we did think -- and it comes in that letter -- that saddam hussein mighresort to terrorism in the theater if he thought his regime was toppled, the capability tdo anything much in the uk. that turned out to be the right judgment. what the letter -- has been redacted from the letter, like i say, in general terms is that is partly as a result of action we took. but i don't think the threat in the uk was anything other than very limited. >> you mentioned tt you were not asked to produce this assessment. what was it about the circumstances of march 2002, which is before crawford and so on, that led you to think it would be useful to produce an assessment? >> that's a difficult one to answer and i noted that it is before crawford. i said to richard norton-taylor of the guardian, when i gave an interview to him, that at the time of 9/11, when i went to america the next day with sir richard dearlove and sir francis richards -- sorry, i'm deviating, but there is a point. >> that's fine. >> we flew back over new yor where fires we still burning, and i think we were all in separate ways reflecting