and his deputy, they would say the i.n.c. is no good, we shouldn't rely on them. but that was the belligerent trend running through the administration before 9/11. let's focus on the opposition. meantime -- and this was the greater strand of the two, if you like -- the focus, particularly from colin powell, was on what we termed in london "narrowing an

saddam hussein probably use wmds engaged in urban warfare. war is very costly.china shop argument. you invaded. you own it. it will be difficult to hold together. it will probably be a prolonged occupation. fourth, it will divert resources from the important struggle against al qaeda in afghanistan. those were the key things of their argument. my time is up. i would say that all the arguments adopted in the three decisions i have talked about, this one looks the best in hindsight. that said, it is very different than the arguments that you hear now. it is -- nonetheless, it reads relatively well in hindsight treated it is the least connected to the scholars own theories. the scholars making the analysis disconnected themselves in many ways from their previous intellectual investments in grand theory and explanation. to conclude, i would say that overall the scholarly performance in these three episodes is not amazing. it is less good than many would have you believe after the fact. it seems to be a disconnect between building general theory and explanation and m

general tommy franks was given the long mission to did wrong mission invade iraq, get rid of the saddam husseinand her turn it over to the minister is bridge he should have been given the mission of getting rid of saddam,'s of fighting iraq, making sure that iraq was a secure military area and then handing over to civilian administrators. there was an under-resources and of the mission from the very beginning. london was not in the position or did not question that setting up missions. control of the security situation was lost from the earliest days after april 9 and was never recovered. you cannot do a political process or an economic process without security. in addition to that, as far as the political process was concerned, no iraqi leadership was identified in reality and with justification as being the leadership to which we would hand over in the phase four perios. -- . . london was not sufficiently consulted on the setting of missions, on the change from oha to the cpa, from, to baghdad. and the setting up resources for the whole test. -- task. we were always, by experience in iraq, fr

in my view, general tommy franks was given the long mission to invade iraq, get rid of the saddam husseinnd her turn it over to the minister is bridge he should have been given the mission of getting rid of saddam,'s of fighting iraq, making sure that iraq was a secure military area and then handing over to civilian administrators. there was an under-resources and of the mission from the very beginning. london was not in the position or did not question that setting up missions. control of the security situation was lost from the earliest days after april 9 and was never recovered. you cannot do a political process or an economic process without security. in addition to that, as far as the political process was concerned, no iraqi leadership was identified in reality and with justification as being the leadership to which we would hand over in the face four. . phase four perios. london was not sufficiently consulted on the setting of missions, on the change from oha to the cpa, from, to baghdad. and the setting up resources for the whole test. we were always, by experience in iraq, from h

and all the problems in iraq were caused by a single individual, saddam hussein. i think there's an effort in sudan as a single individual is the cause of the problem. not to whitewash the actions of these people all of whom were, indeed, criminal persons who did very criminal things, but to suggest that certainly the case of yugoslavia there were many villains, and this was a very complex war which cannot be reduced to single personalities. but never the less, there was an effort to simplify it by reducing it to single personalities because that plays much better in public relations terms. what's very striking is not that it

in iraq all the problems in iraq were caused by a single individual, saddam hussein. i think there's an effort in sudan to suggest bashir as a single individual is the problem. this is a gross simplification of these conflicts and not on to whitewash these people who were all indeed criminal persons who did very criminal things, but to suggest that certainly in the case of yugoslavia, there were many villains and it was a complex war that could not be reduced to single personalities but nevertheless there was an effort to simplify it by reducing it to single personalities because that plays much better in public relations terms. what's very striking is not just that it was accepted by the public but a lot of intellectuals who really should have known better with advanced training and degrees from ivy league institutions seem to accept these very simplified accounts of what actually happened. indeed, you'll see some really very intelligent people. a social theorist said, and yugoslavia you a over when milosevic became president of serbia. as if all the problems were ca

if you can believe it, looking in the rear view mirror, the shah of iran and saddam hussein signed that agreement. and they honored it. they held to it solemnly for the first four years until khomeini returned to iran from paris in early february, '79 and broke it every day for next 19 months before the irani and iraqi war. that principle is as valid in their minds as no division that i think discern until today as it was reaffirmed on march 6th, 1991. perhaps coincidentally but in a nice kind of complementary way, the same evening that george h.w. bush spoke before a joint session of congress and called for a new world order be the six dcc countries plus syria and egypt called for a new order because the one that was shattered to smithereens because of the iraqi one there. the bottom line here is noninterference in iraq's affairs lest they open the door and leave them exposed and vulnerable at any point in iraq's interference in their affairs. and the same thing with regard to iran. there's no discussion about iran's elections. there's no discussions about fraud or free and fair or ope

how should we take saddam hussein? these became questions. and then 9/11. my reaction to 9/11 was, this is the rest of my life. this is the 30 years' war. i am not going to see the end of it. we could argue about that. that is what i believe. we are still trying to figure out what are the implications of that and what should the strategy be. one thing jim did over and over was not just to say that communism is evil but how do we fight it? what is our strategy and we are still grappling with this. here is this for us. it is very different from the soviet union. the soviet union never killed 3000 new yorkers. it never did. it is different. how you wrap your mind around that? what do you do? these are -- i am not going to give you the answer now. no one is going to give it to me or anyone. this is a process of grappling with this. >> we have time for another question. let's go all the way back up here. i will add to what rick said. the political expression of conservatism is going to change. . . >> he was very impressed much a book by claude brown. a lot of it

to agree with from a country that was thrilled at the thought of usair overthrowing saddam hussein and the potential to rebuild the country, to really a realization that the u.s. quite did not know what it was doing or prepared for the problems that it faced. six entry was spinning slowly add of control precut became it was a very safe place in the beginning but very dangerous place by the end. >> the women come from different backgrounds. how did they see a change as how they were treated as women. >> they have a lot of freedom center sadam hussain but they lost them immediately with the war. there was security and under house arrest for a long time. it got worse unfortunately that it led to the arrival of radical islam with a very conservative version how women should live many influenced by iran. iraqi women found themselves unable to leave the house or possibly living at -- losing their rights to the constitution, government, di vorce or inheritance or family loss of a became desperate for the future and what it might told them they never thought they would end up like that because

how should we take saddam hussein? these became questions. and then 9/11. my reaction to 9/11 was, this is the rest of my life. this is the 30 years' war. i am not going to see the end of it. we could argue about that. that is what i believe. we are still trying to figure out what are the implications of that and what should the strategy be. one thing jim did over and over was not just to say that communism is evil but how do we fight it? what is our strategy and we are still grappling with this. here is this for us. it is very different from the soviet union. the soviet union never killed 3000 new yorkers. it never did. it is different. how you wrap your mind around that? what do you do? these are -- i am not going to give you the answer now. no one is going to give it to me or anyone. this is a process of grappling with this. >> we have time for another question. let's go all the way back up here. i will add to what rick said. the political expression of conservatism is going to change. . . i know at least as early as his run for mayor of new york in 1965

this happens with iraq saddam hussein once he had oil revenues embarked on a nuclear weapons program and by 1981 he had a reactor and the israeli air force came and blue with a way. mr. sadam had plenty of money with a nuclear determination he started down a different path and was signed isotope separation which does not with as big of a footprint and was of starting all over again. subsequent expectations vectors feel 1991 at the time of the 2/8 war, he was a few months away from having a ball but then the u.s. air force came along him blew them up and then he was out of the business because the inspectors come embargoes and the clear ambitions were quick. same with syria they decided they wanted nuclear weapons and made a deal with 10 north korea as to build along the euphrates rivers september 2007 the israelis blew away. so much for syria. those of a dozen states. now bear in mind there are a handful that i want to talk about. south korea, japan, germany our industrial states with plenty of money and talent and have everything it takes but they trust the u.s. nuclear umbrella but

and the whole issue gets pushed out the agenda by saddam hussein. but when he invades kuwait.there's enough of it that gorbachev picks up on it and in conversations with baker, she says, you know, well the decision is a relic phase where he tried to come up with structural to post-cold war europe. you've come up with this common european home and it's not really working and he says to baker you guys had the g-7 and the ec 12 and the m-16. how about we have an e. seven and a bridge organization. and baker says that's not really going to work in gorbachev says went away but russia and nato. the soviet union, i'm sorry. the soviet union nato and baker says while that's a fantasy. let's take an world of reality. in gorbachev keeps saying why do we think about this. so it comes up, but it's never really, it's never taken seriously in the west. and baker later then says to the public. you know, if russia embraces democracy and free-market we should include it. so that's an interesting open question. and where he finally came down in the book is i don't, i finally come down on nato e

can you compare this to the role that paul bremer played after the fall of saddam hussein in iraq? >> we did look at iraq when we wrote this book, because how can you not look at it? in terms of iraq, we actually fell into a number of the traps that we talk about in the book. one of those traps was told story syndrome. when the decision was finally made to go in, and looking at reconstruction, what they failed to do, a lot of people in the state department and elsewhere have a lot of knowledge and were looking at this for many years who argued about all the things that could go wrong and all the different problems and possibilities. what happened was that a lot of the administration did not want to hear contrary voices, and they were then shut out of the process. one guy named tom warwick was infamous leaked kicked off the team by rumsfeld. that was a very big problem there. they did more war gaming in terms of looking it then we did and looking at the after raft -- aftermath of iraq. we learned a lot of lessons from iraq from an execution standpoint. one thing we then have to say

the video, the cell phone video, the execution of saddam hussein and the taunting by the shia militia did us great damage, created the impression that was a sectarian revenge killing, not the execution of justice in a society with a legitimate rule of law. what is the desertion rate now? where are those folks going? how are we going to make sure that the military we build is not going to dominate the government and how are we making sure we're not training and ee equipmenting the forces provided for war lords in a short time? >> i think it's important that i start with the fact that one of the things afghans fear most is militias and war lords. there will be security forces that form in afghanistan whether we form them or not. they will form in their own defense. and i think that it's important we form a national army and national police capacity, a recognized legitimate defense security apparatus or the vacuum will be filled by exactly what the afghans fear, which is a return to strong militias that in many cases are ethnic cally based. they don't expect the same things from their ce

the whole issue pushed off the a againeda by saddam hussein. there's enough that gosh chafe picks up on it. baker says well, this isn't the phase where he's trying to come up with structures. he's come up with the common european home. you guys are the g 7 and ec 12. security council. baker said that's not only going to work. and the soviet union. baker says that's in the realm of fantasy. he keeps saying, why don't we think about this? it comes up but it's never taken seriously in the west baker then says where i finally come down in the book i find that justified or you say no, nato was and is all it should be in a military alliance. the point of a military alliance is to create security for the members. i can see the just if i indication for not expanding but i can see the way for expanding. but it should be carried through to the end. >> if one looks at the definition of great nations, one of the criteria along with a great beforeder is a vibrant strong economy. if we look at times that have changed with our great nation, brought to our att

the government blamed al-qaeda and saddam hussein loyalists. but there was no immediate claim of responsibility. gwen ifill has our coverage. >> ifill: at least four separate car bombs rocked the iraqi capital in late morning. two of the strikes appeared to be suicide attacks. the first targeted a police patrol in the city's dora district. the new location of the finance ministry was also hit, as was a court complex, and a judicial training institute. the worst was at the courts complex, where a bomber plowed through a checkpoint and detonated a carload of explosives. the blast brought down parts of buildings and killed several judges, among dozens of others. the attacks shattered a month of relative calm. violence in iraq has diminished over the last 18 months and november saw the fewest civilian deaths since the u.s. invasion in 2003. still, militants have continued to mount spectacular, mass- casualty strikes. in late october, bombings outside three ministries killed more than 150 people and in august, attacks on two other government targets

our own antiterrorism effort of sorts and filed lawsuits against osama bin laden, the taliban, saddam hussein, the country of iraq, fidel castro and hugo chavez. how did any of these suits pan out? >> guest: well, we got a $1.8 million judgment against fidel castro. the other suits are continuing on. we got default judgments against many of these dictators. it certainly is difficult to collect because frequently the u.s. government comes in and protects the dictators, if you can believe that, and doesn't allow you to attach the assets. so it's a fight every step of the way. but the reason we did it and the reason i wrote a prior book called fatal neglect with my colleagues was because i wanted to show how the american government had sat there, basically, you know, twiddling their thumbs when all the information was publicly available that we were going to be hit again, this time with a bigger terrorist attack at the world trade center just down the street from where i am today. the american government was more preoccupied on itself and reestablishing the blush administration -- bush administr

and perhaps in -- saddam hussein against iran.and perhaps in a way of people re-creating bad marriages. you go in and repeat the bad pattern. perhaps people are trying to go back to that time when iran was all alone, it was besieged and yet there was this revolutionary spirit. you see it on the campuses where they are trying to re-create this cultural revolution which took place in the early 1980's. you know this is an impossible task. it as iason pointed out, this third generation is very plucked in. iran has, what, 40% internet usage among the population. it's an extraordinary figure. it's the highest in the middle east and one of the highest in the world. 80% lit rass see -- literacy. this is bound to fail. the question is how long will it take, how disruptive will it be, how bloody it will be? the question about starting up new uranium enrichment plants seem like bombast. they have not completed one facility. this facility has something like 8,000 centrifuges which half is operable. it may take years before that facility is co

likewise, the world recognized the need to confront saddam hussein when he made it a consensus that sentt others follow the rules of the road if we refuse to follow than ourselves. for when we don't, our actions appear arbitrary. and undercut the legitimacy of future intervention, no matter how justified. and this becomes particularly important when the purpose of military action extends beyond self-defense, or the defense of one nation against an aggressor. how to prevent the slaughter of civilians by their own government, or to stop a civil war whose violence is suffering can ingold an entire region. i believe that force can be justified on humanitarian grounds, as it was in the balkans. or in other places that have been scarred by war. in action, it tears at our conscious and can lead to more costly later. . . >> the leaders and soldiers of nato countries and other friends and allies demonstrate this truth through the capacity and courage they've shown in afghanistan. but in many countries there is a disconnect between the efforts of those who serve and the ambivalence of the broader

well, iraq, we successfully took out saddam hussein.then we tried to prevail with a counterterrorism strategy. that's where you send in some of our elite forces and you take out the leaders of al qaeda, and then you go back to your base. well, the problem we found was that once we left al qaeda, we come back. insurgency is different than a regular war. they would come back in, and if anybody had cooperated with the american forces, they would kill them or torture them first and kill them or even torture their families in front of them and then kill them. so we knew things weren't going right, and president bush chose with secretary gates, and he and secretary gates chose general david petraeus who was a real scholar. happened to go to the same college i went to, but he was a real scholar who had developed a counterinsurgency strategy that he felt was the only way to deal with insurgents. so they instituted the clear, hold and bill approach in iraq. they would send in the troops clear out of al qaeda, and then they would embed or lock do

americans' role did the people put forth a couple of people to work with them they said we're glad saddam hussein is gone. we did not like kimmie there. that is pretty common. they welcome to the americans and and there were no problems but then i believe april april 28, 2003, little less than three weeks after the american stock baghdad, and fallujah of the talked to -- there we're occupying a secondary school, a demonstration because folks wanted their kids to use the school to go to school and the americans opened fired on demonstrators and killed 17 people and civil investigations are done and of course, americans claim they took fire from the demonstrations. the next day another demonstration was happening in this city against the americans because of the people killed the previous day and four more people were killed. the resistance was formed in fallujah at the hands of american soldiers killing unarmed demonstrators. things heated up and the resistance heated up the brings us up march 22, 2004. nine days before the four blackwater mercenaries were killed in fallujah. march 22, and then ga

how should we take saddam hussein? these became questions. and then 9/11.ing to see the end of it. we could argue about that. that is what i believe. we are still trying to figure out what are the implications of that and what should the strategy be. one thing jim did over and over was not just to say that communism is evil but how do we fight it? what is our strategy and we are still grappling with this. here is this for us. it is very different from the soviet union. the soviet union never killed 3000 new yorkers. it never did. it is different. how you wrap your mind around that? what do you do? these are -- i am not going to give you the answer now. no one is going to give it to me or anyone. this is a process of grappling with this. >> we have time for another question. let's go all the way back up here. i will add to what rick said. the political expression of conservatism is going to change. . . >> he was very impressed much a book by claude brown. a lot of it was about heroin use in harlem. he came out when he was running for mayor with some very ant

and adjusting to that, what is our role in the world, how should we take saddam hussein, how much ofa threat is the summer street -- these became big questions. and my reaction to 9/11 was that this is the rest of my life. this is the 30 years' war. i will not see the end of it. we could argue about that, but that is what i believe, and we're trying to figure out what are the implications of that. one thing bed jim did in the columns over and over was not just to say it in the columns, but what is our strategy for fighting it. the soviet union never killed three dozen new yorkers. they never did. it is different. just how you wrap your mind around that. what do you do? i'm not one to give you the answer now, and no one will get it this week. this is a process of grappling with this. >> we have time for another question or two. i would add to what risk -- rick said. if reagan had run the goldwater campaign, he would have lost. if george bush had rerun the reagan campaign, he would have lost. political movement does not have the capacity to change with circumstance. so yes, it has chan

and bosnia and kosovo and somalia when there was a famine and kuwait when it was occupied by saddam hussein'ses. and then there was the earthquake and pakistan, the tidal wave and the rescue effort after that in indonesia. certainly the united states was viewed favorably by those people that benefited from that. so to throw back at you in that sense, is it too narrow to judge united states only by the worst things that happened or only by the best things that happened, or is there some way to take all the elements into account? >> that is why i say it is confusing when it comes to the middle east in the arab world and the muslims. if you go back to the early 1950's, you find that the united states was split on the issue of recognition of the state of israel. the state department was opposed. president truman was basically advocating a state. until 1956, we did not support the state of israel. we're opposed even supporting it through arms or enter into any kind of negotiations or treaties with israel. with john f. kennedy, we had problems with the state of israel. relations were not always ver

senior baathists who had taken responsibility for some of the awful things that had happened under saddam hussein and in some effects ambassador bremmer mitigated some of the effects of his decree through the implementation of it. >> now you were sending -- [inaudible] and what sit having an impact opt levels? >> the u.k.'s [inaudible]? >> yes. >> they were performing extremely effectively under very trying circuses. >> i mean, how was the interacting with -- within the c.p.a. when you say it [inaudible] what areas were they concentrating on? >> on the whole, any other nationality, -- american in the c.p.a. was regarded as completely integrated spot c.p.a. process, so the two younger officers we had in the government in the political section of the process, one of them a very good arabic speaker, and his colleague, julie chapel were both very effective younger members of the government team, and the -- the bath hearth was the deputy administrator for operations under ambassador bremmer, hugely effective, trusted by bremmer, regarded with great crpt by bremmer. there were many other britain's work

if you can believe it, looking in the rearview mirror, the shah of iran and saddam hussein signed that agreement and the honored it. they held to it solidly for the first four years until khomeni returned to iran from paris in 1979 and broken from the first day and every day for the next 19 months before the iran-iraq war began. that principle is as valid now and there is no division among them that i could discern until today as it was reaffirmed on march 1991. perhaps coincidentally, but in a nice complementary way, the same evening that george h. w. bush spoke before a joint session of congress and called for a new world order, the six gcc countries and syria and egypt called for a new regional order. the one that had existed since camp david had been shattered with the iraqi invasion in kuwait. that is the same first principle in the damascus accord. the bottom line is not interference in iraq's affairs unless they open the door and leave them exposed and vulnerable at any point to iraq's interference in their affairs. the same with regard to iran. if there is no discussion about i

the home of saddam hussein, and the heart of the insurgency.lso had kirkuk, which is very unique for its kurdish and arab tensions. we also have responsibility for kurdistan. as the multinational north division commander we have responsibilities for 23,000 u.s. soldiers and and other service members, responsible to train iraqi police and to do our best to work with the development of the security forces and government, helping us to build the economy. host: how long were you there? guest: we were there for over one year. we were not a part of the surge. host: how would you assess that region now? politically and militarily? terrorism? guest: from a military standpoint, the iraqi people have done a phenomenal job to build their security forces. the agreement that went into effect in january 1, 2009, through our partnership we were able to work with the iraqis can really coach them, teach them, mentor them, which i think brought them quite a ways. they have contributed to security in a big way. iraq is at the major crossroad of political decision

in 2003 genuflected before bush when he said weapons of mass destruction, if we don't go after saddam hussein we will see mushroom clouds over chicago. well, where are they now? they are attacking obama with everything possible. host: we will leave it there. guest: nobody minimizes the real threat of al qaeda and the threat to this nation by extremists who for theological issues more than anything else threaten this country. the differences we think dealing with that threat and the security of this country, we feel there are other ways, different methods, and more global way to deal with it. we disagree with a strategy that this issue of the threat of al qaeda to this nation can be dealt with solely on military terms. that is the difference. host: this morning in the star- ledger of on the says the surge is vital to national interest. if not, it is this surge vital to any u.s. interest? guest: at this point if the surge were, of the outcome was to stabilise the region, then you could justify the surge. but the fact of the matter is going to be, and has been proven already, it will not stabili

completely capable to run a democratic system and we should allow them to do so but if you remove saddam hussein and the end 1,000 e merge. the basically to answer your question, and nothing really changed on that score. >> they remain very optimistic? we did not get into the planning with them. >> we tried. we did not succeed because they have not gotten their house in order. we would send teams over. >> it never really happened. >> let me finish this point*. it happened but it was not enough. in the autumn and winter 2002, coming from london it teams came over and we gave the americans and afterwards what they found was fragmented interagency reaction but we knew the state department was working on that for ages they had terrific plans and good people. in the end donald rumsfeld would not accept. and then the department of defense you have a different story. the trouble without engaging the americans with the aftermath was that they themselves did not create the office of every construction humanitarian assistance until february 2003. it was not for a lack of trying by british officials. i was

if you can believe it looking in the rear-view mirror, saddam hussein and the sharif of iran signed that agreement and held to it solemnly for the first four years until khomeni returned to iran from paris in early february of 1979 and broke it from the first day and every day for the next 19 months before the iran-iraq war began. author: and that particular principle is as valid now in their minds as no division amongst them that i can concern until today as it was reaffirmed on march 6, 1991. perhaps coincident tally but in a nice, complementary way, the same evening that george h.w. bush spoke before a joint session of congress and called for a new world order, the six g.c.c. countries plus syria plus egypt called for a new regional order because the one that had existed since camp david has been shattered to smithereens with the iraqi invasion of kuwait there. . . there is no discussion about ahmadinejad's hawk jets -- prospects, for the exact same reasons that i gave before, of not giving inner -- ron any pretense to interfere in their society to any greater degree than iran already

how should we take saddam hussein? these became questions. and then 9/11. my reaction to 9/11 was, this is the rest of my life. this is the 30 years' war. i am not going to see the end of it. we could argue about that. that is what i believe. we are still trying to figure out what are the implications of that and what should the strategy be. one thing jim did over and over was not just to say that communism is evil but how do we fight it? what is our strategy and we are still grappling with this. here is this for us. it is very different from the soviet union. the soviet union never killed 3000 new yorkers. it never did. it is different. how you wrap your mind around that? what do you do? these are -- i am not going to give you the answer now. no one is going to give it to me or anyone. this is a process of grappling with this. >> we have time for another question. let's go all the way back up here. i will add to what rick said. the political expression of conservatism is going to change. . . i know at least as early as his run for mayor of new york in 1965

saddam hussein was a terrible person, but by doing that we spent tremendous amounts of blood and treasure help national security. does this help or hurt national security? i applaud president obama for saying i am going to start getting out of afghanistan. we cannot stay there forever, we will give it our best shot, but there are things we can do to protect security without keeping 100,000 people there indefinitely. host: what -- guest: it came up again. the congressman raised it, to his credit, raising the tax issue. president obama at the end of that speech at west point said, basically, in the final analysis, our ability to protect our security in the world is going to be influenced by how well we handle things at home. i thought, this would be a good first step. i mean, i would like to in the long term debt the budget back in balance. that has got to be our ultimate goal. you know, the journey of 1,000 miles begins with a single step, so let's take a look at this. the president talked about it, the country knows about it, and if the congress supports it, let's think about paying for i

of muslims and bosnia and inco's of of -- kosovo, and in kuwait, when kuwait was occupied by saddam hussein'sm that. so to throw back at you in that sense, is it too narrow to judge united states only by the worst things that happened or only by the best things that happened, or is there some way to take all the elements into account? >> that is why i say it is confusing when it comes to the middle east in the arab world and the muslims. if you go back to the early 1950's, you find that the united states was split on the issue of recognition of the state of israel. the state department was opposed. president truman was basically advocating a state. until 1956, we did not support the state of israel. we're opposed even supporting it through arms or enter into any kind of negotiations are treaties with israel. -- four treaties with israel. with john f. kennedy, we had problems with the state of israel. relations were not always very cordial. in terms of united states relationship with the muslim world, despite the fact that the muslim world accounts for 18% of jobs in the united states for impo

iran has really benefited from the in -- from the removal of saddam hussein and the weakening of iraq as a state, and especially the of the bushmen of a shi'ite domenicdominated gove. essentially what we have done is removed -- and especially the establishment of a shiite dominated government. essentially, what we have done is removed its opponents in the area. i think israel rightly is worried by the increased threat presented by iran. you're seeing is an interesting ways. for example, in yemen, there's fighting going on over the caribbean peninsula. and what you are seeing is some confrontation between the radian states and iran, i think because iran is -- between the radiant states and iran, i think because iran is feeling frisky. even countries across the marra over to morocco expressed some concern over this. host: next call from michigan, go ahead. caller: with the situation between the taliban and the al qaeda in pakistan, should our country be concerned about al qaeda getting intense arm pakistan's nuclear-weapons? and if so, -- getting its hands on pakistan's nuclear-weapons?

they allege that al qaeda and former supporters, or supporters of the late saddam hussein were behindit. do you have anything on that? are you working with the syrians to find out more? >> i think that we have -- we, of course, you say saw the secretary's statement yesterday. it was horrific. we strongly condemn these barbarous acts. we have offered to provide support to the iraqi police and military forces. they have -- the u.s. forces have provided explosive ordinance dispose am -- explosived or nantz disposal -- ed or nants disposal assets. providing over watch over baghdad and u.s. forces in iraq of course stand ready to provide additional support if necessary. >> does that support extend to the investigation and especially since it may go beyond the exporters? >> i don't have specific information on that, as i said. we stand adey -- ready to provide that kind of forensic support if that's what they want. >> on iran, we asked about iranian press reports about the disappearance of prominent scientists, those allegations continue in the iranian press in somewhat stronger terms. do y

of muslims in kosovo, in somalia when there was a famine, in kuwait when it was occupied by saddam hussein'se earthquake in pakistan and the tidal wave and post rescue effort in indonesia. certainly the united states was viewed favorably by the people who benefited from that. so to kind of throw back at you in that sense, is it too narrow to judge the united states only by the worst things that have happened or only by the best things that have happened, or should there be some way of taking all these elements into account? >> that is why i said it was rather confusing. to the muslim it is confusing. if you go back to the early 1950's, we find that the united states was split on the issue of recognition of the state of israel, offense. the state department was opposed, and president truman was basically advocating the recognition of the state. until 1956 we did not support the state of israel. we were basically opposed of supporting it through arms. we did not enter into any kind of treaty with the state of israel. so it was confusion in that political sense. even in the administration of jo

the american military has been at with war or had forces deployed continuously since saddam hussein invadeduwait in august of 1990. for the past eight years we have fought terrorists and insurgents in afghanistan and iraq. the forces have been tested during this period as never before. but it has also performed as never before. it is without question the finest fighting force and in particular the fighting counter insurgency force our nation has ever fielded. the determination, skill, initiative and courage of our soldiers, sailers, airmen, marine and coast guardsmen are awe inspiring. so are the sack faces they and their families make every day. it continues to be the greatest of privileges to serve with them and with our civilian and coalition partners in such important important missions we are taking. i want to thank you and your colleagued for the continuous support you provide for our men and women in uniform and their civilian partners. >> thank you very much, general. >> thank you for the opportunity to present my views on afghanistan today. i would like to ask that my full statemen

senator shelby and i got to iraq and met saddam hussein. as yet we have not had an interparliamentary exchange which i have sought for a long time with the iranians. it would be my hope that iran, for humanitarian reasons, would release these people and that we would exercise our best efforts -- the united states government -- working through syria or whatever other channel we could find to secure their release. i yield the floor. i suggest the absence of a quorum. the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll. quorum call: quorum call: quorum call: a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from oklahoma. a senator: i ask consent the quorum call be suspended. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. durbin: before the senate now is the issue of funding our military, the department of defense appropriations bill. this is a bill that's critically important because it provides the funding that our men and women in uniform now risking their lives while we meet in the safety of our business and offices and homes her

the home of saddam hussein, and the heart of the insurgency. we also had kirkuk, which is very unique for its kurdish and arab tensions. we also have responsibility for kurdistan. as the multinational north division commander we have responsibilities for 23,000 u.s. soldiers and and other service members, responsible to train iraqi police and to do our best to work with the development of the security forces and government, helping us to build the economy. host: how long were you there? guest: we were there for over one year. we were not a part of the surge. host: how would you assess that region now? politically and militarily? terrorism? guest: from a military standpoint, the iraqi people have done a phenomenal job to build their security forces. the agreement that went into effect in january 1, 2009, through our partnership we were able to work with the iraqis can really coach them, teach them, mentor them, which i think brought them quite a ways. they have contributed to security in a big way. iraq is at the major crossroad of political dec

the video, the cell phone video, the execution of saddam hussein and the taunting by the shia militia did us great damage, created the impression that was a sectarian revenge killing, not the execution of justice in a society with a legitimate rule of law. what is the desertion rate now? where are those folks going? how are we going to make sure that the military we build is not going to dominate the government and how are we making sure we're not training and ee equipmenting the forces provided for war lords in a short time? >> i think it's important that i start with the fact that one of the things afghans fear most is militias and war lords. there will be security forces that form in afghanistan whether we form them or not. they will form in their own defense. and i think that it's important we form a national army and national police capacity, a recognized legitimate defense security apparatus or the vacuum will be filled by exactly what the afghans fear, which is a return to strong militias that in many cases are ethnic cally based. they don't expect the same things from their ce

likewise, the world recognized the need to confront saddam hussein when he invaded kuwait -- a consensusion. furthermore, america -- in fact, no nation -- can insist that others follow the rules of the road if we refuse to follow them ourselves. for when we don't, our actions appear arbitrary and undercut the legitimacy of future interventions, no matter how justified. important when the purpose of military action extends beyond self-defense or the defense of one nation against an aggressor. more and more, we all confront difficult questions about how to prevent the slaughter of civilians by their own government, or to stop a civil war whose violence and suffering can engulf an entire region. i believe that force can be justified on humanitarian grounds, as it was in the balkans, or in other places that have been scarred by war. inaction tears at our conscience and can lead to more costly intervention later. that's why all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace. america's commitment to global security will never waver. bu

the video, the cell phone video of the execution of saddam hussein and taunting of the shia military but obviously also members of the shia militia that was more loyal to muqtada al-sadr did us great damage. it created the impression that was a sectarian revenge killing not the execution of justice in a society with a legitimate rule of law. what is the -- what is the desertion rate now? where are those folks going? how are we going to make sure that the military we build is not going to dominate the government? and how are we making sure that we are not training and equipping the forces that will be fighting for warlords in a short time? >> i think it's important that i start with the fact that one of the things afghans fear most is militias and warlords. there will be security forces that form in afghanistan whether we form them or not. they will form in their own defense and i think that it's important we form a national army and national police capacity or a recognized legitimate defense security apparatus or the vacuum will be filled by exactly what the afghans fear, which is a

the american military has been at with war or had forces deployed continuously since saddam hussein invaded kuwait in august of 1990. for the past eight years we have fought terrorists and insurgents in afghanistan and iraq. the forces have been tested during this period as never before. but it has also performed as never before. it is without question the finest fighting force and in particular the fighting counter insurgency force our nation has ever fielded. the determination, skill, initiative and courage of our soldiers, sailers, airmen, marine and coast guardsmen are awe inspiring. so are the sack faces they and their families make every day. it continues to be the greatest of privileges to serve with them and with our civilian and coalition partners in such important important missions we are taking. i want to thank you and your colleagued for the continuous support you provide for our men and women in uniform and their civilian partners. >> thank you very much, general. >> thank you for the opportunity to present my views on afghanistan today. i would like to ask that my full statem