sanctions. what our sanctions -- >> no. totale, just to use an example, would have to make a decision does it risk the suit by the iranians because they're violating their contract, given the heaviness of our sanctions. >> that's exactly right. we saw how that played out -- >> i appreciate the answer and i think you've answered. now, next question. so that is our interpretation, what you just gave, of what grandfathering means. i think secretary -- what's your title? >> yes. >> secretary? undersecretary -- >> whatever. >> ambassador sherman. you're undersecretary. you're good by me, whatever your name is. >> likewise, senator. >> a british ambassador said britain agreed with that interpretation. do we have that in writing somewhere that britain, france, germany and the eu agree with that intepgs since they're members of the group of eight? >> we do not have a letter to that. ly talk with them about that possibility. i want to tell this committee though, i had extensive discussions the 27 days i was in vienna towards the end

sanctions. we thank you both for being here. it's worth noting that real questions about sanctions relief remain. on the same day the u.n. passed the resolution endorsing the deal and setting up the sfap back mechanism iran wrote a letter to the u.n. says that had he would treat use of the of snap back as grounds to walk out of the agreement. again, i think you all know this passed in about 90 seconds at the u.n. last monday and at that moment iran sent a letter refuting the ability to use snap back. that same letter swrout lines that extension of current sanctions would be in the -- in violation of the agreement. i know we had an exchange the other day where it was asked if we had some sanctions that are rolling off in 2016, if we just extended those so there would be is something to snap back to. i know senator menendez has made a strong point about this. then that itself would be a violation. and that iran would reconsider any imposition of new sanctions with the nature and scope identical or

follow the policy it has indeed followed with regard to its own sanctions and the sanctions regime as a whole since negotiations began. one more myth needs to be punctured here. negotiations did not begin two years ago, as the administration seems to frequently suggest. negotiations began over a decade ago. you -- why it is irrelevant to station. they began negotiations in late 2003. by there then joined united states, china, and russia by june of 2006. they led the negotiations, headed by the high of thentative on behalf hours. the negotiations lasted for a decade and iran never left the table. iran was at the table all the time. is persuadeds did iran that unless it made meaningful concessions, it was heading for disaster. sanctions were extremely effective the moment the united states and europeans together went beyond u.n. sanctions in bringing iran's economies to its knees. snapotion that you could that sanctions, even if there is a political will in europe in the united states of the with thecouncil international community to snap back sanctions, the effect of sessions is seen o

sanctions regimes and the sanctions of the united states? >> it has no impact on the sanctions of the united states whatsoever. with respect to the u.n. sanctions regimes, as i understand it, the endorsement by the u.n. security council sets out a timetable right in line with what ambassador sherman was describing where iranian performance, when verified, will lead to the lifting of u.n. sanctions. >> and that would be all of the u.n. sanctions on iran? >> no. what it would mean -- at implementation day when iran has taken initial steps and key nuclear steps would mean that the economic sanctions would be relieved. the sanctions on arms trade, the sanctions on acquisition of ballistic missile technology remain in place for many years to come under the u.n. >> in your opening statement you made some point about the fact that it would be very hard right now for the united states to back out of the agreement that it has reached and then reimpose a sanctions regime. correct? >> senator what i was referring to was if congress were to strike down

european sanctions. this deal could also in my judgment spark a nuclear arms race in the middle east as the saudis told me when i recently visited there. as chairman of the homeland security committee what concerns me the most is that the deal frees up hundreds of billions of dollars to the leading state sponsor of terrorism. susan rice the president's national security adviser said, quote, we should expect some portion of the money will go to the iranian military and could potentially be used for the kinds of bad behavior we have seen in the region. now, you're asking this congress to indorse an agreement that the president's own national security adviser admits will spread terror in the region. finally, iran's deputy foreign minister confirmed we will provide weapons to whomever whenever we deem appropriate and buy weapons from wherever we can. chairman royce and i sent a letter to you and the president of the united states asking you to submit this deal for consideration by the american people through

szubin with regard to sanctions. at this point the jcpoa has been approved and submitted to the security council of the united nations, correct? what effect does that approval have on the sanctions regimes, both u.s. and u.n.? sec. szubin: it has no impact on the sanctions of the u.s. whatsoever. with respect to the u.n. sanctions regime, as i understand it, the endorsement by the un security council sets out a timetable in line with what ambassador sherman was describing, where iranian performance, when a verified will lead to a listing of sanctions. senator crapo: that would lead to all of the sanctions on iran? sec. szubin: when enron has -- when iran has taken those initial steps. the sanctions on their arms trade and acquisitions of ballistic missile knology remain -- technology remain in place for many years to come under the u.n. senator crapo: in your opening statement, you made a point that it would be very hard for the u.s. to back out of the agreement that it has reached and then reimpose sanctions regime,

and snapping back sanction. as a european companies invest, pressure not to reimpose sanctions will grow. the same dynamics apply to the -- on july 20 iran was a statement to the security council that it quote me reconsider its commitment under the agreement if new sanctions are imposed irrespective of whether such a new sanctions are introduced on nuclear related or other grounds, and could iran be able to use this newquist that back threat to prevent washington from combating iran's support for terrorism or human rights abuses. in the face of the ran, would you agree to reimpose terrorism sanctions of the central bank of iran if it was found to be financing terrorism but i'm doubtful given the deterrent powers every nuclear snap back. nuclear snap back to previous, use economic pressure to stop iran, military force may become the only option as a result i said his group may make war with iran are likely not less likely. wind that comes iran will be stronger and the consequences will be much more severe. but th

sanctions. iran will be denied access to the world's most important market and unable to deal in the most important currency. will remains list very extensive. we are not releasing sentience against the revolutionary guard corps, or any of their subsidiaries or senior officials. than 225s deal more individuals and companies linked to iran will remain designated including major irradiance companies. there has been much discussion of the iranian foreign reserves that are to be released from foreign restrictive accounts under the deal. if iran fulfills its nuclear commitments than it will receive $50 billion. the rest of what has been inaccessible will remain inaccessible and with that $50 billion, iran will need to try to address that economical that deep.5 trillion snapback, if iran does not uphold its part of the bargain, we can probably snapback u.s. and united nations sanctions. for u.s. sanctions this can be done rapidly in a matter of days and we have the discretion to impose everything from

and eu sanctions largely disappear and remains u.s. sanctions. to be sure, secondary sanctions remain in place and would impact behavior of european and other foreign banks and businesses, but this puts the onus solely on the u.s. the deal is not a bilateral u.s.-iran deal. and our partners should be expected to do their part holding iran accountable for its conduct. thank you very much. >> mr. chairman thank you. ranking member brown, senator kirk, thank you for the opportunity to testify. you have my testimony. i will just make four quick points. i served in the bush administration as undersecretary of state and had the pleasure to appear before your committee before. i had lead responsibility on iran. and i come to you as a supporter of this agreement. i think it has many benefits for our country. and this is my first point. it will effectively arrest the forward movement in iran's nuclear program that began with addin jad's election ten years ago this summer. and it is going to make sure that iran does not have the potential to produce fiscal

sanctions, removing it as a tool. you spoke to the idea of the chinese and others looking for alternative financial systems. that's my fear. my fear is that if we go it alone here as well as in other circumstances, we may actually invalidate the tool of financial sanctions in the future because people just create systems that don't have to involve us. on the issue of flows in iran and what they'll do with them, my view is they will use a lot on domestic economic needs and they've got a lot of infrastructure problems there. i think rowhani was elected on the basis of solve is those problems. he wants to be re-elected. more importantly, the iranian system doesn't want to have instability and conflict on the inside. they are very concerned about things like arab spring and the color revolutions in europe. the way you deal with that is through domestic development at home. that doesn't mean they won't support terrorism with these funds but i think they'll spend most of the money at home. i think this needs to be a multi-f

they engaged in them before sanctions, and while sanctions were in place. in fact, iran even engaged in these activities in the middle of the iran, iraq war, a war that cost them nearly a million lives and hundreds of millions of dollars. the truth is that iran has always found a way to fund these efforts, and whatever benefit iran may claim from sanctions relief pails in comparison to the danger it could pose with a nuclear weapon. moreover there's no scenario where sanctions relief turns iran into the region's dominant power. iran's defense budget is eight times smaller than the combined budget of our gulf allies. their conventional capabilities will never compare with israel's, and our commitment to israel's qualitative military edge helps guarantee that. over the last several years iran has had to spending billions of dollars to support its only ally in the arab world, bashar al-assad, even as he has lost control of huge chunks of his country. and hezbollah has suffered significant blows on the same battlefield. and iran like the rest of the region is b

sanctions have worked. are you going to retract any statements made by secretary lew and anyone else who has said it would cripple them, it would take them years to get servicing again. >> if you're going to quote me, let me speak for myself. >> i quoted exactly what you said. cripple iran and it will take them years to recover. so if we up the sanctions -- >> the other part of what i said is the reason it was crippling is because we had international cooperation. we have worked very hard to get that international cooperation. the parties that we worked with reached an agreement here. >> look who we work with. we work with china and we work with russia. the people who want iran to be in that position because it jeopardizes the united states. >> the power of our sanctions is not going to have the affect -- >> i disagree with you. the economists disagree with you. individuals i have read article after article on disagree with you. >> congressman, as we have said again and again, and i want to repeat it now. w

when wend point is that look at sanctions, you have to understand sanctions are qualitative different than they are in europe. here in congress they are far more complex. they deal not only with the new we're in proliferation for oil but terrorism and human rights issues with regard to iran. a comprehensive iran and investment act of 2010, which i mentioned, best drawn as a kitchen sink in which all of these things go. nuclear issue most important, but not the only one. here i think congress has a lot of incentives to refocus if the deal does go through on the other link on which our regime of pressure on iran, legislative there is a hang up. as part of the terms of the jocp the administration has committed to preventing ancillary forms of pressure that will make the deal harder to implement. all of us, and maybe all of you has read as the administrative working actively against additional sanctions. that may be true, may not be true. we will have to see. my sense is that for congress this is a gut check moment in constitutional prerogatives and a gut check moment in terms of how robu

sanctions. see, when sanctions were tightened, when the european union tightened sanctions in 2012, there was a precipitous trop in iran positive will exports by roughly a million barrels a day. for laterso notice that the opposition of trading partners also shifted. in the tradewas with western europe, whereas trade with partners, the oil exports to eastern partners increased in some cases in proportion was much larger. we set as a first approximation --t iran's oil experts exports were going to grow by about a million barrels a day in thet six to 12 months after accord is ratified. expect isat people the time needed to bring production backup to this level. we took that assumption of a million barrels a day and simulated it in a all-time country equilibrium model, multiple countries trading with each other, then we insert an additional million girls day. simulated the effect of lifting some of the other restrictions sanctions had. additional million barrels a day. the big effect is these addit

they engaged in them before sanctions and while sanctions were in place. in fact, iran engaged in these sanctions in the middle of the iran-iraq war, a war that cost them nearly a million lives and hundreds of billions of dollars. the truth is that iran has always found a way to fund these efforts. whatever been a fit iran may claim from sanctions relief pales in comparison to the danger it could pose with a nuclear weapon. moreover, there is no scenario where sanctions relief turns iran into the region's dominant power. iran's defense budget is eight times smaller than the combined budget of our gulf allies. their conventional capabilities will never compare to israel's. and our commitment to israel's military edge helps to guarantee that. over the last several years, iran has had to spend billions of dollars to support its only ally in the arab world, bashar al-assad. and iran, like the rest of the region, is being forced to respond to the threat of isil in iraq. so, contrary to the alarmists who claim iran is on the brink of taking over the middle east

upon sanctions relief in the middle of next year, the major economic sanctions are brought that it will be seven years before iran comes back to where they ought to be today. invested theey money, it would take them that long? >> the oil repairs might happen in a shorter amount of time, 2-3 years. i need to get back to you on that. curve,look at their gdp and has a radical break due to the international sanctions, and it only gets back in seven years to where it ought to have been today. the whole that they are in cannot be overstated. back to themoming does not begin to meet the needs. that $50 billion is not spending money. is there freed up foreign reserves. no country is going to exhaust their foreign reserves down to zero, risking huge and stability to do so. they will useat it for their domestic economy and will need to leave some in reserve in the way any country would. >> last question. many of us have raised concerns about the prospects of the u.n. embargoes in iran being lifted. of us would have preferred to retain these embargoes longer. russia and china felt differently. spe

european sanctions. this deal could also in my judgment spark a nuclear arms race in the middle east as the saudis told me when i recently visited there. as chairman of the homeland security committee what concerns me the most is that the deal frees up hundreds of billions of dollars to the leading state sponsor of terrorism. susan rice the president's national security adviser said, quote, we should expect some portion of the money will go to the iranian military and could potentially be used for the kinds of bad behavior we have seen in the region. now, you're asking this congress to indorse an agreement that the president's own national security adviser admits will spread terror in the region. finally, iran's deputy foreign minister confirmed we will provide weapons to whomever whenever we deem appropriate and buy weapons from wherever we can. chairman royce and i sent a letter to you and the president of the united states asking you to submit this deal for consideration by the american people through

will our sanctions likely be? undersec. szubin: they will be less effective than they are today and were when we negotiated this agreement. sen. warren: thank you. now let's consider the roughly $50 billion of iran money that is frozen and could be granted as part of sanctions relief if iran complies with the deal. undersecretary szubin, is most or even a very significant part of this $50 billion held in the united states? undersec. szubin: no. sen. warren: if we walk away, do you believe the other countries who hold this money will continue to keep it out of iran's hands? undersec. szubin: i think we will begin to see those funds be released if iran starts meeting its commitments under the deal. sen. warren: but the question i ask is if we walk away from the deal, are you convinced that other countries that hold these funds are going to continue to withhold those funds from iran? undersec. szubin: i can't guarantee that they will. sen. warren: all right, let's talk about iran's nuclear weapons ambitions. if we re

they engaged in them before sanctions and while sanctions were in place. in fact, iran even engaged in these activities in the middle of the iran/iraq war, a war that cost them nearly a million lives and hundreds of billions of dollars. the truth is, that iran has always found a way to fund these efforts. and whatever benefit iran may claim from sanctions relief pales in comparison to the danger it could pose with a nuclear weapon. moreover, there's no scenario where sanctions relief turns iran into the region's dominant power. iran's defense budget is eight times smaller than the combined budget of our gulf allies. their conventional capabilities will never compare with israel's our commitment to israel's qualitative military edge helps guarantee that. over the last several years, iran has had to spend billions of dollars to support its only ally in the arab world, bashar al assad. even as he's lost control of huge chunks of his country. and hezbollah suffered significant blows on this same battlefield. and iran, like the rest of the region, is being forc

what's happened, both before sanction s, as well as during the sanctions era, there was a shift towardastern partners. they had been looking east for policy or something like that and they were trading more with russia, with korea, india, that accelerated during the sanctions era. what we will see with the lifting of sanctions, first of all, is an increase in trade with the west, both simply because that is what was cut but because of the composition of goods they trade with the west are very different. iran basically buys consumer goods from the eastern partners, but it actually buys high-tech machinery and equipment from the western partners and it is in dire need of those, having neglected this during the sanctions period. let me turn to the third part, which is the affect on the iranian economy. and, as i think many of you know, during the period of sanctions being tighted in 20123 and 2013, iran went into a recession and the growth has become positive just this last year to about 3%. we expect that to be somewhat higher with the stimulus offered by the increase in oil exports, it'

are sanctionable. it's that clear. our friends in the uk understand that. france and germany understand that. if there's any doubt, i want to remove it here today. >> could you get a letter from the other parties that agree to that? that would be helpful to us. if you could get the other parties, even including china and russia, to agree that that's the case because we're getting very mixed -- i think it would just help us to some degree. at least some people who may still be on the bubble about the issue. >> if i may just add, i think, senator corker, i spoke with sir peter westmacott, the uk ambassador to the united states, this morning. i know he's talked to many of you. he shared with me an e-mail that i believe he sent to your office about this. he said, i want to clarify the e-3 position on our ability to apply sanctions to iran for other activities and for snapback, and said that, in fact, he is committed and europe is committed to snapback. and if the eu retains the freedom and ability to apply

and the whole point of sanctions, mr. secretary, was not to bring iran to the negotiation table and dismantling the iran nuclear infrastructure used to be the administration's goal. the administration repeatedly told us it would focus sanctions only on the nuclear portfolio yet in the deal we have 60 pages of individuals, companies, vessels that will be de-listed, specifically mentioned, many of the sanctions are not nuclear-related. the administration has always stated that all provisions within this agreement has to be agreement upon by all parties, which includes allow the e.u. to lift sanctions on the cuds force, including the leader sola manny. what do you say to the families of americans that were killed or wounded as a result of his actions in iraq and please explain to them why as part of the nuclear negotiations the u.s. agreed that the irgc kurds force that are responsibility for countless deaths around the globe are getting their designations lifted and will be getting billions of dollars to support their acts

sanctions really still occur. after this painstaking effort we went through to make sure we did not ask you to give us documents you could not give us -- you knew what the iaea protocols work. why now will you not give us the documents that exist that are so important to all of us relative to the integrity of this? why not? >> thank you very much, and thank you, mr. chairman, for all of your hard work alongside senator menendez and senator carton on this deal, and all of your attention to it. let me answer your question, but then i want to come back to another point you made. you are about to have the director general, and meet informally with the senate relations committee. he made this decision on his own because the iaea is an independent agency. he agreed to calm, and i found out about it about the same time -- agreed to come, and i found out about it at the same time you found out about it. we don't have the documents to give to you. and the reasons we don't have them is because they are safeguarded confident

they engaged in them before sanctions, and while sanctions were in place. in fact, iran engaged in these activities during the iran-iraq war. a war that cost them nearly a million lives and hundreds of billions of dollars. the truth is iran has always found a way to fund these efforts and whatever benefit iran may claim from sanctions relief pales in comparison to the danger it could pose with a nuclear weapon. moreover there is no scenario where sanctions relief turns iran into the region's dominant power. iran's defense budget is eight times smaller than the combined budget of our gulf allies. their conventional capabilities will never compare with israel's and our commitment to israel's qualitative military edge helps guaranty that. over the last several years iran has had to spend billions of dollars to support its only ally in the arab world, bashar al-assad. even as he has lost control of huge chunks of his country. and hezbollah suffered significant blows on this same battlefield. and iran like the rest of the region is being forced to respond to the

or sanctions.e obama administration has pulled punches towards north korea but not fully implementing u.s. law and a long list of promises will increase pressure and were still waiting on that. we have seen secretary kerry has promised more pressure. i remember two or three years ago the u.s. official promised we are considering bloodcurdling sanctions on north korea. well, we are still waiting. tenth and final ,-com,-com,-comma negotiations a lot inching across red lines. alternating provocative behavior and a willingness to negotiate to manipulate the international community about imposing penalties as well as that we have seen repeated violations and maintaining a strategic ambiguity on the nuclear programs, pyongyang and tehran might the proverbial camel's nose gain international acceptance of it committees previously declared unacceptable and proponents will dismiss criticism that allows tehran nuclear capability is precluded by a series of u.n. resolution and they argue it's unreasonable to e

sanctions. when the bushing ministration took office, iran had no centrifuges, the machines necessary to produce material for a bomb. despite repeated warnings from the united states government, by the time i took office, iran had installed several thousand centrifuges and showed no inclination to show -- too slow, much less halt its program. among u.s. policymakers, there has never been disagreement on the danger opposed by an iranian nuclear bomb. republicans alike have recognized it would spark an arms race in the most unstable region and turn every crisis into a potential nuclear showdown. it would embolden terrorist groups like has bola and -- like hezbollah. unraveladly, it could the global commitment to nonproliferation that the world has done so much to defend. then is not whether to prevent iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, but how? even before taking office, i made clear that iran would not be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon on my watch. and it has been my policy throughout my

they engaged in them before sanctions and while sanctions were in place. in fact iran even engaged in these activities in the middle of the iran/iraq war, a war that cost them millions of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars. the truth is that iran has always found a way to fund these efforts. and whatever benefit iran may claim from sanctions relief pales in comparison to the danger it could pose with a nuclear weapon. moreover there's no scenario where sanctions relief turns iran into the region's dominant power. iran's defense budget is eight times smaller than the combined budget of our gulf allies. their conventional capabilities will never compare with israel's and our commitment to israel's qualitative military edge helps guarantee that. over the last several years, iran has had to spend billions of dollars to support its only ally in the arab world, bashar al assad, even as he's lost control of huge chunks of his country. hezbollah suffered significant blows on this same battlefield. and iran like the rest of the region, is being forced to res

the pain of sanctions is being felt across iran's export industries like oil and auto but sanctions hitan consumers who must also contend the hyper inflation that has devalued the currency to a third of the value since 2010. >> iranian leaders have decided to make a deal. they have decided to more or less close down the nuclear program which they spent a lot of money on and people died for it. and in return what they want is lifting of sanctions. >> reporter: in the end the fourth belt tightnessing have pushed negotiators to prioritize lifting sanctions over preserving the country's nuclear capacity. ♪ tehran is cool and no humidity and i was pleased not to have a tie because it's hot but it's weird to me because i do my work this a uniform as it were and this does not exist in iran and you will go in government officials and meet with officials and go to the banks and nobody has a tie. the interesting thing is at one point the iatola-komani said after the revolution said dressing like this is a uniform of the west and when the shaw was this power he had a uniform himself and tried to d

sanctions architecture. the administration is telling people privately that it interprets the deals sanctions provisions in a very aggressive way but not making that clear to the public or to congress or allies or the business or finance communities in particular for iran. unfortunately, if we don't articulate the business that doing business with iran comes with real business and reputational risks, others will not perceive there being much risk at all and will rush head first into the lucrative iranian market. some say the deal enables it to do several unilateral things that will deny iran access to the financial system and the u.s. dollar and the u-turn transaction mechanism through which they have done oil transactions in the past and secondary sanctions on foreign entities doing businesses with entities remain listed with terrorism and human rights issues. the problem is the laudable positions have not been made public and they are only effective if they are aggressively publicized and equally enforced.

sanctions in this context. the second step to that would be when we were actually terminate those sanctions. that step that occurs at eight years down the road. eight years or when the iaea reaches its broader conclusion says there are no more undeclared nuclear activities in iran. something we suspect will take that long but that is cornerstone or the milestone we're looking for. so that is the point where we would seek congressional action to actually terminate those sanctions. it was intentionally constructed this way because we know that congress, we can not tell congress what to do with respect to this they have their own prerogatives to make that decision. we will seek that legislation. the administration at times will do its best to seek that legislation but it's not, obviously not a foregone conclusion. so those are the two steps. the e.u. and u.n. are largely similar. the e.u. is using its own mechanisms to ostensibly suspend that in the first stage. these are the kind of economic sanctions they have i

because what happened both before sanctions became tie-ins as well as during the sanctions era was that there was a shift toward eastern partners. a iran was, present aquatint shot himself have been looking to these proposed or somethingmore without -- ahmadinejad. they were trading more with russia, korea, china, india and solar. that process accelerated during the sanctions era.uring i think what we will see with wh the lifting of sanctions, first of all, is just an increase in trade with the west, simply because that was what was cutbee during the sanctions era butf te also because of the composition of goods that they trade with the west are not very differents iran basically buys consumereasn goods from the eastern partners but it actually buys high-techwn machinery and equipment from the western partners. it is in dire need of those having neglected technology duri theg during the sanctions period. now, let me then turned to the third part, which is the affect on the iranian macroeconomy, or the iranian economy.think as i think many of you know, during the period of sanctions bein

sanctions in this context. the second step to that would be when we would terminate the sanctions. that's a step that occurs at eight years down the road. eight years o or when the iaea reaches its broader conclusion this is the are no more undeclared nuclear activities in a man, something we expect to take that long but actually the kind of cornerstone we are looking for. that's the point where we would seek congressional action to actually terminate the sanctions. it was intentionally constructed this way because we know that congress, we cannot tell congress what to do with respect to this. they have their own prerogatives so we'll seek the legislation. the administration in time until it's best to see that legislation, but it's not a foregone conclusion. so those are the two steps. the eu and the u.n. are largely similar to the. the eu is using its own mechanisms to suspend that in the first phase, economic sanctions they have a place. the u.n. is i different in the sense that the u.n. structure terminates old resolutions but then if we establish of the most import and sanction

sanctions. when the bush administration took office, iran had no centrifuges -- the machines necessary to produce material for a bomb -- that were spinning to enrich uranium. but despite repeated warnings from the united states government, by the time i took office, iran had installed several thousand centrifuges, and showed no inclination to slow -- much less halt -- its program. among u.s. policymakers, there's never been disagreement on the danger posed by an iranian nuclear bomb. democrats and republicans alike have recognized that it would spark an arms race in the world's most unstable region, and turn every crisis into a potential nuclear showdown. it would embolden terrorist groups, like hezbollah, and pose an unacceptable risk to israel, which iranian leaders have repeatedly threatened to destroy. more broadly, it could unravel the global commitment to non-proliferation that the world has done so much to defend. the question, then, is not whether to prevent iran from obtaining a nuclear

sanctions. there should be a recommitment to nonproliferation, focused on iran. we can reinforce financial measures against irani and banks. it could be used extensively for those involved in gross human rights violations. these are just some measures the could be taken that could shape a new sanctions framework. very quickly when the iranian president quebec the table, a diplomat shared with me -- came back to the table, a diplomat shared with me that they thought they won the war, but wondered if we could win the peace. it will require leveraging the same powers that helped bring the regime to the table. we must assure that this does not inadvertently empower the regime. >> members of the committee thank you for inviting me to testify with these three great experts. the iran nuclear deal is deeply flawed i will address the sunset clause in the nuclear snapback. it admists -- admits, tehran simply has to comply to maintain near zero breakout time icmbs, access to heavy weaponry, and in an econo

would now sanction would new sanctions be coupled with military action? as i review the deal, there are a number of issues i find troublesome. i hope the three of you will address them in your testimony and as you answer the committee's questions. first, i continue to have concerns that international inspectors will not have immediate access to undeclared sides. under the agreement, iran has 14 days to grant access. if iran refuses access after that time members of the joint commission could take another week to resolve the iaea's concerns. after that iran has three more days to provide access. so we already nearly a month after inspectors first wanted access, but if iran continues to say no another month could go by while this dispute is resolved. that potential length of time gives me pause. i'd like to know how we can be sure iran cannot use these delays to san size sites and get away with breaking the rules. already we're seeing iran's leadership declare that military sites will be off limits to inspectors. if this is iran's version of transparency du

we impose sanctions. we reimpose annex 2 sanctions. this is our power. you talked about how this is power. we do have a lot of unilateral power with regard to sanctions. then iran cites paragraph 26 of the agreement. and i'm going to read it. it says iran will treat such a reimposition of sanctions as grounds to cease performing its commitments. the deal is over. they are cranking. their economy is cranking. and they can walk. they can legally walk from this agreement. so let me ask you this. if we ever impose so-called snap back sanctions, isn't the deal over? where am i wrong on that question? senator kerry: senator, we would snap sanctions back once they violated the agreement. secretary lew you asked two : questions. the first set of questions you asked was about the snapback. does it work? yes, it works. if they violate the agreement our the u.n. sanctions were structured so they could be put back in place. senator and they can walk. :secretary lew that's if they : violate the nuclear agreement. snare yo one is they violate the nuclear agreement. sc

these are the economic sanctions they have in place. different,lightly and that they terminate old resolutions, and then reestablish the most important actions that may want to keep in place for the long-term. those are the ones that relate to missile technologies and transfer of weapons. the relate to the transfer of nuclear technologies. colin: the only thing i would who arefor those of you ?n the beep, implementation day there are technical issues they will have to sort their way through. we estimate it will take them 6-12 month to fulfill the obligations. that means disabling the reactor, reducing their stockpile, addressing the issues on possible military dimensions, etc.. we think it will take 6-12 months. so one implementation day will be is to be determined. chris: it is important to have this bid for bid type of strategy. it is important for iran to get everything done as fast as possible. people ask, why don't you string it out? we don't want to do anything before iran has done it steps. there is no signing bonus. when i ranly

the reason is sanctions. the pain of sanctions is felt across the major export industry - like oil and auto. sanctions hit iranian consumers who must contend with hyperinflation, devaluing the currency si to a third of its value. >> iranian leaders decided to make a dale. they have decided to more or less close down the nuclear programme, which they spent a lot of money on, people died for it. in return, what they want is lifting of sanctions. in the end, the forced belt tightening and workers pushed negotiators to prioritizing sanctions over the capacity. >> tehran is cool, it doesn't have humidity. i was pleased to not have a tie, because it's hot. it felt world, i do my work in a uniform, as it were, this does not exist in iran. you'll go into government officers, meet with officials, go into banks, see the bank manager. no one has a tie. at one point, the interesting thing is the ayatollah khamenei after the revolution indicated that dressing like this is the uniform of the west. and, you know, when the s

we hear about snapback sanctions. we can just renew the sanctions if they violate the agreement.hat is the threshold for renewing those sanctions and how long would it take to impose those sanctions? when you look at this agreement closely, you see there are some large holes they can drive a truck through. agreements made by the regime in tehran struck today up until sanctions are snapped back, those agreements continue. they are not affected by any snapback of sanctions. if you strike a deal to sell oil to japan for the next 20 years and snapback sanctions in four years, that will deal stays. it is not affected by this. it is that type of thing we need to look at because that will impact the judgment of tehran's leadership as to how much risk they will take in skirting the edges were making a push for a major breakthrough in getting around this agreement. evidence thise agreement is going to moderate or impinge upon their regional ambitions. they have great capabilities already. they have a history, as general kean has laid out. they will continue to support their expansionism a

, tough sanctions, even if they are the same type of sanctions or the same sanctions that we have imposedn the nuclear side -- if they break out on the nonnuclear side and increase their support for terrorism in the region. they need to understand that. as i mentioned, that is part of my problem with this agreement. i think they believe that they have neutered our ability to impose sanctions on them, tough sanctions, like financial sanctions, on their central bank, should they misbehave on the nonnuclear side. congress needed to make clear that we will come hard, even if it is the same sanctions. charlie: let me turn to cuba. what do you say to your fellow senator marco rubio about the reestablishment of relationships with cuba? sen. flake: i think this represents the ultimate policy for today and tomorrow and not yesterday. i think this is long overdue. obviously, my concern over the years has been the travel ban more than anything else. as an american, i should be able to travel wherever i want. unless there is a compelling national security reason otherwise. and to restrict americans'

the success of our unprecedented iran sanctions regime including sanctions on iranian financial institutions and the ability to sell its oil has had the collateral benefit of squeezing to ron's ability to fund terrorism groups such as has blood that will no longer be the case. -- hezbollah that will no longer be the case. >> according to crs, there support is 100 to $200 million a year. support for the assad regime in syria is $16 billion to $15 billion year. support for the rebels in yemen, tens of millions of dollars. it is between -- the key question to follow up on is should they get $100 billion in sanctions relief, what would become of the situation? >> they would be enriched, they would be emboldened, they would add to the budget that they have allocated for these groups. hearing from them direct the, the secretary-general from hezbollah expects more support from the iranians. we should take the iranians and proxies from -- at their word. we have to do things to mitigate the risk of that if this deal moves forward. i think shrugging our soldier -- shoulders is not good enough. >> the

sanctions architecture. sanctions are a tool to be used to reach goals. we shouldn't be doing this to say we want sanctions forever but we're always going to have goals we want to reach for which sanctions could be a useful tool. therefore, it's critically important to maintain that tool as viable and effective. >> i'll ask all of you this simple question. i think it -- ambassador burns first. go ahead. >> mr. chairman, if you wouldn't mind, i wanted to answer your question. >> you should have. >> thank you very much. i would say that the most important thing for us, united states, is to have effective treasury, state and white house cooperation on what we're trying to do with sanctions and to persist over the long term. first. second, we've got to marry what we do with our allies around the world. and i think that is lose the problem. we lose potency of the sanctions. third, i say objectively -- i can't say objectively about the bush administration because i was part of it but i think both president obama and president bush have effectively pursued a san

by secondary sanctions on or they keep their sanctions in place and they are in violation of the dealright? i think china and others are going to have frankly and less complicated decision calculus, countries like china, india, south korea, china, taiwan, turkey, the rain -- remaining customers iranian oil company debate economic hit. there are all sorts of ways that you could imagine other countries, if they believe that iran was in compliance and we are out of compliance, doing things to circumvent our secondary sanctions. they could set up that banks that are not connected to our financial system other to transact through the central banks and there is to start trade wars. those six customers firing at us was that occur to mention currently control 47% of all u.s. foreign owned , treasury. like hathcock foreign owned debt. what allows the sanctions regime to operate is not just the influence, power of the u.s. economy. decides our economy, the ability to force banks incumbents to make countries. but the underlying political associate with it because most of that we don't have to sa

, procurement sanctions, to lg sanctions lifted all of its sanctions. they abolished it. they are not waiting for congress. they are not waiting for implementation. even if you can treat sanctions as a yellow light, not a red light anymore, it is not the yellow light that comes before the traffic light turns red. the gala light in some countries comes out before the traffic light turns green. if you come from a country like mine is a recommendation and not a command. when you see the yellow light, you hit the gas in the forward. thank you. [applause] >> thank you to heritage for having me. i don't have any pithy driving tips so let me tackle some of the stuff we talked around so far. i want to focus on three things. we talked a lot about the effects or processes relating to the sanction implementation with regard to iran. let's get down to the nitty-gritty. there's three things we should be thinking about what the sanctions basket of the joint comprehensive plan of action. first of all, were both come from? the myth says this is a gift from the american